The philosophy of tragedy : the tragedy of philosophy : the mimetic interrelationship of tragedy and philosophy in the theoretical writings of Friedrich Hölderlin by Chapman, Helen Christine
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/34636
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
The Philosophy of Tragedy: 
The Tragedy of Philosophy. 
The Mimetic Interrelationship of 
Tragedy and Philosophy in the 
Theoretical Writings of Friedrich Hölderlin. 
Helen Christine Chapman 
Submitted for the degree of Ph. D. 
in the Department of Philosophy 
at the University of Warwick 
September 1992 
.a... 
't. 
The Philosophy of Tragedy: The Tragedy of Philosophy. 
The Mimetic Interrelationship of Tragedy and Philosophy in the 
Theoretical Writings of Friedrich Hölderlin. 
Summary. 
This study investigates Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe's claim in "The Caesura of the 
Speculative" that Hölderlin is a "modern" writer. Its aim is to establish what 
is at stake in this claim and to evaluate whether it can be substantiated. 
In Chapter One I discuss the relationship between tragedy and philosophy. I 
show that the uneasy relationship between philosophy and the arts is premised 
upon Plato's understanding and judgement of mimesis. I contrast Plato and 
Aristotle's treatment of poetry by examining how they understand the mimetic 
process. In Chapter Two I focus on Hölderlin's understanding of the relationship 
between Ancient Greece and 18th Century Germany. After discussing the 
background to Hölderlin's work I provide detailed readings of two texts, The 
Perspective from which We Have to Look at Antiquity, (1799) and the first 
letter to Böhlendorff, dating from 1801. I argue that in these texts Hölderlin, 
through his acknowledgement of the divided nature of Greek culture, offers a 
unique understanding of the relationship between Greece and Germany which 
isolates him from his contemporaries. In Chapters Three and Four, I examine 
Hölderlin's understanding of tragedy. After establishing the centrality of the 
aesthetic presentation for Hölderlin's project I examine the "poetological" 
writings which date from 1798-1800. I give a close analysis of the implications 
of Hölderlin's statement that the tragic "is the metaphor of an intellectual 
intuition" which occurs in the text On the Difference of the Poetic Modes, 
(1800), showing why the tragic form is central to Hölderlin's poetological 
project. To illustrate the problems inherent in this project, in Chapter Four I 
examine Hölderlin's attempts to write a tragic drama which corresponds to his 
theoretical beliefs. I discuss the two theoretical texts - The Ground to 
Empedocles and Becoming in Dissolution - which accompany Hölderlin's drama 
Empedocles. In analysing these texts I argue that there is an inherent tension 
between the presuppositions of the theory and the way they can be realised in 
the drama. In Chapter Five, I turn to Hölderlin's final work, his project to 
translate Sophocles' tragedies. Through close analysis of the theoretical 
Remarks which accompany the translations, I show how Hölderlin's theoretical 
and poetological interests in Greece and Tragedy are brought together through 
this project. I argue that these texts give an insight into the problems which 
confront Hölderlin's poetological project. However, simultaneously, these texts 
provide an alternative way of understanding the function of the tragic form. In 
--- -this- discussion I show how the questions concerning the status of dramatic 
mimesis and the "mimetic" relation between Greece and Germany coincide in the 
analysis of Sophocles' dramas. 
In conclusion I return briefly to the questions that I raised in the 
introduction concerning the status of tragedy in the present time, and assess 
the accuracy of the claim that Hölderlin is a "modern" thinker. 
In memory of my mother, Christine M. Chapman. 
"... f am her only novel... 11 
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Greece. 
The Greeks as Interpreters. When we speak of the Greeks we involuntarily speak 
of today and yesterday; their universally known history is a polished mirror, 
which always reflects something that is not in the mirror itself. We take 
advantage of the freedom to speak about them in order to be silent about other 
things - so that these Greeks might themselves whisper something in the ear of 
the thoughtful reader. Thus for modern man the Greeks facilitate the 
communication of many things which are difficult or hazardous to communicate. 
Nietzsche. Maxims and Propositions no. 218. 
Tragedy. 
What prophecy could still surprise us; could lure from us cries of woe like 
those uttered by the chorus of old Argive men when they hear it proclaimed 
that their king is at that moment being slaughtered by their queen? 
Aren't we beyond all proclamations and prophecies and so beyond tragedy? 
Christa Wolf. Cassandra. 
Nölderlin. 
If someone looks into the mirror, a man, and sees in it his image, as though it 
were a painted likeness; it resembles the man. The image of man has eyes, 
whereas the moon has light. King Oedipus has an eye too many perhaps. The 
sufferings of this man, they seem indescribable, unspeakable, inexpressible. If 
the drama represents something like this, that is why. 
In Lovely Blueness... 
-2- 
Greece. 
Die Griechen als Dolmetscher. - Wenn wir von den Griechen reden, reden wir 
unwillkürlich zugleich von Heute und Gestern: ihre allbekannte Geschichte ist ein 
blanker Spiegel, der immer Etwas wiederstrahlt, das nicht im Spiegel selbst ist. 
Wir benützen die Freiheit, von ihnen zu reden, um von Anderen schweigen zu 
dürfen, - damit jene nun selber dem sinnenden Leser Etwas in's Ohr sagen. So 
erleichtern die Griechen dem modernen Menschen das Mittheilen von mancherlei 
schwer Mittheilbarem und Bedenklichem. 
Nietzsche. Vermischte Meinung und Sprüche. 218. 
Tragedy. 
Welche Prophezeiung könnte uns noch überraschen, uns Ach-und Wehrufe entlocken 
wie dem Chor der argivischen Greise die Ankündigung, daß sein König gerade 
von seiner Königin geschlachtet wird? 
Sind wir nicht jenseits aller Verkündigungen und Prophezeiungen, also jenseits 
der Tragödie. 
Christa Wolf. Kassandra. 
Hölderlin. 
Wenn einer in den Spiegel siehet, ein Mann, und siehet darinn sein Bild, wie 
abgemahlt; es gleicht dem Manne. Augen hat des Menschen Bild, hingegen Licht 
der Mond. Der König Oedipus hat ein Auge zuviel vieleicht. Diese Leiden dieses 
Mannes, sie scheinen unbeschreiblich, unaussprechlich, unausdriiklich. Wenn das 
Schauspiel ein solches darstellt, kommt's daher. 
In Lieblicher Bläue. [i] 
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Introduction. 
"Reflections" on the Problem. 
The three epigraphs placed at the beginning of this study delimit its 
boundaries, introducing the three terms which will act as the touchstones for 
the argument I will put forward. The three terms - Greece, Tragedy and 
Hölderlin - are linked together by a fourth, which although not mentioned 
explicitly in any of the quotations, is intimated by the imagery which they 
contain. Both Nietzsche and Hölderlin employ the figure of the mirror as their 
central image. In these quotations the main preoccupation of both writers is to 
establish the way in which the process of reflection is constructed and 
understood. The image in the mirror can be described as a mimetic image; it is 
an imitation. However, as is suggested by both Hölderlin and Nietzsche, the 
status of this mimetic image can be problematic. The mirror does not reflect a 
simple imitative 'representation of what is placed in front of it. Instead, the 
mirror acts as a site of construction, it constructs that which is presented to 
the observer. The process of construction develops out of the interpretative 
interplay between the observer and that which is observed. As this study 
develops it will be seen that the question concerning the ambiguous nature of 
the mimetic image underlies the discussion of the other three terms. The terms 
Greece, Tragedy and Hölderlin are linked by arguments concerning how the term 
mimesis is understood and employed, which refer both to the terms considered 
separately and to the relationships between them. In order to establish the 
relationship between the terms, I shall discuss each one separately, allowing 
the links and associations between them to develop in a cumulative manner. 
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0.1. Greece. 
The 18th Century's "re"discovery of Greece through the arguments presented in 
the so-called Quarrel of Ancients and Moderns and the rise of Classicism has 
cast a shadow over subsequent developments in thought. It is no accident that 
consideration of the nature of Greek thought and society and its relationship to 
the present arises at the same time as modes of philosophical thinking become 
reflexive, when they start to consider their own status and limits. In the 
desire to understand one's experience of one's own time it is necessary for the 
"present" to set itself against the past, establishing an historical narrative 
that provides the present with accounts and explanations of its own identity. 
This enables a distinction to be drawn between "antiquity" and "modernity". L21 
Thus, at least within German thought, Greece becomes the ancient society 
against which the "modern" is established. As I will show in Chapter Two of 
this study, the way in which the relationship between Greece and Germany is 
understood varies according to the respective diagnosis which is given of the 
nature of the "modern" time. Furthermore, as is shown by Nietzsche's interest 
in Greece, once a genealogy has been established for the "modern" - more 
specifically in relation to German thought, once the Greeks have been 
established as the forebears - each subsequent generation offers its own 
understanding of this history. This is demonstrated in Nietzsche's early work, 
both in the published text The Birth of Tragedy and in the Nachlass 
---fragments. (3] However, as Nietzsche acknowledges in maxim 218, "The Greeks as 
Interpreters" in part two of Human, all too Human, the relationship between 
Greece and the present is not a simple one. When we comment on the Greeks we 
are not speaking about an ancient society as it actually was. It is impossible to 
return to, and speak of, the Greeks as they were in themselves. Any discussion 
-5- 
of the Greeks is necessarily an interpretation which is mediated and influenced 
by the concerns and prejudices of the time in which it is conceived. Thus as 
Nietzsche states in this maxim, "when we speak of the Greeks we involuntarily 
speak of today and yesterday". That is, when a thinker attempts to explain the 
nature of Greek thought and relates it to present concerns, he or she is 
unconsciously implicated in the process of the construction of the historical 
narrative which constitutes the genealogy of the present. Such a narrative 
continues the promulgation of the genealogy, whilst simultaneously offering the 
possibility of critique. One possible form that this critique may take is 
suggested by Nietzsche's use of the metaphor of the mirror. As he says, the 
Greeks' 
universally known history is a polished mirror, which always 
reflects something that is not in the mirror itself. We take 
advantage of the freedom to speak about them in order to be silent 
about other things - so that these Greeks might themselves whisper 
something in the ear of thoughtful reader. C4 
In these remarks Nietzsche suggests that the history of the Greeks operates 
like the surface of a mirror. Just as the reflection in the mirror offers an 
image which is created out of what is situated before it, when we look at the 
Greeks what is projected back is not simply an image of their society as it 
was. Instead we are also presented with an interpreted image of our own 
present. This is because the Greek historical "mirror" cannot be observed in 
isolation. What is seen in this "mirror" always includes a reflection of the 
person who is looking into it. In the interpretation which is presented, the 
history of the Greeks and the concerns of the present necessarily coincide. 
However, the observer does not always acknowledge the presence of him or 
herself in the reflection. As is suggested implicitly by Nietzsche's maxim, the 
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discussion of Greece is often an attempt to retreat from the strictures of the 
present. It is an evasive gesture used to hide away from confrontation with the 
demands of the moment. However, the "thoughtful reader" (dem sinnenden Leser) 
can interpret what is presented in the history of the Greeks to their advantage, 
using the analysis as a means of understanding their own time. Thus "for 
modern man the Greeks facilitate the communication of many things which are 
difficult or hazardous to communicate. " While such communication is risky, 
because it is "bendenklich" it also demands serious thought. It is this ability 
of the Greeks to reflect the concerns of the present which opens the possibility 
of analysis and critique. The Greeks act as the interpreters of the present by 
opening up a space in which contemporary concerns can be expressed and 
discussed, albeit in a disguised manner. 
In the light of these remarks, I want to propose that my use of the term "the 
Greeks" will function in a similar manner. I am not concerned with a study of 
the Greeks "in themselves". In Chapter One it will be necessary to return to 
the Greeks, but this is to establish how the terms tragedy and mimesis are 
understood in this study. In a sense, it is my attempt to provide the 
background which will allow me to move on to attempt to employ my own 
"interpreter" in order to communicate the doubts and concerns of the present. 
However, before this "interpreter" is introduced, it is necessary to turn to the 
question of our own "modernity". What is the nature of our present? How is it 
tö be identified and characterised? To start to provide answers to these 
questions it is necessary to turn to the second touchstone of this study, 
tragedy. 
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0.2. Tragedy. 
As I remarked at the beginning of the previous section, the desire to 
understand the past arises out of the need to make sense of the present. It is 
an attempt to find modes of thought and explanation which will allow the 
present to be given meaning. For us at the end of the twentieth century, 
surveying the prospect of the new millennium this need seems all the more 
acute. The present is perceived as a time of loss and destruction, characterised 
by a sense of absence. The analysis provided by many contemporary thinkers are 
uniformly bleak. E5] In a time which is defined by the loss of the "Grand 
Narratives" - i. e. the metanarratives, the systems of thought which provided 
meaning and structure - we are left in a situation where it is increasingly 
difficult to attribute worth or value. 16] This is illustrated clearly by the first 
chapter of Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe's book Heidegger, Art and Politics, which is 
entitled "The Age's Modesty". [7] In this chapter, Lacoue-Labarthe summarises 
the situation which faces the tradition of philosophical thought in which he 
works. He argues that this tradition has reached a limit beyond which it cannot 
pass, creating a crisis that must be addressed. This crisis has not arisen ex 
nihilo, rather it marks the logical conclusion of a particular tradition of 
philosophical thought. [81 The thinkers engaged with this tradition are left with 
the conclusion that the limit which they face is, 
... the limit of philosophy: not a limit fixed by external boundaries 
or assigned to it, nor one imported from elsewhere, but the limit 
against which philosophy itself has run up, the limit which it has 
encountered within itself. This is why the recognition of the limit 
does not oblige one to give up philosophy, any more than it obliges 
one to repudiate it... 
Philosophy is finished/finite. (La philosophße est flnie); its limit is 
uncrossable. This means we can no longer - and we can only - do 
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philosophy, possessing as we do no other language and having not 
the slightest notion of what 'thinking' might mean outside of 
'philosophizing'. 19 ) 
These statements reflect the mood of exhaustion which is symptomatic of the 
situation facing this tradition. Although philosophy is able to recognise the 
limits and constraints against which it is fighting, it can find no way to 
surpass them. Thus the thinker is left in a double bind; he or she realises that 
they can go no further using the familiar modes of thought, yet at the same 
time they must acknowledge that these ways of thinking are the only ones they 
have. There is no "beyond" of the limit, they must continue within the 
restraints. The realisation of these limits affects all areas of thought. This 
situation is exemplified by Lacoue-Labarthe's discussion of the possibility of 
speaking of "doing wrong" and attributing blame which arises later in the 
book. t I f) His discussion shows how the efficacy of traditional ethical beliefs 
and values are brought into question by the breakdown in philosophical thinking. 
This occurs because the "sacred names" which validated the systems of ethics 
have been brought into question, thus creating a vacuum at the heart of such 
judgements. I II> 
It is the experience of this sense of absence and lack of external criteria for 
validation and judgement which lies at the heart of Christa Wolf's impassioned 
statement regarding the position of tragedy within the modern world. The 
appositeness of this statement which creates a link between the theoretical 
expressions of absence and lived experience is clear. The statement is made in 
the course of the four theoretical lectures that accompany her novel Cassandra. 
These lectures themselves can be seen to be symptomatic of the mood of the 
present. Asked to present a series of "Lectures on Poetics", Wolf feels unable - 
or unwilling - to offer a systematised analysis of her "theory" of writing. 
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Instead, the text addresses the question of why Wolf does not have a poetics, 
basing its arguments on the problem of alienation within the modern world. 112 
The way in which this sense of alienation is perceived is summarised by Wolf's 
statement concerning tragedy: "What prophecy could still surprise us?... Aren't 
we beyond proclamations and prophecies and so beyond tragedy? "1131 The 
question raised by this statement concerns what is implied by the remark that 
we are "beyond tragedy"? What is indicated by the apparent absence of 
tragedy? These questions lead back to the first touchstone of this discussion, 
Greece. As I will argue in the first chapter, dramatic tragedy is a unique art 
form that arose under specific circumstances in 5th Century Greece. Its 
performance is premised upon the idea that the community can come together to 
observe the enactment of legends and stories which make up the shared history 
and consciousness of the society. In order for "proclamations and prophecies" to 
be recognised and acted upon it is necessary that the society is cohesive, that 
it shares a common mythology and set of beliefs. However, for us Moderns, this 
cohesion is absent, we lack belief in the Grand Narratives and thus for us 
tragedy is apparently an anachronistic form. Tragedy - insofar as it 
presupposes an external order and cohesion - is redundant in a society in which 
the guarantees of the validity of the systems of belief are absent. One could 
almost go so far as to suggest that tragedy, having lost its relevance, has 
disappeared leaving only a gap, an absence - perhaps a tragic absence - behind. 
This feeling is captured by Wolf's question "What prophecy could still surprise 
us? " That is, even if the prophets spoke and they were recognised, their words 
would just be seen as commonplace, another opinion among the many, with no 
efficacy or worth to distinguish them from others. 
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However, is it possible to offer a different way of understanding what is meant 
by the idea that we are "beyond tragedy"? Can an alternative approach to this 
question be found? As I hinted above, this absence of tragedy can in itself be 
viewed as a tragic situation. Furthermore, in describing it in these terms the 
basis for a re-evaluation of the current situation is provided. Whilst it is clear 
that we are "beyond tragedy" understood in the Greek sense - and probably it 
would not be too odd to suggest that the Greeks were themselves beyond it[ 141 
- could it not be possible to offer a reassessment and re-interpretation of the 
term so that it is able to address the experience of the present. That is, in 
naming and describing the situation which we experience we create the 
possibility of endowing it with value and meaning. However, as was suggested in 
the first section of this discussion, it is often difficult to provide an 
assessment of the nature of the present directly, for we are unable to gain the 
necessary distance and separation. In fact, it could be suggested that it is this 
lack of distance which accounts for the slightly desperate tone of Lacoue- 
Labarthe's text discussed above. Thus it is necessary to employ the services of 
an interpreter, to speak of another in order to allow us to comment on 
ourselves. In this study, this is the role assigned to Hölderlin. 
0.3. Hölderlin. 
It is in the work of Friedrich Hölderlin that the two previous discussions 
coincide. Several recurring themes appear throughout Hölderlin's work, the most 
prevalent being his overwhelming desire to understand the relationship between 
Ancient Greece and Eighteenth Century Germany. One way in which Hölderlin 
approaches this issue is through his attempts to differentiate, and analyse the 
difference between, the poetic forms, in particular tragedy. This is manifest 
both in his theoretical writings and in his attempts to write his "authentic" 
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modern tragedy as is apparent from the drafts for the drama The Death of 
Emvedocles. However the interest in Greece and tragedy is in itself not 
sufficient to justify my choice of Hölderlin as interpreter over and above his 
peers. In this period - roughly defined as the era of the inception of the 
Romantic and Idealist projects, i. e. the period from 1790 to 1802 - exploration 
of these themes is almost universal. An interest in Greece and in tragedy is 
shown in various forms of thought and expression and is approached from both 
a theoretical and practical point of view. t 15] Theoretically, this interest is 
manifest in both the writings of the Romantic and of the Idealist schools of 
thought. ( 16 ] As Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe comments at the beginning of his 
essay "The Caesura of the Speculative" in Typographies, 
... I would like to show - but this is scarcely a thesis, so evident 
is the point, fundamentally - that tragedy, or a certain 
interpretation of tragedy, explicitly philosophical, and above all 
wanting to be such, is the origin or matrix of what in the wake of 
Kant is conventionally called speculative thought: that is to say 
dialectical thought... in the earliest stages of absolute Idealism, we 
find the speculative process itself (dialectical logic) founded quite 
explicitly on the model of tragedy. t1TI 
Lacoue-Labarthe proceeds to show how this "model of tragedy" is utilised in 
the early work of Schelling and Hegel. However, whilst Lacoue-Labarthe 
illustrates the validity of this claim, he also wants simultaneously to offer a 
"counter-example" to this model. He finds this counter-example in the 
theoretical writings of Hölderlin. As Lacoue-L. abarthe admits, Hölderlin's 
opinions often appear to be close if not identical, to those of his 
contemporaries. Yet in places, particularly in the later theoretical writings, he 
does appear to be offering a different understanding of the relation to Greece 
and an alternative interpretation of the function and role of tragedy. It is the 
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possibility that Hölderlin might be "different" from his contemporaries that 
attracts my attention and warrants my choice of Hölderlin as "interpreter". 
Lacoue-Labarthe claims that in Hölderlin's later dramatic and theoretical 
writings it is possible to discern a new approach 
to the theory and practice of the theatre, in the theory of tragedy 
and the experience or the testing... of a new kind of dramatic 
writing. Perhaps simply a new kind of writing: one which is, as he 
himself and his epoch said, modern. [ 181 
It is this suggestion that Hölderlin may be separated from his contemporaries 
by virtue of the fact that his writing appears "modern" which I want to 
explore in this study. Whilst I will employ Lacoue-Labarthe's analysis as my 
starting point, I intend subsequently to refer to this text only obliquely. 
Rather than reading Hölderlin through Lacoue-Labarthe, I want to return to 
Hölderlin's own texts in order to generate a reading which is situated firmly in 
the primary sources. The reason for adopting this approach lies in the fact 
that Lacoue-Labarthe - whilst providing a brilliant and provocative analysis of 
Hölderlin's relationship to speculative thought - wants ultimately to subsume 
Hölderlin's theory of tragedy into his own theoretical work on mimesis. Thus he 
does not provide a sustained analysis as to why Hölderlin may be considered to 
be "modern". ( 19 ] It is this form of detailed analysis which I intend to provide. 
In a certain sense, I will be filling in the gaps in Lacoue-Labarthe's analysis, 
whilst simultaneously using detailed textual interpretations to show why 
Hölderlin becomes isolated from the mainstream of philosophical thinking. In so 
doing I hope to show why Hölderlin's thought can be said to be "modern", 
ultimately referring the analysis that is developed back to current debates 
concerning our own present modernity. In particular I intend to use Hölderlin's 
arguments concerning the function of tragedy as a way of addressing the 
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questions that I raised in the previous section concerning the apparent 
redundancy of tragedy in our time. 
In response to this proposal it could easily be suggested that my choice of 
Hölderlin as interpreter is at least idiosyncratic, if not, plainly perverse. 
Detractors could argue that if I want to start to understand how the present 
situation arose, I should examine the mainstream theorists who have developed 
the "philosophical" interpretations and understandings of tragedy - i. e. thinkers 
such as Hegel - rather than focussing upon minor figures like Hölderlin. He, 
after all, cannot really be considered to be a philosopher, he is merely a poet 
- albeit great in this sphere - who displayed philosophical leanings and 
pretensions. 1201 However in reply I want to argue that it is because of these 
"mainstream" thinkers that we are placed in the situation that we are. Hence, 
rather than simply tracing back the history of the problem, perhaps it would 
be useful to examine the figures who have become marginalised by this history, 
those who offered an alternative way of thinking which was rejected by the 
mainstream. For in Identifying Hölderlin as "modern" are we not implicitly 
proposing that he had in some sense understood more acutely the possible crises 
and inherent flaws within the dominant modes of thought of his time? It could 
be suggested that in a certain sense, the apparently "modern" quality of 
Hölderlin's thought points to the fact that he identified the problems earlier 
than other thinkers and was forced to look for alternative solutions. Thus, the 
ideas which Hölderlin evolved are relevant for us, for the problems they 
address are similar - but, as I shall show, never identical - to our own. This 
is not to say that Hölderlin will be able to provide "answers" and "solutions" 
to the problems that are generated by the breakdown of the "Grand 
Narratives". However, within his thought it may be possible to find different 
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explanations and ways to approach the current dilemma. It could be suggested 
that Hölderlin himself possesses the "third eye" of King Oedipus, which allows 
him to look beyond the surface of the reflection in the mirro r, generating 
explanations which reveal the depths of the problem he confronts. In looking 
into the "mirror" of Höld erlin's own text, perhaps we too may be able to gain 
a similar insight into our own situation. 
0.4. The Structure of the Argument. 
To conclude this introduction I want to provide a brief outline of the structure 
of this study and the arguments I shall propose. In Chapter One it is necessary 
to establish the background of the relationship between tragedy and philosophy 
and to introduce the main themes of this study. I show that the uneasy 
relationship between philosophy and the arts is premised upon Plato's 
understanding and judgement of mimesis. However, to understand why Plato 
legislates against tragedy it is first necessary to investigate the nature of the 
Greek tragic drama. Thus in first section of this chapter I discuss Greek 
tragedy both in terms of its social function and as a dramatic phenomenon. In 
the light of this analysis, I return to Plato's arguments against the poets in 
the Republic, showing how his disagreements arise out of a particular, limited 
understanding of mimesis. In contrast to this, in the final section of this 
chapter, I examine Aristotle's use of mimesis in the Poetics, to see whether 
this text can offer a more useful description of the mimetic process. 
Having outlined the two opposing readings of mimesis provided by Plato and 
Aristotle and related the arguments to Greek tragedy, in Chapter Two I turn 
to Hölderlin's understanding of the relationship between Ancient Greece and 18th 
Century Germany. Before examining Hölderlin's own texts in depth it is 
necessary to outline the background to the debate. I first give a brief account 
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of the evolution of the Quarrel of Ancients and Moderns in German thought, 
particularly focussing upon the way in which this reintroduces the question of 
the function of mimesis. Secondly, the immediate background of Hölderlin's 
thought is established by a brief examination of the writings of Winckelmann 
and Schiller concerning the relationship to Greece. It is then possible to turn 
to Höiderlin's own texts. In order to establish how Hölderlin's relationship to 
Greece differs from his contemporaries, I provide detailed readings of two 
texts. First, I examine the short fragmentary text The Perspective from which 
We Have to Look at Antiquity, (1799) showing how its arguments relate to the 
work of Schiller. I will contrast these arguments with those which Hölderlin 
presents in the first letter to Bbhlendorff, dating from 1801. I argue that in 
this text Hölderlin offers a unique interpretation of the relation between Greece 
and Germany which separates him from his contemporaries. In acknowledging 
that the Greek society is divided, Hölderlin introduces the necessity of a re- 
evaluation of the nature of the mimetic relationship between Greece and 
Germany. However, how this re-evaluation is interpreted is a point of debate 
among Hölderlin commentators. Therefore in order to establish my own 
assessment of this text it is necessary to outline some of the interpretations 
that have been given. I focus particularly on the arguments put forward by 
Peter Szondi and the criticisms which have been offered by Andrzej Warminski. 
Having summarised the debate concerning Greece, in Chapters Three and Four, I 
examine Hölderlin's understanding of tragedy. Again, before examining the 
theoretical writings in detail it is necessary to establish the background to 
these texts. Thus Chapter Three opens with a discussion of the issues which 
are raised in the text that has come to be known as The Oldest System- 
Programme of German Idealism. In an analysis of this text I show how the 
-16- 
sphere of the aesthetic is placed at the centre of system-thought, re-adjusting 
the Platonic assessment of the value of art. The ideas proposed by this text 
are then linked to Hölderlin's own work through a discussion of his novel 
Hyperion. Having established the centrality of the aesthetic presentation in 
Hölderlin's work, I examine the so-called "poetological" writings which date 
from 1798-1800. In these texts Hölderlin introduces his theory of "poetic 
modes" which outlines the qualities of, and distinctions between, the poetic 
genres of epic, lyric and tragic. Through an analysis of Hölderlin's statement 
that the tragic "is the metaphor of an intellectual intuition" which occurs in 
the text On the Difference of the Poetic Modes, (1800) I show why the tragic 
mode is central to Hölderlin's poetological project. I argue that the tragic mode 
becomes the site in which Hölderlin's theoretical and poetological projects 
coincide. This is because it is through the tragic mode that the relationship 
with the Absolute is offered. However the way in which this relationship is 
manifest and understood is very problematic. To illustrate these problems, in 
Chapter Four I examine Höideriin's attempts to write a tragic drama which 
corresponds to his theoretical beliefs. After a brief discussion of the drafts of 
the drama Empedocles I discuss the two theoretical texts which accompany it. 
In these texts - The Ground to Empedocles and Becoming in Dissolution - 
Hölderlin explains the relationship between the dramatic presentation and his 
theoretical beliefs in greater depth. In analysing these texts I argue that there 
is an inherent tension between the presuppositions of the theory and the way 
they can be realised in the drama. It is these tensions which prevent Hölderliin 
from completing the project of Empedocles. 
In Chapter Five, I turn to Hölderlin's final work, his project to translate 
Sophocles' tragedies. Through a close analysis of the theoretical Remarks which 
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accompany the translations, I show how Hölderlin's theoretical and poetological 
interests in Greece and Tragedy are brought together through this project. I 
argue that through these texts it is possible to gain an insight into the 
problems which confronted Hölderlin's poetological project. However, 
simultaneously, these texts provide an alternative way of understanding the 
function of the tragic form. This analysis brings together the debate concerning 
the process and function of mimesis which has been developed throughout the 
preceding inquiries. In this discussion I show how the questions concerning the 
status of dramatic mimesis and the "mimetic" relation between Greece and 
Germany coincide in the analysis of Sophocles' dramas. 
In conclusion I return briefly to the questions that I have raised at the 
beginning of this introduction concerning the status of tragedy in the present 
time and show how these issues can be related to the arguments presented in 
the course of the study. 
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Chanter One. 
Greece, Tragedy and Mimesis. 
1.1. Introduction. 
Now, as it seems, if a man who is able by wisdom to become every 
sort of thing and to imitate all things should come to our city, 
wishing to make a display of himself and his poems, we would fall 
on our knees before him as a man sacred, wonderful and pleasing; 
but we would say that there is no such man amongst us in the city, 
nor is it lawful for such a man to be born there. We would send 
him to another city, with myrrh poured over his head and crowned 
with wool... [>] 
Plato reaches this conclusion concerning the position of the poet within his 
ideal state at the end of the discussion of the appropriate education of the 
guardians in Book Three of the Republic. Previously, he has argued - in outline 
- that most poets and dramatists cannot be included in the state because their 
work is capable of corrupting and confusing the young. Poems and dramas 
present only imitations of an object or subject, they cannot present the object 
itself. Furthermore, these imitations are often so accurate - especially in the 
case of drama - that they can confuse the spectators by leading them to 
believe in the actuality of what is depicted; thus the rigid differentiation and 
hierarchical ordering which Plato wants to establish between the Idea, its mode 
of appearance in the world, and a copy of this appearance, is challenged. 
However, the poet is not dismissed without receiving honour. Within Plato's 
discussion there is an implicit admiration and recognition of the skill of the 
poet. It is clear that the expulsion of the poet occurs on political rather than 
aesthetic grounds. The poet is viewed as a threat to the basic tenets upon 
which the state is founded. At the heart of the threat lies the problem of the 
status of the mimetic process, the imitation; i. e. the introduction of that which 
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challenges and threatens the theoretical structures upon which the state is 
built. When it is also taken into account that this state is meant to be the 
state ruled over by the Philosopher-Kings, it can be seen that more is at stake 
than simply the ground-rules for a hypothetical system of government. Rather, 
what is being confronted is the enterprise of philosophy itself. In the 
denigration of the status of the mimetic arts there can be seen the foundation 
of the disjunction and dichotomy between philosophy and literature; between the 
serious and the frivolous; between the "real" and the "mere imitation". In fact, 
this brief passage contains the embryonic foundations of the traditional 
structures of philosophy, the oppositions upon which it is constructed, which 
will enable the great edifices of systems of thought to be built, and in whose 
ruins we, at the end of the twentieth century, stand. 
If it is accepted that the poet poses such a threat to the philosophic 
enterprise, it is perhaps surprising that he is not disposed of in a quieter 
manner, simply run out of the city at the dead of night, ostracised, and 
denigrated. Also, if it is only "mere" appearance that he offers, surely this 
fact should be instantly apparent to all spectators. However, it is clear that 
because the threat posed by mimesis is considered so great and potentially 
problematic, that it must be addressed by more subtle means. At the least it 
appears that it is unwise to upset the poets, they must be afforded some 
recognition. Hence the elaborate ceremonies which Plato suggests should 
accompany their expulsion; they are anointed with myrrh and a "crown of wool 
[is] placed around their heads". How is this ceremony to be understood? What 
does it denote? On the one hand the adornments of the poets are similar to 
those worn by the priest, the celebrant of the sacrifice, yet there are also 
resonances of the garb of the sacrificial victims themselves. (23 Plato's 
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honouring of the poets is thus implicitly double-edged. As I will show in the 
following discussion, the ambiguity of this ceremony reflects Plato's own 
difficult relationship with the poets and their arts. Whilst for the sake of the 
philosophical premises of his thought he must necessarily sacrifice the poets, he 
is still also reliant on their arts and complicity. Whether the poet is viewed as 
an unnecessary threat which must be eradicated from the state, or an artist 
who is to be praised and honoured depends upon the attitude that is adopted 
towards the problem posed by the mimetic relationship. 
However, the simple description of the expulsion of the poets does not provide 
any explanation of the exact nature of the problem posed by the mimetic 
process as it occurs in the production of the work of art. As I suggested 
earlier, Plato does not object to the poets on aesthetic grounds - in fact the 
care which is taken to confront the works of the poet indicates an implicit 
recognition of their merit. The roots of his hostility lie much deeper for there 
is something fundamentally threatening and problematic in the notion of the 
mimetic, the imitation. It is this point that I will address in this chapter. My 
concern will be to investigate certain aspects of the role and function of 
mimesis within Greek thought, in particular with respect to the discussion of 
Greek tragedy. What is the position of tragedy in relation to Greek thought, 
and what does tragedy demonstrate about the relationship between mimesis and 
philosophy? This discussion will cover three distinct areas. First, I consider 
the nature of Greek tragedy itself. Secondly, in the light of what has been 
established about the unique nature of Greek tragedy, I shall discuss Plato's 
treatment of mimetic arts and of tragedy in particular in the Republic. (31 
Finally, I shall contrast Plato's opinions with Aristotle's discussion of tragedy 
in the Poetics, highlighting the difference between their respective understanding 
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of the term mimesis. Generally, however, the motivation behind these 
considerations must be borne in mind. My interest in the discussions of mimesis 
lies primarily in relating the questions and problems which emerge in the 
discussion of these texts to Hölderlin's work. The underlying possibility which I 
am exploring is that the problems which Greek tragedy poses for the Greek 
philosophical enterprise have a direct relevance and relationship to those which 
are to be found at the centre of Hölderlin's theoretical work. 
1.2. The Greek Tragedy. 
The possible ambiguity of the title of this section is intentional, if not in fact 
inescapable. Greek tragedy as a dramatic form is essentially constructed around 
ambiguity; the ambiguity of knowledge, the impossibility of ever being able to 
ascertain stability and certainty in relation to oneself and one's position within 
the world. A similar ambiguity exists in relation to the question of the genesis 
of Greek tragedy. How, and why, did this apparently singular dramatic form 
arise within the Greek society? The only real certainties that can be 
established about the form are that its inception, period of flourishing, and 
decline occurred in one site in the space of less than 100 years - between the 
6th and 5th centuries BC - which corresponds roughly with the most successful 
period of Athenian democracy. When the influence and significance of these 
works are placed alongside and against the actual duration of their flourishing, 
a striking degree of incommensurability is instantly visible. It appears 
extraordinary that a form which arises in such a limited time and area could 
exercise such an immense and universal influence over all subsequent centuries. 
What is specific to Greek tragedy that inaugurates and ensures its survival and 
apparently continuing relevance? To examine this question it is necessary for it 
to be considered from two distinct points of view. First, the relation between 
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the state and the tragedy needs to be established. Secondly, the nature of the 
dramatic presentation itself needs to be reviewed. It will become clear in the 
ensuing discussion that these two aspects are not mutually exclusive; in fact the 
problems of the state enter and inform the drama and vice versa, creating a 
situation where tragedy is to be understood as the site where a set of 
problems concerning the identity of the state, and thus by inference, the 
identity of its subjects, are made into - literally, in the case of the dramatic 
presentation - the focus of debate. Hence it is apparent, even from this 
preliminary outline, that the issues which lie at the heart of this discussion 
are concerned with the particular nature of the Greek dramatic presentation; i. e. 
with the issues introduced by the mimetic art of drama. 
Greek tragedy was performed at a certain specific time and place within the 
city state. It occurred at the festival entitled the City or Great Dionysia. The 
competition between the three selected playwrights was only part of the 
celebrations and rites of the festival. 141 Many commentators have interpreted 
the function of the festival as a time of release and excess - undoubtedly 
reading back Aristotle's discussion of the cathartic effect of tragedy onto their 
understanding of the festival - concluding that it was primarily a religious and 
ritualistic festival. E51 However, other more recent commentaries, whose research 
is based on reconstruction of the fragmentary primary evidence, suggest that 
this is only a partial understanding of what occurred. To substantiate the 
ciaims that a wider understanding of the function of the tragedy is necessary, 
one need go no further than a contemporary Athenian proverb which said that 
the rituals of the festival had "nothing to do with Dionysus"16]. That is, 
whilst the festival may have been held under the name of Dionysus, and the 
God's statue paraded to the theatre on the first day of the competition and 
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established in the place of -honour overlooking the action that would unfold on 
stage, the events which followed bore very little relation to the excesses and 
debauchery which the 5th century Athenian would have associated with Dionysian 
celebration. In fact what emerges from the accounts of the events of the 
festival is that these events were primarily civic occasions, undertaken with a 
great degree of ceremony and officialdom, and that they were informed by rigid 
structures and traditions of pageantry. It is evident that this was a situation 
where the city itself was put on display; an occasion when the thirteen tribes 
that made up the ruling families of the city were brought together in a common 
arena and with a common purpose. 171 Undoubtedly the main event of this 
festival is the competition between the plays, but even this takes place within a 
rigid framework of rules and laws concerning the form of the performance, the 
way in which it is to be judged and by whom. Thus, as Simon Goldhill writes 
in his discussion of the festival, 
... the Great Dionysia is in the full sense of the expression a civic 
occasion, a city festival.. . The Great Dionysia is a public occasion 
endowed with a special form of belief. This is fundamentally and 
essentially a festival of the democratic polis. 181 
However as Goldhill then emphasises, 
After such preplay ceremonies, the performances of tragedy and 
comedy that follow could scarcely seem - at first sight -a more 
surprising institution... For both tragedy and comedy, in their 
transgressive force, in their particular depictions and use of myth 
and language, time after time implicate the dominant ideology put 
forward in the pre-play ceremonies in a far from straightforward 
manner; indeed the tragic texts seem to question, examine and often 
subvert the language of the city's order. t93 
A brief examination of the plots of a representative selection of the extant 
tragedies supports this statement. It is clear that there is a radical 
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disjuncture between the pageantry of the festival itself which celebrated the 
stability and wealth of the city, and the events of the plays themselves which 
depicted cities and families at war, clashes occurring both between and within 
rival groupings. [lo] There cannot be any simple contrast drawn between the 
stability of the city which hosts the plays and the dramatic depiction of these 
alien places which are subjected to division and strife. Rather, as Goldhill 
emphasises, the problems and conflicts raised by the plays precisely call into 
question the basic tenets of this host society itself. Furthermore, when the 
themes of the surviving tragedies are examined, it is clear that they are 
constructed around the essential problems or ambiguities of the relation between 
the individual and the state, or the problem of defining the individual's position 
within the society. From this discussion it can be concluded that a fundamental 
tension is established between the tragedy and the context of its performance. 
Not only does an ambiguity exist within the tragedy itself, but this can be 
extended to the position which tragedy occupies within the functioning of the 
state. 
What does the tragedy contain which generates this tension and ambiguity? How 
is the tension created and sustained? The answers to these questions are 
related to the main theme of this discussion; the problem of the potentially 
ambiguous status of the mimetic presentation. In the staged drama the audience 
is presented with the depiction of a series of events which is a literal 
enactment and embodiment of the contradictions of their own society. Although 
the events of the tragedies refer back to another era, to the past age of 
heroes, II1I the tragic dramatist re-works and reinterprets these myths so that 
they reflect the ambiguities and dilemmas of contemporary society. It is no 
accident that the language of the tragedy frequently employs legal terminology, 
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basing argument and justification of action upon the claims of law, e. g. the 
rights of the familial law versus the rights of the law of the state, that is 
the law of the oikos versus the law of the polls. [123 As Jean-Pierre Vernant 
points out in his essay "The Historical Moment of Tragedy in Greece", the 
"moment" of the irruption of Greek tragedy is the time when the society begins 
to attempt to codify and regulate the differing claims of opposing notions of 
Dike, Justice, The tragedy is built upon the tensions which arise from the 
differing world-views which are competing for dominance within the Athenian 
state. It reflects the claims of the values which originate in the historical 
past, where the law is equated with the divine law, and opposes to this the 
questions which arise out of the need to establish forms of law which are 
appropriate to the establishment of a democratic polls. Even in those tragedies 
which do not have the interpretation of law as the dominant theme of the plot, 
the language which is used to describe any conflict that occurs is predominantly 
technical, employing the new linguistic distinctions established by the law of 
the Athenian democracy. Thus, 
What tragedy depicts is one dike in conflict with another, a law 
that is not fixed, shifting and changing into its opposite. To be 
sure tragedy is something that is quite different from a legal 
debate. It takes as its subject the man actually living out this 
debate, forced to make a decisive choice, to orient his actions in a 
universe of ambiguous values where nothing is ever stable or 
unequivocal. 1131 
It is this notion of acting out, of living out, the debate which introduces the 
element of the mimetic. As I mentioned previously, the tragedy combines two 
separate, and in a sense, mutually exclusive ages; the characters depicted on the 
stage come from the mythology of the society, they refer back to the age of 
heroes, yet the reinterpretation of the myths by the 5th century dramatists 
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introduce the contemporary debates of the society. Thus, these two aspects are 
brought together and held in tension within the drama. What is given on the 
stage is a literal enactment of the problems and quarrels of the society as it 
attempts to establish its own unique identity. It is this which differentiates 
tragedy from the art forms which had evolved previously. The lyric and the 
epic both take as their subject matter the events of the age of heroes, yet they 
differ from tragedy in two crucial, related ways. First, these forms do not 
introduce the contemporary problems into the development of the narrative, 
rather they simply recount the events that occurred. Secondly, - and this arises 
as a consequence of the first point - the narrative is related predominantly in 
the third person, it is a distanced account of events, rather than it being 
viewed as an enactment. The rhapsode who is reciting epic verse never claims to 
adopt the persona of any of the heroes completely. Even when he speaks in the 
first person, it is clear that there is still a separation between the assumed 
character and the orator; the adoption of the persona is not a literal 
embodiment, what is spoken is still seen as an account. C 14 ] However in tragedy 
this separation disappears; 
What the public sees before it in the theater is not a poet 
recounting the trials withstood in ancient times by men now gone, 
whose absence is, so to speak, implied by the very narration. 
Instead, those trials take place before its very eyes adopting the 
form of real existence in the immediacy of the performance. The 
tragic poet becomes totally invisible behind the characters on the 
stage, acting and speaking for themselves as if alive. In Plato's 
analysis, it is this directness of speech and action that constitutes 
the essence of mimesis: Instead of speaking in his own name and 
recounting events indirectly, the author disappears inside the 
protagonists and apes them by taking on their appearance, manners, 
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feelings and words. The precise meaning of mimeistha. i, to imitate, is 
to simulate the presence of one who is absent. t 15] 
These remarks summarise succinctly how the tragic form introduces the 
problematic elements of dramatic mimesis. Unlike those genres which had been 
established earlier, it is only with the emergence of tragedy that the mimetic 
is fully brought into consideration. Within the lyric and the epic, the 
characters within the narration have only a two dimensional existence; what is 
given is an account of an event, the subject has no existence independent of the 
narration, what is given is clearly a relayed account of the events. However in 
the staging of the tragedy the characters take on a three dimensional form. On 
the stage the events of the narrative become literally embodied. In dramatic 
mimesis, what is shown is a concretized presentation of the characters of the 
tragedy; they are given, in a certain sense, an autonomous identity. Yet the 
status of this identity is ambiguous, for as Vernant states, "the precise 
meaning of Mimeisthaf, to imitate, is to simulate the presence of one who is 
absent. " This "precise" definition of Mimeisthai highlights the specific nature 
of the problem introduced by the dramatic presentation. The process of 
imitation is premised upon the interplay of presence and absence. The imitation 
"simulates the presence of one who is absent"; i. e. the status of that which is 
presenced is always necessarily indeterminate. As I will argue, it is this 
essential indeterminacy of the status of that which is presenced which Plato 
perceives as the greatest threat to his theoretical schema and which provides 
him with the motivation to legislate against the poets. 
How, then, is the mimetic presentation to be understood? Furthermore, what is 
the relation between the tragedy and the spectator? This discussion of dramatic 
mimesis suggests that the relation between the spectator and the image is 
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highly problematic. This relationship contains many ambiguities which exist on 
several levels and with varying degrees of complexity. It is clear that not only 
is the status of the represented character brought into question, but that this 
in turn also problematises the identity of the spectator. First, if it is accepted 
that on one level, the spectator is perceiving an image of themselves - i. e. what 
is presented before them on the stage is a human subject, albeit from a 
mythical past - the unfolding of the drama demonstrates that the identity of 
this subject is a problem for the society. The ambiguity that surrounds the 
identity and actions of the tragic character calls into question the identity of 
the perceiving spectator. The tragic presentation challenges the spectator's own 
epistemological and ontological beliefs. For example often the play "questions" 
the sense of selfhood and identity which the Athenian city-state is developing. 
This is not to say that the term "subject" is being used here in its 
contemporary Twentieth Century understanding. The Greek conception of subject 
differs from our own in that there is a lack of reflexivity in the former. ( t 6] 
The subject is not so much an agent who acts but rather an agent who is acted 
upon. It is this which creates the potential for the tragic confrontation, for 
whilst such agents often consider they are acting in an autonomous manner, 
what will be revealed in the unfolding of the dramatic narrative is that their 
action is also dependent upon external forces, events and causes. It is through 
the action that the character's true identity is established, rather than there 
being an identity which exists and survives outside of this action. It is in this 
tragic confrontation that the challenge to the identity of the observer occurs. 
For example, on an epistemological level, the actions of the character call into 
question the status of human claims to self-knowledge and judgement. This is 
epitomised by the figure of Oedipus. On an ontological level, the nature of the 
human is questioned. This is exemplified in the interplay between the tragic 
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protagonists and the chorus where the chorus comments upon the events that 
have occurred and tries to attribute to them order and meaning. The most 
obvious instances of this occur in Sophocles' Theban Plays.; e. g. the Ode to Man 
in Antigone, and also in the remarks made by the chorus in relation to the 
appearance of Oedipus after his self-blinding. [ 171. 
These problems are compounded further by consideration of the status of the 
dramatic presentation. First, there is a tension in the relation between the 
spectator and the character presented on the stage in that the problematic 
status of the dramatic presentation also challenges the status of the spectator. 
It might be presumed that it is easy to differentiate between these two, for 
the character embodied in front of the spectator is merely illusory, it is a 
simulation. However, whilst on one level what is presented is an "illusion", on 
another, it is as "real" as the observer themselves. As Vernant remarks, the 
poet disappears into the characters on the stage, his voice merges with theirs, 
and this problematises how the status of the characters is to be understood. 
There is no longer the rigid separation between the narrator and that which is 
narrated. Rather, both coincide in the figure which is presented on the stage. 
Again, to understand the exact nature of this problem it is necessary to refer 
back to the precise definition of Mimeisthai which has been given: namely 
Mimeisthai means "to simulate the presence of one who is absent. " This 
definition emphasises that the root of the problem lies in how that which is 
---"presented" is understood. It acknowledges the fact that the drama offers 
concrete representations, it presents one who is absent; yet this presentation is 
also a simulation. Hence the paradoxical situation arises in which the figure 
presented on the stage both is, and is not, what it claims to be. This 
description of the fundamental ambiguity of the ontological status of that which 
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is presented allows several conclusions to be drawn. First. it indicates that 
there is a fundamental break between the Athenian world-view and the Age of 
the Heroes to which the dramas allude. The plays demonstrate the division, the 
break which marks the separation of the Athenian-Greeks from their 
mythological past. The Gods themselves no longer appear among men, all that is 
possible is their simulation in the drama. The tragic dramatic form indicates 
that the Greeks lack an immediate relationship to their Gods. Knowledge of the 
Gods can only be communicated in a mediated form, through the way in which 
they are manifest in the drama. As I will argue in subsequent chapters, it is 
the recognition of the essentially divided nature of Greece which is crucial to 
an understanding of Greek drama and helps to account for the apparent 
"modernity" of the Greeks. 
The second conclusion that can be drawn from the ambiguous status of the 
dramatic presentation relates to how the figure on the stage is to be 
interpreted. In the Greek drama the figure presented on the stage claims to be, 
in a certain sense, the figure who is absent. It adopts the name, the position, 
even the history of the absent character. Thus it can be seen that the figure 
on the stage is, and is not, simultaneously, what it claims to be. This situation 
arises out of the way in which the drama presents the character as embodied, 
understood in both senses of the word; i. e. the character has a physicality, it 
is corporally embodied, and furthermore in the course of the unfolding of the 
---narrative of the drama, it takes on the life of the figure: in the performance 
of Oedipus Rex, Oedipus is Oedipus. Within the world opened up through the 
dramatic presentation this is his identity. The ambiguous status of the dramatic 
figure subverts attempts to claim that what is presented is a "mere simulation" 
for it begs the question concerning the status of the "original" of which this 
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Is supposed to be a simulation. This consideration disrupts the belief that it is 
possible to make the apparently simple distinction between that which is a 
simulation and that which is real. Instead of there being two separate sites, 
one of which contains the original, one the copy, the implication of this 
discussion is that it is impossible to see them as two distinct entities each 
within separate ontological spheres. Any discussion of origin, or the original, is 
effectively annulled. Rather, the play of presence and absence which defines the 
mimetic relationship highlights that there can only be the site of the 
presentation itself. The mimetic presentation must be understood as an active 
process which constructs that which is presented. 
This conclusion also necessarily affects the way in which the status of the 
spectator who views this process is understood. In the same way that there 
cannot be a rigid distinction drawn between the object of imitation and the 
imitation itself, there also cannot be such a differentiation between the observer 
of the drama and the drama itself, as a single event. In calling the status of 
the figure on the stage into question the possibility of attributing' an 
autonomous identity to the spectator is also challenged. The identity of the 
spectator is constructed in and through the viewing of the drama. tt8] The stage 
of presentation is not simply to be understood as the stage in front of which 
the spectator sits and on which the drama unfolds. Rather, the spectator 
becomes part of this stage; the play of presence and absence which constitutes 
the- mimetic relationship must be extended to cover the status of the observer 
of the drama. -I will return to these issues in subsequent chapters and 
discuss them in greater depth when I consider Hölderlin's understanding of the 
nature of the dramatic presentation. 
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This discussion has shown that in placing identifiable apparently autonomous 
figures upon the stage, Greek tragedy unleashes the full force of the mimetic 
process. Dramatic mimesis introduces the potential for disruption and 
problematisation of the way in which the autonomous identity of the presented 
object is to be understood. The tragic presentation demonstrates the 
fundamental instability of the status of that which is presenced, it complicates 
the meaning of terms such as the "real", "the illusory" and introduces the 
problem of providing any foundational certainties as to the status of that which 
perceived within the sphere of the mimetic. However, it is crucial to note that 
this form of analysis is necessarily retrospective. It is only from the position 
of the present that these problems can be identified, or even be labelled as 
"problems" as such. For mimesis only becomes a problem after thought has 
taken the fatal step towards becoming theoria, when questions are asked which 
demand foundational answers, which in itself is a concretization of the 
processes of thought. That is, mimesis only becomes problematic when 
philosophy labels it as such. [ 19 1 Mimesis in itself is not a problem, in fact it 
is the dynamic process through which drama is constructed. Mimesis opens up 
the possibility of the realm of the imagination, of art, of the aesthetic, for in 
practice it simply denotes the process of creation. As Paul Ricoeur states, 
"mimesis is not a copy; mimesis is poeisis, that is, construction, 
creation ... "1'o). I will return to this designation in the third section of this 
chapter when I discuss Aristotle's definition of mimesis in the Poetics. At its 
root mimesis is always something other to theory, the mimetic process functions 
in such a way as to call any theoretical framework in which it is placed into 
question. Hence, perhaps, Plato's anxiety about the function of the poets within 
his republic. 
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Two main points can be drawn from this discussion. First, as I emphasised in 
the first part of this section, Greek tragedy must be understood as an unique 
art form which arises at a specific time and place as a response to a particular 
set of needs and circumstances. It arises in a specific historical context in the 
development of Western Civilisation. It marks the advent of the concept of the 
political man, when human beings start to adopt an autonomous identity and to 
establish rules and laws to govern society. Tragedy therefore arises as the 
form which reflects the conflicts between the new and old ways of thought and 
expression. It presents the society with a mirror in which its own problems are 
reflected. This is not to say that the function of the tragedy is to resolve 
these conflicts, in fact, it is impossible with any degree of certainty to 
attribute a definitive "meaning" to the tragedy of the Greeks. Any 
interpretation that is given - including this one - is necessarily coloured by 
the historical demands of its own present. Hence tragedy in its original form 
must considered to be a specifically Greek phenomenon. This does not mean that 
it cannot be re-interpreted, but, as I suggested in the introduction to this 
thesis, the necessity of the re-interpretation must be acknowledged. The second 
conclusion that can be drawn from this section concerns the way in which the 
Greek tragedy introduces the problem of the status of the staged presentation. 
In placing figures on the stage, the tragedy introduces the power of dramatic 
mimesis into the society. Mimesis is to be understood as the process through 
which the tragic drama is constituted. However, the analysis of the functioning 
of mimesis within tragedy which I have given demonstrates that the mimetic 
process problematises how both the object of imitation and the imitation itself 
is to be understood. That is, the dramatic presentation challenges the new 
forms of thought which also arise as a consequence of the establishment of the 
Athenian democracy. As I will show, for Plato, tragedy is corrupting precisely 
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because it challenges the basic presuppositions of the new modes of thought 
which he wishes to introduce. 
How does Plato achieve this limiting of the power of the tragedy? What 
controls must he impose on the form so as to ensure its subjugation, and by 
implication the limitation of the effects of the disruptive influence of mimesis? 
For if it is correct to assert that the control of mimesis has occurred only by 
the imposition of laws alien to the process itself, is it possible to understand 
these constraints as themselves being subject to subversion by that which they 
are apparently limiting. How secure a safeguard is the simple expulsion of the 
Poets out of the front gates of the city? - especially if the ceremonies which 
this entails means that the back gate is left unguarded, unmanned, and thus 
vulnerable to attack. 
1.3. Plato, Mimesis and Tragedy; The Expulsion of the Poets. 
Plato's arguments against the poets vary, depending upon the context in which 
the issue is raised. As was suggested in the introduction to this chapter, the 
need to exclude the poets is not simply political, it is not to be seen as a ploy 
to exclude the undesirables from the society. The problem is much more 
pressing: the threat which the poets pose is to the philosophical enterprise 
itself; they challenge the basic presuppositions upon which the philosopher-ruler 
establishes his authority. The nature of the challenge is elaborated at two 
specific points in The Republic, first in the initial discussion of the education 
of the guardians in Book Three and secondly in the discussion of art in Book 
Ten. The fact that the problem of the status of the poets merits two separate 
discussions is not to be overlooked, because this in itself suggests that Plato 
considers that the arguments need to be returned to and re-emphasised. The 
actual positioning of the arguments is also of importance and I will return to 
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this point after the arguments that are set out in these two sections have been 
examined in more detail. At this stage it is sufficient to point out that between 
Book Three and Book Ten Plato establishes the need for a philosopher-leader by 
recourse to the analogies of the cave and the line. Thus, the polemics against 
the works of the poets, their "mere imitations", surround the philosophical core 
of the book, which is itself outlined in the form of a fiction, of an allegory. 
The potential for irony here is unmistakeable. 
The arguments against the poets which are put forward in Book Three arise out 
of a discussion of the form of education appropriate for the Guardians of the 
Republic. Plato has established that the ideal Republic will need a class of 
people whose task will be to lead and govern; these are the Guardians, a group 
of people who are by nature "philosophic, spirited, swift and strong. "(Z 1I This 
emphasis on the "correct" set of qualifications for the role of Guardian is 
important insofar as it allows Plato to start his attack upon the poets. 
Previously he has argued that the best way to ensure the smooth operation of 
a society is for each citizen to have an assigned role and function which it is 
their duty to fulfil. Thus a person should only have one skill which they carry 
out to the best of their abilities. Furthermore this insistence on specialisation 
ensures the maximisation of efficiency within the state. However the poet and 
dramatist challenge these presuppositions in that within the enactment of a 
drama the player takes on a role which is other to his own nature, and often 
plays two or three roles. [221 According to the logic upon which the state is 
built, this form of role playing is to be understood as inferior and possibly 
disruptive, for it appears to challenge the premise that it is only possible to 
play one role correctly. Thus Plato argues, 
-36- 
Does this follow from what went before - that each one would do a 
fine job in one activity, but not in many, and if he should try to 
put his hand to many, he would surely fail of attaining fame in all? 
Of course that's what would happen. 
Doesn't the same argument hold for imitation - the same man isn't 
able to imitate many things as well as one? 
No he isn't. 
Then, he'll hardly pursue any of the noteworthy activities while at 
the same time imitating many things and being a skilled 
imitator... 1231 
This argument enables Plato to conclude that the occupation of the poet is 
necessarily inferior to that of the other craftsmen, because it lacks the 
specialisation which is inherent in the definition of the craftsman's skill. The 
poet only imitates (the Greek term used here is mimesfs) the skills of the 
craftsman, he does not actually have the skills himself. However it is clear 
that this argument is not sufficient in itself to dismiss the works of the poets. 
The discussion which surrounds this argument indicates that often the skill of 
the poet is so great that it leads the spectator into believing that the actor is 
capable of portraying the craft or the role. Therefore, the need to legislate 
against the poets stems not so much from the fact that they produce manifestly 
inferior works, but rather that their works are so good that they confuse the 
spectator and therefore by implication, upset one of the basic tenets used to 
justify the structure of the society. Again here the potential power of mimesis 
is revealed, simply through the evident need to legislate against it. This point 
is emphasised further by the discussion which follows, where Plato argues that 
if the Guardians are to take part in the drama as part of the process of 
education they can only play roles which are appropriate for their future 
careers; i. e. they are only to play characters suitable to them, namely "men 
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who are courageous, moderate, holy, free and everything of the sort"(241 The 
reason for this is made blatantly clear by Plato's subsequent query: "Haven't 
you observed that imitations, if they are practised continually from youth 
onwards, becomes established as habits and second nature, in body and sounds 
and in thought? "1257 This query implies that the influence of the effects of the 
mimetic process is more insidious and pervasive than might at first be thought, 
for if the imitation becomes "second nature" it leads to a situation where it is 
difficult to distinguish between what is an affectation and what is the actual 
behaviour which is true to a person's nature. Therefore through mimesis a 
person may start to become something other than their true nature. The danger 
that this poses for Plato's project is clear, for it confuses the rigid 
distinctions that are being made between the proper and improper. Here again it 
is apparent that mimesis must be legislated against not because it produces 
merely inferior copies, but rather because it challenges the rigid categorisation 
upon which such distinctions themselves are based. Furthermore, it raises the 
possibility that Plato's own role within this enterprise may also be brought 
into question, for he too has to be seen as a writer, one who engages with the 
mimetic arts. The question that this raises is how many roles is Plato himself 
playing within this text? As he suggests, writing is the mimetic form par 
excellence. As may be suspected with any successful mimetic project, this 
question will return, and will have to be subject to closer examination later in 
the discussion. 
However the argument outlined above does not seem to provide sufficient 
justification for the outlawing of the poets, for as has been argued, it justifies 
their expulsion on purely political terms. That is, the poets must be expelled 
because they encourage the type of behaviour which is not appropriate to the 
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ideal state. If these political arguments are challenged, is Plato able to justify 
his actions by recourse to a more theoretically sophisticated argument? 
Another, more philosophical argument, does underpin the argument which has 
just been discussed. It focusses upon the effect of the content of the drama 
rather than its form. This argument is concerned primarily with the 
epistemological status of that which is presented by the poet, and the way that 
these images challenge the way in which the notions of truth and falsity, 
fictionality and fact are to be understood. Plato argues that it is necessary to 
use stories in order to educate the mind. These stories are necessarily fictional. 
However, within the realm of the fictional, there are some stories which contain 
more truth than others, for the legends and myths often misrepresent that 
which they are depicting, showing the protagonists carrying out deeds which are 
either unsavoury or alien to their character. An example of this is the manner 
in which the Gods are depicted. Gods, by definition, are perfect beings, 
therefore any representation of them must correspond to this description. 
However, in many of the legends the Gods are depicted as either acting evily or 
imperfectly and changeably. Because of this, these legends are to be understood 
as less truthful and should not be used by the poets. Using these criteria 
Plato is then able to establish the correct material for the poets to use in 
their writings. The criterion which Plato is using here demands that the work 
should strive to attain a degree of verisimilitude. The way in which this is to 
be judged links back to the previous argument in that what should be shown is 
the character acting in accordance with their nature; i. e. God should be perfect, 
a king just etc. However, in this section there is still no exterior justification 
given as to why these criteria should be adhered to. This discussion also 
indicates that the term mimesis is being employed in a certain very specific 
sense. In the demand that the work should display some degree of 
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verisimilitude, Plato is employing a very static notion of mimesis. He focusses 
upon the content of the mimetic presentation rather than the actual process 
whereby the representational object is created. In concentrating upon the object 
itself, Plato is able to offer a critical judgement which establishes whether the 
work is a good or bad, truthful or untruthful imitation. However as was 
suggested at the end of the previous section, this is only a partial 
understanding of the function of the mimetic process which perhaps ignores its 
most powerful dimension. To concentrate upon the object itself may enable Plato 
to pass judgement upon the mimetic process, but as will be shown, this also 
means that he leaves the most problematic aspect of the mimetic relation 
untouched. That is, he ignores the dynamic, creative movement of mimesis which 
enables the production and presentation of the objects. Thus this dimension is 
not directly affected by the form of legislation which is brought against the 
work, allowing for the possibility of its return to haunt the text. 
It is only in Book Ten when Plato returns to his discussion of art that he is 
able to provide reasons as to why the judgements he has passed upon the works 
of the poets and dramatists are correct. However the reasoning he employs is 
dependent upon the arguments which have been established in Book Six 
concerning the theory of forms. These arguments establish a rigidly hierarchical 
metaphysical schema which judges the veridical statusvalue of phenomena by 
reference to a distinction between appearance and reality. This schema justifies 
the denigration of art by stating that it is "mere imitation" and therefore does 
not have access to truth, this being defined as existing only in the realm of 
ideas. Therefore at the beginning of Book Ten, before Plato starts to reiterate 
why the poet should be excluded, he states that the poet "if he is an imitator; 
he is naturally as it were a third remove from a king and the truth, as are 
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all the other imitators"t261 In this remark, Plato acknowledges that his 
reasons for excluding the poets arise out of his metaphysical beliefs. This is 
confirmed by the subsequent exchanges. Plato writes, 
I also recognize in many other aspects of this city that we were 
entirely right in the way that we founded it, but I say this 
particularly when reflecting upon poetry. 
What about it? 
In not admitting at all any part of it that is imitative. For that 
the imitative, more than anything, must not be admitted looks, in my 
opinion, even more manifest now that the soul's forms have been 
separated out. 
How do you mean? 
Between us - and don't denounce me to the tragic poets and all the 
other imitators - all such things seem to maim the thought of those 
who hear them and do not have the knowledge of how they really 
are as an antidote. (2 7 
In this exchange Plato indicates that he is aware that his treatment of art can 
only be justified on the basis of the imposition of the theory of forms. This 
theory, in that it establishes the "real nature" of art, enables him to 
substantiate the claims which he has made in Book Three. In arguing that the 
artist merely copies that which is in itself a copy of the form, Plato is able 
to employ an argument which establishes that the skill of the artist is 
necessarily less than that of the craftsman. This is because the craftsman 
creates the object in relation, and with reference, to knowledge of the form 
itself. However the artist only creates his work by reference to the object 
created by the craftsman. Hence the claim that the work of art is a "third 
remove" from the truth. These arguments deny the validity of any objection 
which appeals to the apparent "reality" of that which is presented by the 
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artist, annulling their relevance automatically. Anyone who wants to make a 
claim about the status of the work of art has been simply seduced by its 
power, they have been deceived by its illusions. It is therefore impossible to 
challenge Plato's characterisation on its own terms. This schema manages to 
impose a set of criteria which allows for the denigration of the artist and his 
skills, for built into these criteria is the explicit assumption that the artist 
"knows nothing worth mentioning about what he imitates; imitation is a kind of 
play and not serious; and those who take up tragic poetry in iambics and in 
epics are all imitators in the highest possible degree". (281 This prescriptive 
denunciation of the status of the work of the art - in particular, the tragic 
drama - enables Plato also to apply his arguments to the spectator, and to 
create a distinction between those who are seduced by art and those who are 
aware of its inferior status. In turn this leads him to create a division 
between the irrational arts of poetry and drama, which appeal to the lower 
elements of the human - i. e. to emotion and feelings - and the higher rational 
elements of thought which pursue the quest for wisdom and justice by recourse 
to theoretical modes of explanation. C291 This distinction can therefore be 
understood as the first systematic manifestation of the division between 
philosophy and the aesthetic. 
However, is this rigid schematism as invincible and invulnerable to attack as it 
at first sight appears to be? For all the explanations given here still do not 
explain why Plato feels it necessary to attack and denounce the poets whilst at 
the same time apparently honouring them. To address this question further, it 
is necessary to return to the last remark that Plato makes in the passage cited 
earlier, for two equivocal - and thus potentially useful - utterances are to be 
found here. In the first Plato is adamant that the works of the poets will 
-42- 
harm the observer; so adamant, in fact, that he demands that the observer is 
given an "antidote" to ward off the effects of the imitative arts. The Greek 
terminology used here is very interesting in that the word that is translated 
as "antidote" is in fact the medical term Pharmakon, a drug that can be used 
as both a poison and a cure. (30] Thus Plato is demanding that the observer 
must have taken the correct dose of Platonic theory before watching the drama 
so that they are able to see the spectacle for what it is; so they are able to 
observe the "mere imitations" that are presented before them, and so that they 
can subsequently be able to attribute it to the correct theoretical category. 
However, if the double-edged meaning of the term Pharmakon is taken into 
account, is it not equally possible to suggest that this prescription of Platonic 
theory can in fact also be understood as a poison? As it is expressed in the 
translation, the theory offers an "antidote" to the observer to protect them 
from the effects of the drama, but what is there to prevent an outsider from 
suggesting that this "antidote" is to be understood more as a drug which 
controls and allows the observer to see only that which the state wants; i. e. it 
is the introduction of a theoretical filter which acts as the poison which leaves 
the observer immune to the troublesome disruptive effects of mimesis. The 
introduction of the theoretical understanding of mimesis "poisons" the observer 
to any other point of view; i. e. they become blind to the potentially disruptive 
movement of that which is presented to them, they refuse to see the process of 
mimesis. Furthermore, like any successful poisoner, Plato is fairly subtle in his 
administration of the lethal prescription, he is able to seduce at least some 
observers into believing in the "good" of this poison. It is the philosophers 
who swallow the largest draft of the Platonic Pharmakon and this has far 
reaching consequences. For Plato's prescriptive judgement against the poets 
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introduces the modes of thought and methods of enquiry which will come to be 
used as the touchstone for all subsequent philosophical investigations. 
However, not everyone is prepared to accept the Platonic Pharmakon readily 
and unquestioningly. Plato is all too aware of this, thus perhaps the apparently 
throwaway statement he makes just before the introduction of the drug where 
he comments that he doesn't want the tragedians and other writers of that kind 
to know why it is that he is able to object to their work. This is strange for 
several reasons. First, if the motivation underlying his maieutic project is a 
desire to enable everyone to be freed from their prior illusions and delusions 
concerning the nature of truth, it is unusual that Plato is here apparently 
discriminating against the poets. Surely if the task in which they are engaged 
is so liable to lead people astray, they ought to be the first group to be 
enlightened about the folly of their enterprise so as to prevent them from 
continuing to mislead others. However, according to this comment this is not the 
case. An alternative explanation is that if the tragedians do get to know what 
is wrong with their work, they may be able to devise ways and means to 
combat Plato's objections; i. e. they may find their own antidote to his poison, 
they may modify the drama in such a way that the boundaries between fiction 
and fact, truth and illusion become even more blurred and potentially 
corrupting. Both these explanations presuppose a rational fear or problem is 
being addressed. This is not the case. A third alternative is that in response 
to learning Socrates' justification for not telling them why they are being 
victimised, the poets will simply laugh. For as was suggested earlier, perhaps 
not everyone is so prepared to swallow the substances administered by the 
Platonic apothecary, not everyone wants to become immune to the seductive 
powers of mimesis. If the poets do laugh in response to Plato's theory, it is 
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certain that they are not laughing with him, but rather at him. If Plato wished 
to find an explanation for their laughter, he need go no further than taking to 
heart the maxim of the delphic oracle, "Know thyself". If the process of self- 
examination takes place, sooner or later he will come across the following 
statement, made in the centre of his explanation of the position of the 
philosopher-ruler. He writes, 
For... a man who has his understanding truly turned toward the 
things that are has no leisure to look down toward the affairs of 
human beings and to be filled with envy and ill will as a result of 
fighting with them. But, rather, because he sees and contemplates 
things that are set in a regular arrangement and are always in the 
same condition... he imitates them and, as much as possible, makes 
himself like them. Or do you suppose there is any way of keeping 
someone from imitating that which he admires and therefore keeps 
company with? 
It's not possible, he said... 
... Now if the many become aware that what we are saying about this 
man is true, will they then be harsh with the philosophers and 
distrust us when we say that a city could never be happy otherwise 
than by having its outlines drawn by the painters who imitate the 
divine pattern? (311 
Throughout this passage Plato refers to the process in which the philosopher 
constructs the ideal state using mimetic terminology. The "painters" who draft 
the blue-prints of the state "imitate the divine pattern". Similarly, the 
-philosopher "imitates" the "things that are set in a regular arrangement" in 
order to elevate himself into "company with the divine". In all these instances 
the term employed in the Greek original derives from the root word 
"Mfineisthaf'. Hence it would be tempting to suggest that in his attempt to 
outline the details of the ideal state, Plato has succumbed to practising the 
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arts which the state explicitly forbids. His texts are riddled with examples of 
the mimetic arts; he creates allegories to illustrate and elucidate the theories 
which he puts forward. Therefore, in admitting that philosophers are also 
imitators it might be supposed that Plato is transgressing the distinction which 
allowed him to bar the poets, thus allowing his own system to be called into 
question. However, these conclusions are too hasty: they fail to take into 
account one crucial difference which separates these instances of the use of 
mimesis from the way which it is employed by the poets. From his treatment of 
the poets it might be supposed that Plato's objection to their work is based 
solely upon the fact that it is mimetic; i. e. it is "merely imitative". This 
interpretation could lead to the conclusion that it is the mimetic element itself 
which Plato objects to in the poet's work. However this is not the case. Plato 
does not establish any arguments against mimesis per se anywhere in his 
writings. He does not condemn the mimetic process itself, rather what he 
objects to is the way in which it is employed. The mimetic process in itself can 
never be judged to be right or wrong, good or bad. What is to be judged is 
the use to which the mimetic process is put. Thus the philosopher's use of 
mimesis is good for it is directed towards the imitation of the forms, providing 
examples of the correct modes of thought and reason. However the poet's 
employment of mimesis is problematic because they do not possess the correct 
forms of knowledge and wisdom, hence they produce images which are corrupting 
_ 
and challenge the order which the philosophers wish to impose. 
An example from Plato's own text can be used to reinforce this interpretation. 
When Plato is outlining the forms of education that are appropriate for the 
Guardians it is apposite to note that he does not expel all the poets from the 
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Republic. After the statements which outline the ceremony which accompanies the 
poets' expulsion, Plato remarks, 
... we ourselves would use a more austere and 
less pleasing poet and 
teller of tales for the sake of our benefit, one who would imitate 
the style of the decent man and would say what he says in those 
models that we set down as laws at the beginning, when we took to 
educate the soldiers. [327 
From this statement it is clear that some poets will remain in the state. 
However the ones who are allowed to stay are limited to those who provide 
works which are edifying and instructive. They follow the "models" that have 
been prescribed earlier in the dialogue; i. e. they are the poets whose works 
only depict Gods as good, kings as just, etc. As Plato admits, these poets are 
"more austere and less pleasing" but they are the only ones who can be 
tolerated, for the images of the others necessarily corrupt. This example 
demonstrates that Plato is not concerned so much with the mimetic process; he 
will allow some forms of imitation to be practised in the state. Rather, his 
objections are levelled at the content of the mimetic production. The arguments 
that he levels against the content of the poets' productions are two-fold. First, 
according to the arguments given in Book Three, they produce images which are 
corrupting for they show people acting against their true natures. Secondly, in 
the arguments employed in Book Ten, Plato objects to the images of the poets 
because they are only third hand copies of the "original". The artist does not 
have access to the world of forms, he only copies them as they appear in the 
world. Thus the images that they produce are necessarily limited. [33] In both 
these instances it can be seen that Plato is not offering any objections to the 
process in which the work of art is created. He is not in any way criticising 
the mimetic process itself, he is criticising its content. 
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If Plato does not object entirely to the mimetic arts, why is it that the 
expulsion of the poets has come to be seen to mark the moment of division 
between philosophy and the work of art? The answer lies in the fact that, 
although Plato does not object to the mimetic process in itself, by constraining 
it within the boundaries of his theoretical system he severely limits the use to 
which it can be put. In fact, as is suggested by this dialogue and others. [34] 
the mimetic process can only be tolerated when it is being used to further 
philosophy's own ends. The majority of the poets will always remain outside the 
gates of the city ruled by philosophers. 
Furthermore, in the light of the analysis and interpretation I have given here I 
want to suggest that Plato's analysis of the work of art fails even to start to 
investigate the nature of mimesis when it is understood as process. As I 
suggested in the first section, this is because the imposition of the Platonic 
metaphysical schema - i. e. the theory of forms - automatically annulls any 
questioning of the status of that which is presented through the mimetic 
process. The theory of forms provides the Platonic theorist with an a priori 
explanation of the status of the mimetic process. The image is always a "third 
remove" from the truth. This sidelines any possible investigation into the 
nature of mimesis, declaring it redundant and secondary. (35] That is, it belongs 
to the realm of the aesthetic, not to philosophy. Hence the absence of any 
sustained discussion of the nature of the work of art as an aesthetic 
phenomenon. 
For an explanation and description of the way in which mimesis contributes to 
the creation and functioning of the tragic form it is necessary to look 
elsewhere; but one needs to look no further than the discussion by Aristotle in 
the Poetics. 
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1.4. Aristotle, Mimesis and Trapedy; The Revenge of the Poets. 
In the following discussion I do not intend to offer a full interpretation of the 
arguments of Aristotle's Poetics, for this would take me too far away from the 
main focus of this debate. My interest is not in the details of Aristotle's text 
-I am not concerned primarily with his interpretation of the internal 
components of the tragedy - rather I am interested in showing how Aristotle 
introduces and employs an alternative understanding of mimesis. My analysis of 
this text will be necessarily selective, only highlighting the parts which have 
direct relevance to the question of the nature of mimesis. 
The first point that needs to be made in relation to this work is that insofar 
as it is a treatise that focuses solely on the nature of the work of art, it 
marks the point of the emergence of the separation of the aesthetic from the 
theoretical per se. By discussing the nature of the aesthetic object in a manner 
which is informed by external theoretical presuppositions - i. e. moral, political, 
epistemological - but yet treating it as a phenomenon of worth which can be 
examined in its own right, the notion of the discipline of aesthetics becomes 
manifest. This is demonstrated by the way in which in Chapter Nine Aristotle 
differentiates between poetical and historical modes of truth. Interestingly, in 
opposition to Plato, Aristotle wishes to claim that poetical truth is more 
philosophical than historical truth in that poetry is concerned with universals, 
whilst history can depict only specific events. Hence it can be inferred from 
this division that the criteria of judgement which are used in relation to the 
work of art will necessarily differ from those applied to actual events. This 
is because historical truths are limited for they can only refer to "things that 
have happened", whilst the scope of poetical truths are much larger for they 
can portray "the kinds of events that are possible according to probability or 
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necessity. "[361 This distinction emphasises how greatly Aristotle's discussion 
and treatment of poetry dif fers from Plato's insofar as the former's 
understanding of the nature of poetical truths does not attempt to limit or 
control what can be portrayed by referring to higher theoretical principles. 
Thus, as long as an event is "probable" it is suitable for depiction by the 
poet. 
At the beginning of the text, Aristotle establishes his definition of the 
nature of the work of art, whether epic or tragic poetry, dithyrambic poetry, 
or music, by arguing that they can all be described as "forms of imitation". 
This definition is then expanded further by the statement that, 
They, [the works of art] differ from one another in three respects: 
viz in the fact that the imitating has (1) different media, (2) 
different objects, or, (3) different modes or methods. (37] 
This statement shows that Aristotle considers mimesis - i. e. the process of 
imitation - to be the common element in the definition of the work of art. 
From this description, it might be assumed that Aristotle's understanding of 
the term mimesis is similar to Plato's insofar as he is referring apparently to 
a form of copying and replication. On a certain level this is correct, for 
Aristotle argues that the underlying motivation for mimetic presentation is the 
desire to produce likenesses of phenomena that are observed in the world, and 
that it is through this process of imitation that man starts to learn. In fact 
imitation is described as being "a part of man's nature from childhood". (381 
However, when Aristotle starts to distinguish the between the various forms of 
art the way in which his views differ from Plato's starts to become clearer. 
From the statements that are made in Chapter Five it is clear that Aristotle 
considers tragedy to be the most complete art form, because it is a combination 
of all the others. Tragedy can contain elements of the epic but "not everything 
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the tragedy has is present in the epic. " This helps to explain why Aristotle's 
discussion proceeds to concentrate on the features of the tragic drama. In 
focussing on the tragic drama, he is able to analyse the features which make up 
the most complete, hence the highest, work of art. It is in chapter six that 
Aristotle gives his summary of the "essential nature " of the tragedy, outlining 
the main features of its component parts. He states, 
Tragedy then is an imitation of an action which is serious, complete 
and has bulk, in speech that has been made attractive, using each of 
its species separately in the parts of the play.. . And since tragedy is 
an imitation of an action, and is enacted by certain people through 
action, who must necessarily have certain qualities of thought and 
character... and since it is the plot which is the imitation of the 
action (for by "plot" I mean here the organisation of the events) ... it 
follows necessarily that the constituent elements of the tragic art 
are six in number ... they are plot and characters, speech composition 
and thought, visual appearance and song-composition. [391 
To understand how this description of the functioning of the mimetic process in 
the drama differs from Plato's, I want to refer to the analysis which Paul 
Ricoeur gives in Volume One of Time and Narrative. As Ricoeur points out, in 
this description of the components of the tragedy Aristotle establishes an 
equivalence and "quasi-identification" between the expressions "imitation of an 
action" and "the organisation of events". The two terms imitation and plot, 
(mimesis and muthos) are inextricably linked together. Furthermore, neither term 
is to be understood as referring to a "structure" or static entity. Rather, both 
refer to the active process of construction; i. e. the process of imitation, the 
process of "emplotment"140]. The "organisation of events" - the process of 
emplotment - is the imitation of the action. Having shown how these two terms 
are linked, Ricoeur then uses this analysis to show how far removed Aristotle's 
understanding of mimesis is from Plato's. He writes, 
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This equivalence first of all excludes any interpretation of 
Aristotle's mimesis in terms of a copy or identical replica. Imitating 
or representing is a mimetic activity inasmuch as it produces 
something, namely, the organisation of events by emplotment. With 
one stroke we leave behind the Platonic use of mimesis, both in its 
metaphysical sense and its technical one in book 3 of the 
Republic... the metaphysical sense of mimesis, [is] associated with the 
concept of participation, by means of which things imitate ideas, and 
works of art imitate things. Platonic mimesis thereby distances the 
work of art by twice over from the ideal model which is its 
ultimate basis. Aristotle's mimesis has just a single space wherein it 
is unfolded - human making [fairel, the arts of composition. (411 
This description summarises succinctly the differences between Aristotle and 
Plato's understanding and use of mimesis. In placing the emphasis of the 
analysis on the process of imitation - the process of the organisation of the 
events - Aristotle removes the link between the object which is presented and 
that to which it refers which is always presupposed in the Platonic use of the 
term. Aristotelian mimesis refers to the presentation, the process of the 
production of the work of art, which as Ricoeur states, "has just a single 
space wherein it is unfolded". It can be seen that this interpretation correlates 
with the analysis I gave in section one concerning the way in which actual 
dramatic presentation disrupts the rig id distinction between appearance and 
reality. Aristotle's understanding of mimesis as the process of imitation 
emphasises the fact that the drama is a form of production; it is always a 
presentation. As Ricoeur states later in his analysis "The action is the 
"construct" of that construction which the mimetic activity consists of. "(421 
This difficult statement can be used to summarise the relationship between the 
process of imitation, the plot, and its presentation. The actions, the events 
which are presented on the stage are the unfolding of the process of the 
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mimetic production. However, this process of production cannot be thought 
separately from the action itself. That which is presented is the mimetic 
production. The use of the term "production" in this context is to be 
understood in both its nominal and adjectival sense. What is presented is the 
production of the production. Furthermore, the characters and events of the play 
which are presented on the stage are not to be understood as separate entities 
which can be divorced from the process of production. Rather, the process and 
the result are identical. This can be substantiated by Aristotle's comment that 
... plot is the foundation or as 
it were the soul of the tragic art, 
with character portrayal second.. . it 
is in fact an imitation of an 
action and for that reason, rather than any other, an imitation of 
the dramatic persons. t43] 
This remark suggests that it is through the "imitation of the action" that the 
characters of the drama are established. In that the "organisation of events" is 
equivalent to the "imitation of the action", this means that it is the action 
which necessarily determines the forms of character that are presented. The 
process of mimesis creates, generates the individuality of the characters, but 
they too, cannot be considered separate from this process of generation. 
However this does not mean that Aristotle is limiting the types of character 
and plot that may be generated. Although he will comment on the types of plot 
and character that are appropriate to tragedy, these are not to be understood 
as being defined in relation to a wider metaphysical system as occurs in 
_. 
Plato[441. As I stated earlier, this is because Aristotle wants to show that 
the work of art is not a debased form, it can present "universal truths" for it 
is capable of showing "what can happen" rather than what has happened. Hence 
it can be seen that in defining mimesis in terms of process, Aristotle allows 
-53- 
the work of art to have value, albeit one that is not recognised by the 
dominant Platonic tradition. 
Conclusion. 
To conclude this chapter I want briefly to summarise the arguments that I have 
presented. In the first section I discussed the role of tragedy in the Greek 
state, and argued that this can be seen to generate two types of problem. The 
first problem concerned the relation between the drama and the context in which 
it was performed. The second problem concerned the status of the dramatic 
image. However, it is clear that these two problems are inextricably interlinked, 
for both relate back to the question of the status of the mimetic presentation. 
However, as I argued, the mimetic image is not considered problematic until it 
confronts the modes of thought of the philosopher who wishes to be able to 
impose control and order; i. e. they desire to understand the nature of the 
image. Thus, in the second section, I showed Plato's response to the dramatic 
presentation, namely that in subsuming it under the wider categories of his 
thought, he is able to denigrate and thus legislate against it. However, this 
means that Plato is unable to give an account of the process whereby the 
mimetic presentation is created that is not based upon the prior suppositions of 
his theoretical system. As I stated, Plato does not discuss the nature of 
mimetic production itself, he does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the 
processes which are internal to the generation of the work of art. It is only in 
Aristotle's Poetics that such an analysis can be found. In discussing this work 
I highlighted how Aristotle's understanding of mimesis as a dynamic process 
leads to the possibility of a different understanding of both the nature of 
mimetic production and the status of the work of art. 
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However, as I will show in the next chapter, it is the Platonic understanding of 
mimesis that gains the ascendancy and informs much of the subsequent 
formulations of the function of mimesis and the status of the work of art. This 
understanding only starts to be challenged in the aftermath of the so-called 
"Quarrel of Ancients and Moderns" which introduces a new dimension into the 
debate. This is because the question concerning the nature of the imitation is 
compounded by the introduction of an historical dimension. Discussion of the 
process of mimesis does not therefore refer simply to the way in which work 
of art is generated, but must refer also after the quarrel to the relationship 
between the work and its historical precedents. As I will argue, the process of 
the creation of the work is re-evaluated, introducing an alternative 
understanding of mimesis which is much more akin to the interpretation of 
Aristotle's Poetics which I have just outlined. 
-55- 
Chapter Two. 
Hölderlin and Greece. 
2.1. Introduction. 
At midnight on December 31st 1798, Johann Friedrich Hölderlin celebrated the 
arrival of the new year, not with a toast among friends, but rather by writing 
a long letter to his brother. Towards the end of this letter, he comments, 
Oh Greece with your geniality and your piety, whereto have you 
come? I myself, too, despite all good will, merely stumble in my 
deeds and thoughts after these only human beings in the world, and 
in what I do and say I am often only the more inept and 
inconsistent because I stand like geese, with my flat feet in the 
modern water and helplessly beat my wings up to the Greek sky. Do 
not scold me for the simile. It is unseemly but true, and among 
ourselves something like that is still acceptable; also it shall only 
be said of me. 
O Griechenland, mit deiner Genialität und deiner Frömmigkeit, wo 
bist du hingekommen? Auch ich, mit allem guten Willen, tappe mit 
meinem Tun und Denken diesen einzigen Menschen in der Welt nur 
nach, und bin in dem, was ich treibe und sage, oft nur um so 
ungeschickter und ungereimter, weil ich wie die Gänse mit platten 
Füßen im modernen Wasser stehe, und unmächtig zum griechischen 
Himmel emporflüge. Nimm mir das Gleichnis nicht übel. Es ist 
unschicklich, aber wahr, und unter uns gehet so was noch wohl an, 
soll auch nur mir gesagt sein. j>> 
These remarks reflect the complexity of the time in which Hölderlin is writing. 
His relationship to the thought and culture of the Greeks is influenced by 
several, often conflicting, movements of thought. Although on first reading it 
could be presumed that these remarks position Hölderlin firmly within the 
German classicist tradition, such easy categorisation is not possible. Hölderlin 
mourns the loss of Greek culture and ideals, but he is also aware of the 
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unbridgeable gap between antiquity and his own time. As he comments in this 
letter to his brother his "flat feet" are firmly in "the modern water". As I 
argued in the introduction to this study, the thought of the late 18th century 
is characterised by the development of a sense of self-reflection. Hölderlin 
acknowledges that he speaks from the perspective of the modern, and this 
necessarily affects his understanding of the relationship between the world of 
Ancient Greece and his own time. 
Thus, in order to understand Hölderlin's own writings on Greece it is first 
necessary to summarise briefly the contemporary context of his thought. I shall 
then argue that Hölderlin's position is opposed to his contemporaries and that 
the point of dissension is located in Hölderlin's problematisation of the way in 
which the mimetic relationship between Greece and Germany is to be understood. 
I shall offer an interpretation of the short fragment The Perspective from 
which We have to look at Antictuity (Der Gesichtspunct aus dem wir das 
Altertum anzusehen haben) which dates from 1799. The views expressed in this 
fragment will then be compared with the statements that Höiderlin makes in the 
first letter to Bölendorff written on the 4th December 1801. The focus of the 
discussion will be to ascertain exactly how Hölderlin's conception of the mimetic 
relationship between Greece and Germany - the mythical past and the present 
modernity - differs from the traditional Classicist arguments, and to assess 
the implications that may be drawn from this reappraisal for the debate 
concerning the nature of Hölderlin's - and perhaps our own - modernity 
2.2. Two Conflicting Interpretations of Mimesis. 
One way in which the question concerning Hölderlin's attempt to comprehend the 
relation between Greece and Germany can be confronted is by situating it in 
relation to the discussion in the last chapter concerning the way in which the 
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concept of mimesis is to be understood. As I argued in the conclusion there, the 
meaning and understanding of mimesis is complicated further by the introduction 
of a historical perspective. Hence in the 17th and 18th centuries, the term 
mimesis has to refer not only to the relationship between the work of art and 
the "original" of which it is a copy - eg. the relation between the painting of 
a flower, and the "actual" flower which blooms in the field - but also to the 
relationship between the work of art and its historical precedents. The artist 
must be aware that they are working within a tradition which is necessarily 
self-referential and self-perpetuating. The artist establishes the relative merit 
of his or her work by placing it in relation to other works of art. Hence the 
Classicist movement establishes the work of ancient Greece as the paradigm 
example against which all other works are to be measured. This elevation of 
the qualities of one society over another provides the basis for the re- 
evaluation of the way in which the concept of history is understood. In the 
17th and early 18th centuries the introduction of rationalist, scientific modes 
of thought devalued the idea of historical modes of understanding. True 
knowledge was understood to be necessarily ahistorical and universal. Hence, for 
aesthetic judgements to be valid they must have recourse to universal principles 
of beauty and order. This is exemplified in the development of French classicist 
theory - e. g. the work of theorists such as Boileau - where it is argued that 
for a work to be beautiful it must be truthful. This imperative is based upon 
an ahistorical understanding of both beauty and truth; the terms refer to 
universally known and verifiable concepts-. 131 This belief in universal truths and 
concepts corresponds to an understanding of history as cyclical. It suggests 
that there is a universal standard of perfection to which each society aspires 
and against which it is to be measured. It is the questions and aporias raised 
by this notion of universality which generated the first "round" of the 
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"Quarrel of Ancient and Moderns". As Karl Menges argues in his article in 
Eighteenth-Century German Authors and their Aesthetic Theories, in the early 
stages of the development of the Quarrel in France, both parties shared a 
common belief in the validity of the idea of a universal "historical greatness". 
Neither party is concerned to establish the qualitative differences between the 
ancients and moderns - as occurs in relativist theories of history; rather they 
focus upon judging and evaluating their own time. 141 When discussing these 
early instances of the quarrel, Menges contends that, 
The only difference rests with the fact that the Ancients place 
classical perfection at the beginning of history, with the consequence 
that its imitation is considered the only possibility to gain a 
similar status. The Moderns on the other hand, view the splendour 
of French Absolutism as indicative of the end of the historical 
cycle, thus offering ample evidence that classical greatness does not 
have to be limited to Antiquity but that it can re-occur - through 
emulation - in a quantitatively identical or even superior form. In 
that sense, the cultures of the two classical ages ultimately merge 
in the perception of their outstanding characteristics which is 
possible only because this perception does not extend into the 
realisation of their qualitative difference; or to put it differently, 
because it is not yet supported by an historical consciousness, 
developed enough for an individual differentiation of the ages.! 51 
However, Menges proceeds to demonstrate that as the thought of the French 
Enlightenment develops and matures, there is a corresponding reassessment of 
how the idea of historical development is to be understood. The "progress" 
made in thought necessarily involves a re-evaluation of how history is 
comprehended. Hence, there is a move away from a cyclical understanding of 
historical development towards the idea of linear development and continual 
progress and enlightenment. This move comes about because of the gradually 
developing awareness of the unique nature of each individual era. Belief in the 
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Enlightenment ideas of progress and development must entail the notion that the 
present time is necessarily better than the previous time. This judgement is 
based upon a qualitative assessment between eras; in relation to the arguments 
of the French Quarrel, this means that the debate culminates in an effective 
truce because there is the recognition of the relative nature of the arguments 
proposed by both sides which means that there can be no external criteria to 
which the proponents can have recourse. The fight degenerates into squabbles 
concerning individual preference and taste. However, the most important outcome 
of this debate is the development of a notion of historical consciousness; the 
society and culture becomes aware of itself as unique, thus introducing the 
possibility of self-questioning and self-evaluation. 
It is against this background that the rise of the German Classicist movement 
must be set. Whilst German aesthetic theory is necessarily influenced by the 
debates surrounding the Quarrel, it never engages directly in the arguments or 
adopts entirely the conclusions which are drawn. At the latest from Lessing 
onwards there is active opposition to French classicist regulations, particularly 
in the theatre. It must also be remembered that the nation state of Germany 
did not exist; in the 18th century "Germany" comprised a large number of 
separate principalities - with Prussia as the dominant state - each of which 
fiercely guarded its own identity. Hence, although the Enlightenment notion of 
progress and historical development is adopted in German thought, it takes a 
different form. 161 This is demonstrated most clearly in the writings of J. 
Winckelmann, the writer who formulated the main precepts of German Classicist 
theory. In his influential article, Thoughts on the Imitation of the Painting and 
Sculpture of the Greeks, (1755) Winckelmann acknowledges that there is a 
difference between eras. However, rather than celebrating the work of 
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contemporary artists as the achievements of an enlightened age, Winckelmann 
sees these works as symptomatic of a decline in standards and skill. The 
contemporary German artist must not look towards his or her immediate 
ancestors in France or Britain for instruction on how to proceed, instead they 
must return to the birthplace of art; they must look towards the works of 
ancient Greece. Thus, Winckelmann's famous demand with which he begins the 
essay Thoughts..., "The only way for us to become great, and indeed - if this 
is possible - inimitable is by imitating the ancients. "(71 It is this imperative 
which motivates the entire German Classicist tradition. The only way in which 
German art can be revived and progress is by emulation of the Greek models 
and ideals. This idea becomes the rallying cry for subsequent generations of 
German writers and artists. However, it is clear that the form of mimesis 
advocated by this movement is much more akin to a notion of imitatio", it refers 
to the restrictive copying of prescribed models, not to the actual process 
whereby the artist creates the work of art. t8] Furthermore, although 
Winckelmann and his followers are aware of the qualitative difference between 
eras - in fact it is this which leads them to advocate the emulation of the 
Greek model - they are unable to offer a positive analysis of the present 
situation which they face. That is, in demanding that the Germans emulate the 
Greeks, they are implicitly providing a negative diagnosis of the state of 
modern culture. For the thinkers of Winckelmann's generation this is not 
_problematic 
for they believe that the programme of emulation which they will 
institute will bring about a renaissance in German culture. However, by the time 
that the second and third generation of the followers of Classicism emerge, the 
problem becomes more acute. The much vaunted revival of Greek ideals has not 
been fully effective, thus a more sophisticated response is called for. This is 
provided by the work of Hölderlin's contemporaries, F. Schiller and F. Schlegel. 
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It is outside the scope of this study to provide a detailed outline of the work 
of these two thinkers. (9] However, in relation to the present discussion it is 
sufficient to state that both thinkers complicate the manner in which the 
relation between Ancient Greece and contemporary Germany is understood, 
through the introduction of a dialectical understanding of history. In Schiller's 
writings Greece is viewed as the ideal, unified society from which the modern, 
fractured society is irretrievably distanced. However, through the emergence of 
a growing awareness of the split nature of the modern society, it is proposed 
that humanity can start to work towards a reconciliation between the two 
cultures in the utopian concept of the "ideal". The Greek and the modern, 
nature and civilisation will be reconciled through the "aesthetic education" of 
humanity. This aesthetic education will occur initially in and through the work 
of the poet. ( l o] As I shall argue in Chapter 3 of this study, the aesthetic 
sphere becomes central to this process because it was perceived that purely 
theoretical modes of thought are symptomatic of the malaise of the modern time 
for they are unable to bring about the reconciliation which is needed. This can 
only occur in the sphere of the aesthetic. The individual poet or artist hence 
becomes central to the process. In the introduction of the dialectical 
understanding of historical progress there is a subtle re-evaluation of the role 
and function of the individual artist. The artist does not simply copy the pre- 
existing models, as is advocated by the Classicism of Winckelmann, rather they 
become actively engaged in the process of progress. Hence this opens the 
possibility for a different understanding of the process of mimesis. The artist 
is not simply an emulator or copier, they are viewed also as active creators. 
In fact, this re-assessment of the status of the artist does not occur ex nihilo 
with the emergence of dialectical forms of thought. Between Winckelmann's 
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Classicist initiative and the full development of "Classical Weimar" there is 
also the development of a counter movement which rejects the classicist precepts 
entirely. This is, of course, the Sturm und Drang movement led by writers such 
as J. M. R. Lenz and H. W. von Gerstenberg. This movement can also be viewed as 
a reaction to French Classicist poetics and the emergence of enlightenment modes 
of thought. As Helga Madland shows in her book Non-Aristotelian Drama in 
Eighteenth Century Germany and its Modernity. J. M. R Lenz, throughout the first 
half of the 18th century, German dramatic theorists move away increasingly 
from an adherence to either Aristotelian or French Classicist theories and 
develop their own understanding of the place and function of the work of art. 
An integral element of these theories involves a re-evaluation of the status of 
the artist. This occurs because once the artist is freed from the imperative to 
follow prescriptive rules regarding composition and form they are allowed to 
create works of art which reflect their own concerns and understanding of the 
world. I11I Thus the artist is not constrained entirely by rules which define 
how they are to emulate or imitate the world of nature. The artist must not 
simply be a copier of pre-existing models, rather he or she must also be 
viewed as a creator. t 121 Thus, as Madland remarks in relation to Lenz's text 
Anmerkungen übers Theater, 
Lenz reminds the reader that the writing of a drama requires a 
"poet, " "einen Dichter". A poet possesses talents and capabilities not 
shared by non-poets - he is able to represent nature in an 
aesthetic fashion, as opposed to the factual rendition of the 
historian. The implication here is that the result of the poet's 
attempt to imitate nature is no longer a copy, but a re-creation of 
reality... Certainly Lenz, unlike a number of earlier theoreticians, 
rejects the imitation of traditional literature: a poet must create not 
copy, before he is worthy of the name "poet". [13] 
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It is apparent from these comments that the understanding of mimesis employed 
by these writers is much closer to Ricoeur's interpretation which I outlined in 
the previous chapter. Mimesis is understood in terms of the process of creation; 
i. e. mimesis is seen as a mode of poiesis, as a form of "making". It refers to 
the active process of construction, rather than the static imitation of an 
already existing model, be it the rules governing the form of a dramatic genre 
- e. g. French Classicism's interpretation of Aristotle - or the "ideal" example 
provided by a work of art - e. g. Winckelmann's analysis of the qualities of the 
Laocoon. Thus, the Sturm und Drang writers redefine the status of the 
individual artist through the emphasis which they place on the "originality" of 
the work. The work must necessarily reflect the mood and feelings of the 
artist; it is an expression of their own, unique point of view. In the work the 
artist offers their interpretation and understanding of the world. Thus the 
work of art is to be viewed as a product of a certain specific historical 
situation; it expresses the specific situation of an individual artist. 
These ideas, in particular the celebration of the position of the individual 
artist as creator, form the basis of the Sturm und Drang movement. In his 
early years, Schiller was heavily influenced by this movement and this helps to 
explain where the emphasis which he places upon the function of the individual 
poet originated. Furthermore, from this discussion it is clear that when 
Hölderlin starts to consider the relationship between Greece and contemporary 
Germany, he is confronted with two conflicting conceptions of the mimetic 
project. In the Classicist tradition mimesis is understood as the imitation of 
the models provided by ancient Greek art, whilst in contemporary poetics, the 
artist is viewed as the imitator who re-creates in and through the production 
of the work of art the world which they perceive. Hölderlin is influenced by 
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both these traditions, and as I shall show in the following sections, he 
attempts to develop a form of theoretical understanding which utilises both. 
However, as will become evident in the course of the discussion, in considering 
both these interpretations of the function of mimesis, Hölderlin encounters a 
problem which will cause him to separate his opinions from t hose held by 
Schiller and his other contemporaries. 
2.2. The "Perspectives" Fragment. 
Although Hölderlin is preoccupied with Ancient Greece throughout his work, it 
is not until 1799 that he engages with the problem of the relation between 
Antiquity and Modernity from a theoretical perspective. This occurs in the 
fragmentary text, The Perspective From Which We Have to Look at Antiquity. 
The fragment can be divided into two main parts. In the first part, Hölderlin 
outlines the situation which faces the contemporary artist particularly with 
reference to their problematic relation to the given tradition. In the second half 
he offers his own response to the analysis he has given and proposes a solution 
to the problems he has outlined. 
The first difference between Hölderlin and his contemporaries is established 
immediately by the tone of the work. He writes, 
We dream of education, piety, p. p. and have none whatsoever; it is 
assumed - we dream of originality and autonomy; we believe to be 
saying all kinds of new things and, still, all this is reaction, as it 
were, a mild revenge against the slavery with which we have 
behaved towards antiquity. 
Wir träumen von Bildung, Frömmigkeit pp und haben gar keine, sie 
ist angenommen - wir träumen von Originalität und Selbstständigkeit, 
wir glauben lauter Neues zu sagen, und alles diB ist doch Reaction, 
gleichsam eine milde Rache gegen die Knechtschaft, womit wir uns 
verhalten haben gegen das Altertum ... 
1141 
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In these opening remarks two different opinions are being challenged. Firstly, in 
describing Germany's relationship to Greece as one of "slavery" it is clear that 
Hölderlin is criticising the Classicists who have uncritically advocated that the 
Greeks offer the only standards against which the work of art can be judged. 
It is probable that Winckelmann and his followers are those whom Hölderlin 
here has in mind. [I57 However, he is also challenging the presumption that it is 
possible to adopt a diametrically opposed position; i. e. to argue for the creation 
of a totally new set of ideas and values which owe nothing to the previous 
traditions. This point underlies the opening statement of the fragment "We 
dream of education, piety, p. p. and have none whatsoever; it is assumed. " These 
remarks suggest that it is impossible to create the absolutely new; Hölderlin is 
challenging the assumption that a culture may be able to create a movement or 
idea that is original. An idea, even if it is apparently innovative, owes its very 
innovativeness to that against which it is a reaction. To dream of achieving 
either "originality" or "autonomy" is exactly that; it is a mythical fiction, a 
project which can never be realised. How then can a society progress if, as is 
apparently being suggested here, it can never rid itself of what has gone 
before? Hölderlin's response to this problem appears initially to be very 
negative. He states, 
There seems to be indeed hardly any other choice than to be 
oppressed by what has been assumed and by what is positive, or 
with violent effort, to oppose as a living force everything learnt, 
given, positive. 
Es scheint wirklich fast keine andere Wahl offen zu seyn, erdrückt 
zu werden von Angenommenem, und Positivem, oder, mit gewaltsamer 
Anmaaßung, sich gegen alles erlernte, gegebene, positive, als 
lebendige Kraft entgegenzusezen. tI61 
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Hölderlin does not appear to have much hope or enthusiasm for either of the 
alternatives which are here suggested, and in the following paragraphs he 
explains the reasons for this negative diagnosis of the situation. He argues that 
the problems arise out of the unavoidable conflict between Antiquity and 
Modernity. This conflict occurs when the Modern artist attempts to create a 
work of art which is representative of his or her time. Hölderlin states that 
the artists' drive to create, to form ("Bildungstrieb"), always tends towards a 
desire to "form the unformed" ("das Ungebildete zu bilden'). t 171 However, 
Modern society cannot provide the conditions for this to occur, for it is 
necessarily dependent upon what has gone before. It is only within Antiquity 
that the conditions existed which were conducive for the artist's "Bildungstrieb" 
to flourish, because it was a society that was not subject to the influence of 
another; i. e. it is only here that the "unformed" is present. It is this which 
makes Antiquity unique, and in a certain sense, inimitable. However it is not 
difficult to see the potential contradictions which arise out of this situation. 
Hölderlin's argument highlights the almost incommensurable difficulties of 
attempting to use Antiquity as a model for the revival of the conditions 
necessary to allow the creative drive to flourish. This is because the moment 
that Antiquity is seen as a model, as a "form" that can be imitated, it loses 
that which makes it unique; i. e. the unformed becomes the formed, it is 
something which can be assumed, adopted ("angenommen'). As Hölderlin states, 
it becomes "positive" and in so doing it loses the very quality that has made 
it inimitable. Therefore the factor upon which the distinction between Antiquity 
and Modernity itself is drawn also starts to break down, for implicit in this 
distinction is the assumption that Greek culture is unformed and unique. 
Hölderlin does not expand this point any further and does not explicitly state 
that this is the conclusion to which his argument leads. It is perhaps doubtful 
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therefore whether at this stage he realised the full implications of what is 
here stated. However it is clear that within this fragment there can be found 
the seeds of the thinking which, as I will argue later, come to full fruition in 
the letter to Böhlendorff and which will lead Hölderlin to offer a different 
understanding of the mimetic relation between antiquity and modernity. 
Instead Hölderlin moves back to presenting his analysis of the situation which 
faces the modern artist, drawing an analogy between the decline of the Greek 
society and the conditions which presently prevail. He writes, 
And that which was the general reason for the decline of all 
peoples, namely, that their originality, their own living nature 
succumbed to the positive forms, to the luxury which their fathers 
produced, that seems to be our destiny as well, only on a larger 
scale in that an almost boundless, prior world, which we internalize 
either through learning or experience, works and exerts pressure on 
us. 
Und was allgemeiner Grund vom Untergang aller Völker war, nemlich, 
daß ihre Originalität, ihre eigene lebendige Natur erlag unter den 
positiven Formen und unter dem Luxus, den ihre Väter hervorgebracht 
hatten, das scheint auch unser Schicksaal zu seyn, nur in größerem 
Maße, indem eine fast gränzenlose Vorwelt, die wir entweder durch 
Unterricht, oder durch Erfahrung innewerden, auf uns wirkt und 
drückt. 1181 
Here Hölderlin offers an explanation for the decline of Greek society premised 
upon the argument outlined above, namely that the moment that the society 
becomes implicated within a mimetic relationship with itself, when it "succumbs 
to the positive forms", by definition it loses that which makes it unique and 
thus loses its identity and declines. Furthermore, as he then states, it would 
seem that this is the fate with which the Modern society is faced, albeit in a 
more aggravated and critical form. 
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However it is at this point in the fragment that Hölderlin challenges the 
negative point of view that he has presented hitherto, stating that "On the 
other hand, nothing seems more favourable than precisely these circumstances in 
which we find ourselves. " This break between the two halves of the fragment 
also marks the point at which Hölderlin moves back to giving a much more 
conventional reading of the situation, insofar as the positive solution that he 
offers to the problems that he has outlined earlier is heavily reliant upon 
Schiller's and Schelling's aesthetic theories. It is also interesting to note that 
in this second section of the fragment any consideration of the problems posed 
by the relation between Antiquity and Modernity are absent. This can help to 
explain why after giving such a problematic account of the position of the 
contemporary artist, Hölderlin is apparently able to move so easily to offering 
an alternative, more affirmative solution. The analysis which he proposes does 
not consider the relation between Antiquity and Modernity - seen as distinct 
periods with their own characteristic traits and problems - rather it views the 
problem strictly from the perspective of the present. This suggests that the 
problems occur when a comparative analysis is made; i. e. when the analysis 
involves consideration of the mimetic relationship between Antiquity and 
Modernity. 
Hölderlin is able to offer an alternative reading of his situation through the 
distinction which he draws between whether "the artist's drive to cultivate 
operates blindly or with consciousness. " ("Es ist nemlich ein Unterscheid ob 
jener Bildungstrieb blind wirkt, oder mit Bewußtseyn'9 This distinction - 
characterised by whether a society is reflective or not - is very similar to 
Schiller's analysis i n Über Naive und Sentimentalische Dichtung. (1795-6) In 
this essay Schiller distinguishes between the Ancient and Modern societies by 
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arguing that in the latter "it is the elevation of actuality to the ideal.. . the 
representation of the ideal that makes for the poet". Ancient society is 
characterised by unity, hence it has no need for reflection and idealist forms of 
thought. However in the modern world there is a cleavage between the natural 
and the cultural, and hence the function of art is to attempt to regain this 
unified Absolute, a task which is by definition infinite. The artist is caught up 
in the process of elevating the natural into the ideal through its representation 
in the work of art. This movement allows the natural to transcend its 
limitations as the purely natural; it allows the move from the sphere of the 
finite into the infinite. As Schiller states, the role of the artist alters so that 
The correspondence between his feeling and his thought which in his 
first condition - the ancient - actually took place, exists now only 
ideally; it is no longer within him but outside of him as an idea 
still to be realised, no longer as a fact within his life. E 191 
In elevating the function of the work of art to the realm of the ideal, it 
transcends the limitations of the finite artist, it gains an autonomy which is 
not possible in the ancient world. The break between the natural and the 
cultural is indicative of "civilisation" itself, for the civilisation is 
characterised by this striving towards the representation of the ideal. Thus art 
has not only an aesthetic function but also one that is moral. 
These Schillerian ideas underlie the arguments which Hölderlin puts forward as 
a solution to the problems of modern society. Hölderlin argues that within 
modern society it is possible for the drive to cultivate to operate in a self- 
conscious manner, so that "it knows from where it emerged and whereto it 
strives" C 'Er weiß woraus er hervorgieng und wohin er strebt'). It is through 
this process of constant self-reflection that it is possible to avoid becoming 
enslaved to what has occurred before. In the rest of the fragment Hölderlin 
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develops an account of the way in which this process of constant self-critique 
and self-reference prevents the individual or society from falling prey to 
"positivity" and hence stultification. The movement he describes is strictly 
dialectical and involves the complete absorption of the past into the present, in 
such a way that the present is always aware of, and informed by, its origins. 
This movement ensures that "[we] give ourselves our own direction which is 
determined by the preceding pure and impure directions that we, due to 
understanding, do not repeat. " ("unsere eigene Richtung uns vorsezen, die 
bestimmt wird, durch the vorhergegangenen reinen rind unreinen Richtungen, die 
wir aus Einsicht nicht wiederholen. ") As is evident from this statement, 
Hölderlin believes that the progression of the dialectic in this manner will 
prevent a blind repetition of past forms from occurring. In the taking up of the 
past into the present, the past will necessarily be transformed and altered and 
this prevents it from being viewed as a static entity. The process is motivated 
by the underlying Bildungstrieb, the drive to form, cultivate. The system is 
necessarily dynamic and relies upon the assumption of the validity of the 
dialectical progression from moment to moment. The emphasis which is placed 
upon the centrality of the process of reflection and self-understanding to this 
project reinforces Hölderlin's acceptance of this form of dialectical thinking 
This reading of Hölderlin's short essay makes it now necessary to ask whether 
the solution he offers in the second part is able to solve the problems that 
were outlined in the first. At the very least, it appears slightly strange that 
after having offered such a negative, yet also astute, diagnosis of the problems 
which arise out of the relationship between Antiquity and Modernity as given 
within the German Classicist theories, Hölderlin is apparently able to move so 
easily towards offering a solution. As I suggested earlier, it is important to 
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observe the change of perspective between the two halves of the essay which 
arises out of the employment of Schiller's idealist theory. The use of this 
theory removes the static oppositional relation between Antiquity and Modernity 
in favour of the progressive dialectical model, enabling solutions to the 
problems that have been diagnosed to be proposed. It would not be incorrect to 
conclude that whilst Hölderlin is moving towards offering a different analysis 
of the nature of the relation between Antiquity and Modernity, at this stage he 
is not sufficiently free of Schiller's influence to be able to offer a truly 
alternative solution to the problem. In the face of the difficulties that his 
analysis throws up, he attempts to conceal the problem by returning to the 
thought of his mentor, Schiller. (20] However by the time of the letters to 
Böhlendorff two years later, Hölderlin has started to formulate his own reply 
to the problem. It is to these letters that I now turn. 
2.3. The First Letter to Böhlendorff. 
It is in the so-called "first letter to Böhlendorff"(211 that Hölderlin gives his 
fullest theoretical account of how the relationship between Greece and Germany 
is to be understood. The letter is dated the fourth of December 1801, two 
years after the Perspectives... fragment. In the letter Hölderlin announces his 
intention to leave Germany to take up a tutorial position in Bordeaux, France. 
The announcement of the move to France is unexpected, coming at a time when 
Hölderlin's interest and concern with Germany is at its peak. (22J It would not 
be an exaggeration to claim that this short letter has received more critical 
attention than the rest of Hölderlin's critical writings put together and has 
proved the basis for many disparate and often contradictory interpretations. My 
intention is to demonstrate how the views expressed in this letter render any 
easy interpretation problematic, particularly insofar as the issue which this 
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letter expressly addresses - the relation between Antiquity and Modernity, seen 
from the perspective of the latter - necessarily undercuts any firm statements 
being made about the status of the discourse of the Modern. In discussing the 
letter it will be necessary to have recourse to some of the critical responses 
which it has generated not only to illustrate their conflictual nature, but also 
to offer a concise summary of the position in which we are left. 
The discussion of the relationship between Antiquity and Modernity arises in the 
context of Hölderlin's response to Böhlendorff's new work, his drama 
Fernando. (2 31 Hölderlin congratulates his friend on the technical qualities which 
the work exhibits, claiming that its "precision and able suppleness" C "Präzision 
und tüchtfger Gelenksamkeit') is indicative of his increasing abilities and 
promise of progress. Hölderlin then writes, 
We learn nothing more difficult than the free use of the national. 
And as I believe, it is precisely the clarity of representation that 
is originally as natural to us as the fire from heaven is for the 
Greeks. For just this reason they will be more readily surpassed in 
beautiful passion - which you have also preserved for yourself - 
than in that Homeric presence of mind and gift of representation. 
Wir lernen nichts schwerer als das Nationelle frei gebrauchen. Und 
wie ich glaube, ist gerade die Klarheit der Darstellung uns 
ürsprunglich so natürlich wie den Griechen das Feuer von Himmel. 
Eben deswegen werden diese eher in schöner Leidenschaft, die Du Dir 
auch erhalten hast, als in jener homerischen Geistesgegenwart und 
Darstellungsgabe zu übertreffen sein. 1241 
In this statement, Hölderlin starts to explain the relation between Greece and 
Germany with respect to how the concept of the "national" is to be understood 
and employed. At this stage it is not made clear exactly what is meant by the 
term "national", whether Hölderlin intends it to be understood in terms of the 
given culture of a country or nationality, or whether it refers to a more 
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originary relationship between the artist and the source of their inspiration 
which will allow him or her to reveal something concerning the nature of their 
"national" which has hitherto been concealed. This is problematized further by 
the emphasis which is placed upon the "free use of the national", the inference 
being that it is possible to reflect the national through the work, but this in 
itself does not guarantee the autonomy necessary for it to be "freely" manifest. 
However it is clear that the term "free" is not intended to introduce any notion 
of laxity or spontaneity on the part of the artist - it is not a manifesto for 
the avant-garde, a sweeping away of accepted convention1253 - for as is stated, 
the skill of freely using the national is one that must be "learnt"; i. e. it has 
its own form of logic and regulation. 
Hölderlin then moves on to characterise the Greek and Modern forms of art, 
stating that it is "precisely the clarity of representation that is originally as 
natural to us as the fire from heaven for the Greeks". The question raised 
above concerning the meaning of the term "national" is complicated further by 
this statement for it establishes a connection between the natural and the 
national. However the way in which this connection is to be understood is 
problematic and potentially ambiguous; is the "clarity of representation" to be 
seen as that which is natural to us - or that which is national? Or is it even 
possible to consider the two terms as mutually exclusive? The difficulties 
raised by these questions are exacerbated further by consideration of how 
Hölderlin intends the term "originally" to be read. One possible interpretation 
would be that this term indicates that what is characteristic of the natural for 
us has been lost. In the sentence that follows, Hölderlin appears to suggest 
that this interpretation could be valid. He aligns the Modern form of art with 
the "beautiful passion", remarking to Bb"hlendorff that in his work this is "also 
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preserved for yourself". He then states that the Greeks "will be more readily 
surpassed" through this form of art - through beautiful passion - than "in 
that Homeric presence of mind and gift of representation. " What this remark 
suggests is that the "clarity of representation" that is "originally natural to 
us" is no longer so readily available. If the modern artist desires to surpass 
the Greeks, it cannot be through the form that is most natural, it cannot occur 
in "clarity of representation". At this stage Hölderlin gives no explanation as 
to why this conclusion may be drawn - it is merely given as a fact - but, in 
turn, this raises a subsidiary question. What is the relation between the 
"beautiful passion" through which the Modern Artist may surpass the Greeks 
and the "fire from heaven" which is characteristic of that which is "originally 
natural" to them? Is Hölderlin suggesting that a similar relationship of 
alienation from the "natural" exists within the Greek world? Is Hölderlin 
arguing here that it is precisely through appropriating the "natural" of the 
Greeks - the peoples to whom in the Perspectives fragment the Moderns were 
seen to be "in slavery" - that the Moderns will be able to surpass and remove 
themselves from their enslavement to the Greek legacy? No quick resolutions of 
these questions can be made, for they are fraught with ambiguities and 
contradictions. Hölderlin himself is aware of the problems raised by these 
statements for he resumes the next paragraph, by stating "it sounds 
paradoxical". To start to unravel these paradoxes it is necessary to quote the 
next section at length so as to follow the line of argument employed. 
It sounds paradoxical. But I will maintain it once again, and make it 
available for your examination and use: in the progress of culture, 
the properly national will become ever more the lesser virtue. For 
this reason the Greeks are less masters of sacred pathos, since it 
was inborn in them; on the other hand, they excel in the gift of 
representation from Homer onward, because this extraordinary man 
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was spirited enough to capture the Occidental Junonian sobriety for 
his Apollonian realm, and thus to truly appropriate what is foreign. 
With us it is the reverse. For this reason it is also so dangerous 
to abstract the rules of art for oneself simply and solely from 
Greek excellence. I have long suffered from this and now know that 
except for that which must be the highest for the Greeks and for 
us - namely the living relationship and skill -, we should not even 
have anything the same as them. 
Es klingt paradox. Aber ich behaupte es noch einmal, und stelle es 
Deiner Prüfung und Deinem Gebrauche frei: das eigentliche Nationelle 
wird im Fortschritt der Bildung immer der geringere Vorzug werden. 
Deswegen sind die Griechen des heiligen Pathos weniger Meister, weil 
es ihnen angeboren war, hingegen sind sie vorzüglich in 
Darstellungsgabe, von Homer an, weil dieser außerordentliche Mensch 
seelenvoll genug war, um die abendländische Junoische Nüchternheit 
fUr sein Apollonsreich zu erbeuten, und so wahrhaft das Fremde sich 
anzueignen. 
Bei uns ist umgekehrt. Deswegen ists auch so gefährlich, sich die 
Kunstregeln einzig und allein von griechischer Vortrefflichkeit zu 
abstrahieren. Ich habe lange daran laboriert und weiß nun, daß außer 
dem, was bei den Griechen und uns das Höchste sein muß, nämlich 
dem lebendigen Verhältnis und Geschick, wir nicht wohl etwas 1ý eich 
mit ihnen haben dUrfen. 12 6] 
In the first paragraph of this section, Hölderlin addresses the question of the 
status of the national. His first statement that "in the progress of culture, the 
properly national will become ever more the lesser virtue" Is surprising 
considering that in the previous paragraph he had apparently wished to 
emphasise and valorise the role of the national. The clue as to how this 
contradictory statement is to be interpreted lies in the relationship that is 
drawn between the progress of culture ("der Fortschritt der Bildung") and the 
National. This reference to the progress of culture can be linked back to the 
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earlier discussion of the Perspectives fragment. As was argued there, it is 
through the drive to cultivate ("Bildungstrieb`) that the break can be made 
with the past; in order for the culture to progress it necessarily has to free 
itself from a slavish dependency upon the "positive" forms provided by past 
cultures. Hence as Hölderliin goes on to explain, Greek culture developed not 
through that which was "inborn" in them; their culture is not founded upon, or 
recognised for, its "sacred pathos". Rather it flourishes and reaches maturity 
through Homer's ability to appropriate the foreign; i. e. he "captures the 
Occidental Junonian sobriety for his Apollonian realm. " It is because of this 
explanation that Hölderlin is able to argue that the national should become the 
"lesser virtue" for if the example provided by the Greeks is accepted, it 
appears essential that the culture be developed through appropriation of that 
which is outside, rather than simply accepting the positivity of that which is 
inborn and given. [271 
This interpretation is substantiated further by the second part of the quotation 
where Hölderlin turns to examine the contemporary position. He states that 
"with us it is the reverse"; i. e. what is inborn for the Moderns is the "clarity 
of representation". Thus it cannot be expected that the Moderns will be able to 
"surpass" the Greeks in this form because by definition it is that which 
constitutes the "positive" form for this culture, and is precisely that which 
acts against the artist's "Bildungstrieb". Hence the warnings that Hölderlin 
---- makes -against abstracting "the rules of art for oneself simply and solely from 
Greek excellence". It is evident that this comment is addressed at the advocates 
of Winckelmannian Classicism and their demands that "the only way we can 
become great is by imitating the ancients. "C28] Through the arguments outlined 
in this letter, Hölderlin shows the reactionary nature and consequences of such 
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demands. In advocating a blind submission to the authority of the Greeks, these 
theorists do not allow the culture to advance, but rather aid its stultification. 
Hence the adamant tone of 14ö1derlin's statement that "we should not even have 
anything the same as them. "; i. e. the one to one, imitative mimetic relation 
which Classicism advocates must not be allowed to occur. 
However there is one element common to both the Greeks and Moderns. This is 
that which is "the highest... namely the living relationship and skill" ("Das 
Höchste... dem lebendigen VerhMtnis und Geschick"). The relationship to which 
Hölderlin is referring can be equated with the statements that have been made 
concerning Bildungstrieb. It is this drive, this desire to cultivate which is 
shared both by the Greeks and the Moderns and which motivates the production 
of the living work of art. The relationship between the Greeks and the Moderns 
is thus not to be seen as a simple hierarchical ordering - i. e. Greece as the 
model which the Moderns merely have to imitate - but rather it is a dynamic, 
parallel relation arising out of a recognition of the necessary difference and 
incompatibility between the two cultures. Hölderlin emphasises this difference 
when he returns to reconsider the problem of that which is "one's own". ("das 
Eigene") He writes, 
But that which is properly one's own must be learned just as well 
as that which is foreign. For this reason the Greeks are 
indispensable for us. Only we will not catch up to them precisely in 
that which is our own, proper national element because, as has been 
said, the free use of that which is one's own is the hardest. 
Aber das Eigene muß so gut gelernt sein wie das Fremde. Deswegen 
sind uns die Griechen unentbehrlich. Nur werden wir ihnen gerade in 
unserm Eigenen Nationellen nicht nachkommen, weil, wie gesagt, der 
freie Gebrauch des Eigenen das Schwerste ist. 1291 
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What is important in this statement is the emphasis which Hölderlin places on 
learning. Contrary to what might be expected, not only the foreign but also the 
"own, proper, national element" must be acquired through an active process of 
learning. This process of learning is to be equated with the "Bildungstrieb". It 
is the recognition of the split nature of both the Greek and Modern cultures 
that allows for the process of learning to proceed in a way that does not 
simply replicate old structures, but rather introduces the possibility of the 
new. As Hölderlin states in this passage, it is through the recognition of the 
impossibility of "catching up" with the Greeks that the step can be taken which 
will start to introduce the new. What must be discarded is the dream of the 
perfection of the Modern form of art through the taking up and surpassing of 
the Greek form, for this only reinforces the Modern's inadequacy in relation to 
the Greek; it is a copying of Greek culture, not the discovery of the Modern's 
nature: it will not give "that which is one's own. ". The only way to discover 
that which is "one's own" is through a recognition of the differences that exist 
between Greece and the Modern. The origin of "what is one's own" for the 
Modern may initially be thought to be found in Greece, for surface similarities 
necessarily exist; e. g. in the recognition of shared qualities such as "clarity of 
representation". However, what has to be acknowledged is that these qualities 
are specific to their own culture, they are not mutually interchangeable. It is 
this recognition of the necessity of difference which underlies Hölderlin's 
insistence that it is the free use of what is one's own that is most difficult. 
In emphasising freedom Hölderlin points towards the way in which his 
formulation of the relationship between the Ancient and Modern breaks down the 
possibility of considering the former as a model in any simple sense of the 
term. The Greeks can only act as a shady, negative model for the Modern 
artist; they demonstrate only what the work cannot be, thus leaving the modern 
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artist alone and in a certain sense always divorced from what they hitherto 
had understood as their history. The possibility that the Greek may act as a 
guide is removed, leaving the Modern artist to find their own route forward. 
Hölderlin gestures towards the nature of the autonomy that emerges from this 
re-formulation in the comments he makes with regard to tragedy. He writes, 
... you [i. e. Böhlendorff] treat the drama in a more epic manner. It 
is, as a whole, an authentically modern tragedy. For this is the 
tragic for us: that, packed up in any container, we depart very 
quietly from the realm of the living, and not that, consumed in 
flames, we atone for the flames we are not able to control. 
... Du das Drama epischer behandelt hast. Es ist, im Ganzen, eine 
echte moderne Tragödie. Denn das ist das Tragische bei uns, daß wir 
ganz stille in irgendeinem Behälter eingepackt vom Reiche der 
Lebendigen hinweggehn, nicht daß wir in Flammen verzehrt die 
Flamme büßen, die wir nicht zu bändigen vermochten. [30] 
The difference between the two forms of tragedy, the ancient and the modern is 
starkly encapsulated in this statement. It also helps to highlight the position 
of the Modern artist insofar as the distinction which is drawn between the two 
types of tragedy emphasises how the structures given in the Greek form of 
tragedy are no longer applicable. The Modern's "authentic" experience of tragedy 
lacks prescriptive guidelines or rules; there is no pre-ordained mechanism to 
give order or structure, rather for the Modern "any container" will suffice and 
the departure is not heralded by pomp or ceremony, it is simple and quiet 
("stille"). If the Modern artist wishes to create a work of art which is 
representative of his or her time they must choose their own route without 
recourse to the Greek example. This is the consequence of the autonomy which 
arises when the artist is freed from the compulsion to use the Greek model. 
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2.4. Critical Responses: The Problem of Interpretation. 
It is now necessary to set the arguments presented in the first letter to 
Böhlendorff in relation to my wider concerns regarding how the mimetic relation 
between Greece and Germany is to be understood. The question I wish to 
address is how far the views which Hölderlin expresses in this letter differ 
from those given in the Perspectives fragment. In the discussion of this 
fragment, I concluded by questioning how far Hölderlin's proposed "solution" 
differed from that given by his contemporaries such as Schiller. This is the 
question to which I now wish to return, but with reference to the Böhlendorff 
letter and the apparently different formulation of the problem that it yields. In 
relation to the Perspectives fragment I suggested that Hölderlin was able to 
give an alternative more affirmative solution to the problems that he had 
diagnosed only by ignoring the dynamic, relational reading of the relationship 
between Antiquity and Modernity; to solve the problems he introduces a 
dialectical framework which automatically subsumes the past into the present by 
advocating of a forward progression of self-critique and enlightenment. Can it 
be argued that a similar dialectical process underlies the arguments in the 
Böhlendorff letter? or does the recognition of the complexities involved in the 
consideration of the split nature of both Antiquity and Modernity start to call 
elements of this reading into question?. 
Several commentators have adopted the former position, arguing that the 
Böhlendorff letter is to be viewed as the culmination of the development of a 
mature dialectical schema, which integrates Hölderlin's poetological and 
philosophical writings. This leads them to regard Hölderlin's work as a form of 
proto-Hegelianism, which is interesting only insofar as it is to be considered in 
relation to the mature Idealist project. (3>> Whilst it cannot be denied that 
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Hölderlin's writings are heavily influenced by Idealist thought, such readings 
pay insufficient attention to the tensions within the works - primarily caused 
by the attempts to understand the relation of Antiquity and Modernity - and 
rely upon a reading of Hölderlin through the filter of the Hegelian dialectical 
schema, thus creating a totalising interpretation which ignores those elements 
which do not comfortably fit. 
A more sophisticated interpretation is given by Peter Szondi in his article 
"Hölderlin's Overcoming of Classicism" ("Überwindung des Klassizimus"). In this 
detailed essay, Szondi outlines several of the "accepted" interpretations of the 
Böhlendorff letter, highlighting their problems and inadequacies. [ 321 In 
critiquing the existing interpretations he also offers his own more radical 
reading which is based upon a recognition of the central role played by the 
relation of antiquity and Modernity within Hölderlin's work. As the title of 
Szondi's article indicates, he acknowledges the radicality of Hölderlin's insight 
into the necessarily split nature of the Greek world, overturning, as it does, 
the Classical interpretations' insistence on its undivided, unified nature. Szondi 
summarises this point when he states, 
This differentiation [between the Greek and the Hesperian] relieves 
him [Hölderlin] entirely of the imitation of antiquity which 
Winkelmannian classicism had made obligatory for him, and at the 
same time it allows him to see the reason why the Greeks are 
nevertheless "indispensable" for him. Hölderlin overcomes classicism 
without turning away from the classical. E33] 
The final statement neatly encapsulates Szondi's Interpretation of Hölderlin's 
"overcoming of classicism", insofar as it prevents Hölderlin from being aligned 
with the classicist tradition, whilst at the same time, recognising that Greece, 
the classical, still has an important function in his thought. How Szondi 
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understands the nature of this function is suggested in the title of his essay, 
emphasising the overcoming of classicism. Classicism is replaced by "the 
classical" freeing the latter to operate as one side of another dialectical 
opposition. Szondi's interpretation frees the classical from Classicism only in 
order to reappropriate it for another "overcoming" which will pitch "the 
Greeks" against the "Hesperian poet" culminating in the emergence of the third 
of the dialectical structure, here characterised as "poetic language". Hence 
Szondi writes, 
The Greeks are "indispensable" for the Hesperian poet because in 
their art he encounters his own proper origin as a foreign element. 
Thus he gains the distance from his own element which is freedom. 
From Greek poetry he learns, without imitating, or "commenting 
upon" it, to "use freely", to apply as a medium of his own 
language, that which is indeed given by nature, but which has until 
now remained unused in his poetry... both elements - his own and the 
foreign, "precision" and "warmth" - are to be integrated into poetic 
language. (341 
It is not possible to question this reading in terms of its accuracy in relation 
to Hölderlin's texts, for it does not distort or add anything to what Hölderlin 
himself writes. However, what is at stake is whether Szondi's reading is 
coloured by the Hegelian theory upon which it relies. Whilst this reading is 
totally consistent in its own terms, positing as it does a third term through 
which the opposition between the Greeks and the Moderns can be mediated, it 
does not question how the opposition itself is to be understood. Or rather, it 
assumes the term "opposition" to function in accordance with a strictly 
dialectical reading which presupposes a symmetrical relation between the terms, 
as would be expected if Hölderlin is implying that the form of dialectical 
relation that is operating here is based upon the Hegelian model. Szondi 
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acknowledges that he understands the dialectic relation to be symmetrical when 
he describes the relationship between Greek and Hesperian nature and art in 
terms of the "mirror-symmetry" between the two. It is this presupposition of 
symmetry which allows him to claim that the Hesperian poet "encounters his 
own proper origin as a foreign element" in the work of the Greeks. However, as 
I argued earlier, what is distinctive about Hölderlin's reading of the relation 
between Greece and the Moderns is the emphasis which is placed upon the 
difference between the two cultures. A strict mirror-symmetry cannot exist 
between the two, for whilst they apparently contain similar qualities - the 
"clarity of representation" appears on both sides of the Greek/Modern equation 
-, they have different functions and meanings within each culture. Hence Szondi's 
claim that the Hesperian poet encounters his "own proper origin" within the 
Greeks cannot be supported. What the poet finds in the Greek poetry cannot be 
described as his origin because Hölderlin's formulation of the problematic 
questions the validity of any discussion of origin understood as ground. The 
Greek world, both in its nature and culture, is alien to the Modern. The 
Modern may have inherited qualities from the Greeks, but these are mediated 
and tainted by history and time. This point is summarised by Andrzej 
Warminski in his discussion of Szondi's interpretation in his book Readings In 
Interpretation. In response to Szondi's presupposition of a symmetrical relation 
between with two cultures, Warminski writes, 
This presupposition becomes questionable once we read the relation 
between the Greeks and us as an asymmetrical chiasmic reversal of 
terms, one of which (das Fremde) we have no access to because it 
cannot be the object of our perception or our knowledge, not the 
object for a subject. If it is an object at all, it is somebody else's 
(the Greeks') object and not ours. The fact that our relation to the 
Greeks is structured not like the relation of consciousness to the 
object of its knowledge but like a trope - chiasmus, a reversal 
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concerned only with the relation of terms and not their constitution 
- is already indicative of the problem. (3 51 
Here Warminski challenges Szondi's reading precisely because it fails to 
recognise that the relation which Hölderlin evolves cannot be understood in 
terms of a strict mirror-symmetry. Once this is acknowledged the full force of 
Hölderlin's interpretation can be realised. As Warminski states, what is 
important for Hölderlin is the relation between the terms, not what constitutes 
the terms themselves. Szondi's reading, whilst recognising the relational aspect 
to a certain degree, is also equally dependent upon the constitutive elements. 
This is exactly what Hölderlin warns we must not base our theories upon, what 
is important is "we should not even have anything the same as them", that is 
excepting the "living relation and skill", we cannot have anything in common 
with the Greeks. 
Conclusion. 
At the beginning of the previous section I questioned the extent to which 
Hölderlin's theory differs from his contemporaries and whether it could be said 
to offer a different understanding of the relationship between Antiquity and 
Modernity. Through a discussion of Szondi's and Warminski's views I think it 
has become clear that differences do exist and that Hölderlin is gesturing 
towards a different reading of the relationship which emphasises the problems 
that occur through assuming that a simple dialectical relation between past and 
present can operate. In concentrating upon a relational analysis, Hölderlin 
effects a break with the past, not only in that he brings the status of the 
Classicist approach into question, but also in the way that he problematises the 
role and function within the Modern of terms such as "the Greeks" and 
"Antiquity". He challenges the assumption of linear continuity between past and 
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present, offering instead a multi-layered reading which although apparently 
dialectical, challenges any easy understanding of how the dialectic can function 
within the Modern. In the Böhlendorff letter, Hölderlin manages to rewrite the 
relation between Antiquity and Modernity in such a way as to force a re- 
evaluation of how both terms are to be understood. This is because in 
acknowledging that the Greek culture is itself split, the assumption which forms 
the basis of the theory of his contemporaries, in particular Schiller, is called 
into question. As I argued earlier, Schiller's characterization of ancient and 
modern is dependent upon the assumption that the ancient world is unitary 
whilst the modern world is divided. It is this distinction which allows Schiller 
to privilege his dialectical understanding of the progress of the modern over 
the ancient. However through his discovery of the split nature of the ancient 
world - Homer must also have recourse to the "foreign" - Hölderlin is 
prevented from simply assuming the primacy of the modern over the ancient, for 
the premises which underlie this claim have been removed. It is this which 
makes Hölderlin's position much more critical and problematic for he is forced 
into a position where he has to rethink his understanding of the modern. r36] 
The project of Bildungstrieb cannot be understood as a process towards 
enlightenment which is opposed to, and necessarily surpasses, the limited 
achievements of the Greeks. Rather it has to find its own means of justification 
and legitimation for its progress. Hence the ambiguous and ambivalent comments 
concerning the nature of the national and its relation to the natural. The 
"national" of the modern is something which must be created in and through 
the process of Bildungstrieb. However as the arguments I have put forward 
suggest, the form that this "national" must take is something that is far from 
predetermined or certain. There can be no assumptions made as regards what 
constitutes the "national" of Hölderlin's time, for the removal of the Greeks as 
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a model casts modernity adrift from any form of certainty or ground regarding 
its own origins. Hence, perhaps, Hölderlin's increasingly desperate attempts to 
find a voice which will be representative of the problems of his time, for in 
age which he views as being characterised by an "absence of destiny" Cdas 
Schiksaallose")(371 no easy solutions can be found. 
As I shall show in Chapter 5 of this study, this search culminates in the 
Remarks on Oedipus and the Remarks on Antigone, which accompany Hölderlin's 
translations of Sophocles' dramas. However, before these texts can be discussed 
in detail it is necessary to examine Hölderlin's treatment of tragedy in relation 
to the wider concerns of his theoretical work. 
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Chapter Three. 
Hölderlin and Tragedy: The Poetological Writings. 
3.1. Introduction. 
At the end of the last chapter I showed how Hölderlin's discussion of the 
problem of the relationship between Antiquity and Modernity in the letter to 
Böhlendorff culminated in a few brief comments concerning the form of tragedy 
which is most relevant and applicable to these eras. The question that I want 
to address in this chapter concerns the reasons why the tragic form comes to 
play such an important and central role in Hölderlin's thought - not only in his 
poetry and drama, but also in his theoretical writings. It is clear that 
Hölderlin's concern with poetic form is not limited to the narrow sphere of 
"Aesthetics" understood in terms of earlier theorists such as Baumgarten. 
Rather, as I argued in the previous chapter, Hölderlin's work is heavily 
influenced by Kant and Schiller. Any discussion of the "aesthetic" Is 
necessarily influenced by this wider philosophical framework. Thus before any 
analysis of Hölderlin's specific writings on tragedy can take place, it is 
necessary to establish how they are related to this wider framework. In 
particular, in order to ascertain how the term "aesthetic" functions within 
Hölderlin's thought, it is useful to establish how the relationship between 
poetry and philosophy is understood. One reason for a systematic account of 
this background is the need to demonstrate that Hölderlin's work is a move 
away from the position of both Schiller and the early Idealists such as Fichte. 
This is necessary in order to prevent Hölderlin's work from being cursorily 
dismissed as a regressive move into a form of naive Romanticism which 
celebrates the natural over the theoretical, the non-conceptual over the 
conceptual. This interpretation would see his thought as a move away from the 
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rigour of the "philosophical" approach towards a form of analysis which is 
much more akin to "literature" and "literary theory". As will become clear in 
the course of this discussion, the reasons why such evaluations may be made 
arise out of Hölderlin's insistence on conducting his theoretical investigations 
into the status of the "aesthetic" by way of analyses of poetic structure and 
functions. However as I intend to show, when these analyses - in particular the 
analyses of tragedy - are read in the light of the philosophical positions by 
which they are informed, such dismissals are much more difficult to make. 
3.2. The Relation between Philosophy and Poetry: The System Programme 
Fragment. 
The difficulty of understanding the relationship between poetry and philosophy 
is exacerbated in Hölderlin's work not least because he operates in both fields; 
he is literally both a philosopher and poet. Yet to state the position in this 
way is to adopt automatically the categorisations against which Hölderlin is 
reacting. To view these two appellations as defining mutually exclusive 
enterprises with no interaction between them is clearly fallacious. This position 
also falls into the trap of presupposing that the genre distinctions which 
distinguish the difference between "literary" and "philosophical" texts can be 
transposed easily onto the writings of the late eighteenth century. In fact as 
the work of Hölderlin and many of his contemporaries demonstrates, one of 
their express intentions is to question the validity of establishing such barriers 
between the disciplines. This is exemplified by the fragmentary text which has 
come to be known as the Earliest Svstem-Programme of German Idealism. This 
short text contains in embryonic form many of the ideas which characterise the 
mature Idealist and Romantic position and establishes the primacy of the 
"aesthetic" modes of understanding. Therefore to establish the background to 
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Hölderlin's employment of the term "aesthetic", I shall give a detailed reading 
of this text. Subsequently, I shall show how Hölderlin's own writings are 
related to the concerns of this text. 
Many mysteries surround this text, not least of which being the uncertainty 
concerning its authorship and date of composition. Most critics now agree that 
it is the product of the combined. authorship of Hölderlin, Schelling and Hegel 
and was written between June and August 1796. (1) The intentions of the text 
are extremely ambitious. These intentions are summarised by the declaration 
which concludes the text. The authors declare that the programme which they 
have set out "will be the very last and grandest of humanity's works. " What, 
then, does this text contain which allows such grandiose claims to be made, 
enabling all subjects ranging from ethics to metaphysics, physics to politics to 
be covered and which culminates in the statements which place the aesthetic 
firmly at the centre of the system? 
The first issues discussed arise out of Kantian and Fichtean theory. The first 
paragraph refers specifically to Kant and the division between the theoretical 
and practical philosophy. It is suggested that the System-Programme offers a 
way of overcoming this division through the collapsing together of the Kantian 
practical and theoretical postulates. Hence it is stated that the form of ethics 
advocated in the system "will be nothing else than a complete system of all 
ideas, or, what comes to the same, of all practical postulates" ("... so wird 
diese Ethik nichts anders als ein vollständiges System aller Ideen, oder, was 
dasselbe ist, aller praktischen Postulate. ")(2) This is reminiscent of Fichte's 
argument that the philosophy of the Absolute must be based within the 
practical sphere and, in particular, that the founding act of philosophy must 
originate in the action of the autonomous agent. The Fichtean overtones become 
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clearer in the next stage of the argument which establishes the position of the 
subject in relation to the system. The authors write, 
The first idea is of course the representation of me myself as an 
absolutely free creature. At the same time, along with the free, 
self-conscious creature, a whole world comes to the fore - out of 
nothing - the sole true and conceivable creation out of nothing. 
die erste Idee ist näturlich die Vorstellung von mir selbst, als einem 
absolut freien Wesen. Mit dem freyen selbstbewußten Wesen tritt 
zugleich eine ganze Welt - aus dem nichts hervor - die einzig wahre 
und gedenkbare Schöpfung aus Nichts. L3] 
This passage introduces two of the most important ideas of the system. First, 
there is the insistence on the primacy of the representation of the self, which 
simultaneously gives the disclosure of world to the subject. Secondly, what is 
referred to here is the representation of the self through an act, understood as 
the founding act of self-consciousness. Thus the "I" is not to be seen simply 
as a given. It is not the mere Kantian logical construct which accompanies my 
actions but about which nothing can be ascertained except in formal terms. «] 
Rather, what is posited here is the active construction of the "I" in and 
through intellectual intuition. To substantiate this interpretation, the quotation 
from the System-Programme can be compared with the statements which Fichte 
makes in his 1796 essay, A Comparison between Prof. Schmid's System and the 
Wissenschaftslehrer 5]" Here Fichte writes that the "entire act through which 
the "I" posits itself, while at the same time positing within itself everything 
that exists, is an act which does occur. "16] The emphasis placed upon the 
actuality of the act, on its basis within experience, can be related to the 
statements made in the first section of the system concerning the conflation of 
the Kantian division between the theoretical and practical spheres. The Fichtean 
notion of act ("Tathandlung") is employed here to bring together the two 
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spheres of the Kantian system. The Fichtean overtones of this passage are 
substantiated further by the emphasis which is placed upon the fact that the 
act which founds the system is to be understood as a free act, which in turn, 
both creates and confirms the "I" as a free acting agent. Throughout the 
various versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte attempts continually to assert 
the importance and radicality of this aspect of his system. The notion of act 
which is built into his system presupposes the possibility of self-determination 
even if this can only be understood conceptually after the act of positing the I. 
The Fichtean insistence on the primacy and necessity of freedom is prevalent 
throughout the System-Programme fragment. It occurs particularly with respect 
to the discussion of how "the works of mankind" - i. e. the state and its 
institutions - are to be understood. Hence the authors of the programme write, 
"I want to show that there is no idea of the state, because the state is 
something mechanical; just as little is there an idea of a machine. Only that 
which is an object of freedom is called an idea. "(71 This remark implies that 
practical philosophy has hitherto placed freedom in a subordinate position within 
discussions of the practical ordering of the system. This has meant that 
freedom has only been considered to operate upon the level of the practical 
rather than the theoretical. It is this which separates the Idealist 
understanding of the importance of freedom from the Kantian, for the former - 
the Idealist -is based upon the assumption of the primacy of the actuality of 
freedom which then enables the positing of the details of the system. Hence the 
statement which is made in the remark quoted above that "only that which is 
an object of freedom is called an idea. " 
After discussing the effects that this re-evaluation of freedom will have upon 
the practical sphere of state and government and then relating it to religion, 
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the authors turn to the question of the position of the aesthetic. This sudden 
and abrupt move marks the turning point of the text where the Fichtean 
terminology and concerns are removed and a radically different set of concepts 
is introduced. The authors write, 
At the close, the idea that unifies all, the idea of beauty, the word 
taken in its higher, Platonic sense. For I am convinced that the 
supreme act of reason, because it embraces all ideas, is an aesthetic 
act; and that only in beauty are truth and goodness of the same 
flesh, - The philosopher must possess as much aesthetic force as 
the poet, those human beings who are devoid of aesthetic sense are 
our pedantic philosophers. The philosophy of the spirit is an 
aesthetic philosophy.. . Poesy will thereby attain a higher dignity; in 
the end she will again become what she was in the beginning - the 
instructress of humanity. 
... Zuletzt die Idee, die alle vereinigt, die Idee der Schönheit, das 
Wort in höherem platonischem Sinne genommen. Ich bin nun überzeugt, 
daß der höchste Akt der Vernunft, der, indem die alle Ideen umfast, 
ein ästhetischer Akt ist, und daß Wahrheit und Güte, nur in der 
Schönheit verschwistert sind, - Der Philosoph muß eben so viel 
ästhetische Kraft besizen, als der Dichter, die Menschen ohne 
ästhetischen Sinn sind unsre Buchstaben Philosophen. Die Philosophie 
des Geistes ist eine ästhetische Philosophie... Die Poesie bekömt 
dadurch eine höhere Würde, sie sird am Ende wieder, was sie am 
Anfang war - Lehrerin der <Geschichte> Menschheit. C8] 
In the light of what has been established earlier it might be expected that 
when the move to a discussion of the aesthetic is made, it will be from the 
perspective of Kant's Third Critique. 191 Instead the authors introduce the 
concept of an idea of beauty which will unite all other ideas which is based 
upon Plato's discussion of the idea of beauty in the Phaedrus. tto] Thus in 
elevating beauty to the highest point of the system, in making it the idea which 
"unifies all", the move away from the Fichtean system is made. This passage 
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suggests that the accomplishment and understanding of the Absolute I through 
the act of intellectual intuition occurs in the sphere of the aesthetic, rather 
than it being a purely theoretical operation. The authors of the System- 
Programme are suggesting that it is only through the aesthetic that this act 
can be fully realised, for it is only in the idea of Beauty that full unity can 
be attained. Hence the statement which can be seen to summarise the manifesto 
of the System-Programme: "the philosophy of the spirit is an aesthetic 
philosophy"; i. e. access to the Absolute can occur only in and through the 
aesthetic. This explains why later in the fragment, the authors argue that the 
"philosophers must become sensuous" or risk remaining as mere 
"Buchstabenphilosophen". This call for "sensuous" philosophers indicates the 
radicality that lies at the heart of this text, for it involves the reintroduction 
of precisely the elements which the philosophical enterprise has traditionally 
tried to exclude and legislate against. Furthermore, the call for "sensuality" 
also introduces the possibility of an alternative "way of doing" philosophy. 
This point is summarised succinctly by Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc 
Nancy in the introductory chapter of their book The Literary Absolute. After 
emphasising the potential radicality of the statement "the philosopher must 
possess just as much aesthetic power as the poet" they write, 
In other words, because the idea of beauty is the very ideality of 
the Idea, the speculative Aesthetics in which the System-subject 
culminates must necessarily reverse itself in aesthetic speculation; it 
must adopt a presentation or exposition which is itself aesthetic. 
Philosophy must fulfill itself in a work of art; art is the 
speculative organ on par excellence. 11 >> 
These remarks suggest that the System-Programme offers the possibility of 
breaking down the rigid distinctions which separate philosophical, theoretical 
modes of thought from the aesthetic arts. Philosophy itself must become 
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aesthetic. This means that not only must it consider the sphere of the aesthetic 
but also its mode of presentation must become aesthetic. As is expressed by 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, "philosophy must fulfill itself in a work of art. " 
It is this idea that the work of art can itself be seen to be the site of 
presentation of the philosophical project which intrigues Hölderlin. Although at 
the time of the development of the System-Programme fragment he has not yet 
evolved his mature analysis of the function of the work of art, it is clear that 
he is already exploring the nature of the problematic relationship between the 
work of art and theoretical modes of thought. In fact it could be suggested 
that the importance which is placed on the aesthetic in the System-Programme 
fragment can be related directly to Hölderlin's influence on its conception. 
Throughout his work of this early period - i. e. between 1794 and 1797 - 
Hölderlin returns repeatedly to consideration of the nature of the beautiful and 
in particular to how the notion of unity is made manifest in the beautiful. This 
is evident most clearly in his epistolary novel Hyperiont12], specifically within 
the final chapter of Volume One. Here Hyperion and his friends finally have the 
opportunity to visit Athens. Whilst making the crossing to the mainland of 
Greece, they engage in a discussion which valorises the world of Greek 
antiquity. Many of the statements that are made mimic the Schillerian position 
that I outlined briefly in the previous chapter; e. g. there is a discussion of 
which factors led to the emergence of the Greek state, whether it is 
attributable purely to the climate, the art, the religion or a combination of all 
occurring at a pertinent moment in time. The qualities of the Greeks are then 
compared favourably to other civilisations, specifically the Eygptians and the 
"Northern". Hyperion, the character who personifies Hölderlin himself and who 
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has been leading the conversation is then asked what makes the Greeks a 
philosophical people rather than simply "poetic and religious". He replies, 
"The fact is... that without poetry they would never have been a 
philosophical people! " 
"What has philosophy, " he answered, "what has the cold sublimity 
of philosophical knowledge, to do with poetry? " 
"Poetry, " I answered, confident of my argument, "is the beginning 
and end of philosophical knowledge. Like Minerva from the head of 
Jupiter, philosophy springs from the poetry of an eternal, divine 
state of being. And so in philosophy, too, the irreconcilable finally 
converges again in the mysterious spring of poetry. " 
"... The man who has not at the least once in his life felt pure 
beauty in himself, when the powers of his being merged like the 
colours in the rainbow... that man will not even be a philosophical 
sceptic. 
Sie waren sogar, sagt ich, ohne Dichtung nie ein philosophisch Volk 
gewesen! 
Was hat die Philosophie, erwiedert' er, was hat die kalte Erhabenheit 
dieser Wissenschaft mit Dichtung zu thun? 
Die Dichtung, sagt ich, meiner Sache gewiß, ist der Anfang und das 
Ende dieser Wissenschaft. Wie Minerva aus Jupiters Haupt, entspringt 
sie aus der Dichtung eines unendlichen göttlichen Seyns. Und so läuft 
am End' auch wieder in ihr das Unvereinbare in der geheimnißvollen 
Quelle der Dichtung zusammen. 
... 
Der Mensch 
... 
der nicht wenigstens im Leben Einmal volle lautre 
Schönheit in sich fühlte, wenn in ihm die Kräfte seines Wesens, wie 
die Farben am Irisbogen... der Mensch wird nicht einmal ein 
philosophischer Zweifler werden. 1131 
Resonances of many of the ideas expressed in the latter half of the System- 
Programme fragment can be identified in this passage. First, there is the 
distinction that is drawn between the purely "theoretical" philosopher and the 
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one who also has recourse to the aesthetic. The former - i. e. the "theoretical", 
- like the "Buchstabenphilosophen" of the System-Programme, is judged to be 
inferior, unable to even be recognised as a "philosophical sceptic". However the 
latter - i. e. the aesthetic - is aligned with the philosophers of Greece, whose 
thought arose out of and recognised the necessity of the aesthetic realm. If the 
terminology of the System-Prop-ramme is interjected, these people could be 
described as "sensuous" thinkers who recognise and revel in the relationship 
between philosophy and poetry. Secondly, in both texts, there is the recognition 
that it is the idea of beauty which has the capacity to unify all the other 
spheres. Hence Hyperion later declares that, 
The great saying, the cv Sianepov sautV (the one differentiated in 
itself) of Heraclitus, could be found only by a Greek, for it is the 
very being of Beauty, and before that there was no philosophy. 
Now classification became possible because, for the whole was there. 
The flower had ripened; now it could be dissected. 
Das große Wort, das cv ötapepov eauiip (das Eine in sich selber 
unterschiedne) des Heraklit, das konnte nur ein Grieche finden, denn 
es ist das Wesen der Schönheit, und ehe das gefunden war, gabs 
keine Philosophic. 
Nun konnte man bestimmen, das Ganze war da. Die Blume war 
gereift; man konnte nun zergliedern. 1141 
As in the System-Programme fragment, beauty - i. e. the aesthetic - is seen not 
only to be prior to the theoretical, but is also that which allows for its 
emergence. The aesthetic sphere is understood as the whole, the necessary, prior 
unity out of which differentiation occurs. Hence the similarities which can be 
observed between the statement quoted above from the System-Programme that 
"Poesy will thereby attain a higher dignity; in the end she will again become 
what she was in the beginning - the instructress of humanity", and the remark 
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made by Hyperion that it is only through Heraclitus' notion of the one 
differentiated in itself, which is "struggling reason's ideal of Beauty" that 
philosophy is able to occur. In both instances the prior status of the aesthetic 
sphere is acknowledged; it is that from which the theoretical emerges, and it is 
understood as necessarily subordinate to, and dependent upon, the former. 
However, in both Hyperion and the System-Programme fragment there is the 
recognition that philosophy has moved away from and denied its origin within 
the aesthetic. In so doing it has lost touch with that which gave it life, 
relying on the purely theoretical sphere thus producing ideas and theories which 
are both limited and sterile for they can only address this sphere itself; i. e. 
the theoretical cannot adequately speak of the aesthetic. This leads Hyperion to 
claim that this type of theory cannot be considered as philosophy for, 
"Mere understanding produces no philosophy, for philosophy is more 
than the limited knowledge of what is. 
" Mere reason produces no philosophy, for philosophy is more than 
the blind demand for ever greater progress in the combination and 
differentiation of some particular material. " 
Aus bloßem Verstande kömmt keine Philosophie, denn Philosophie ist 
mehr, denn nur die beschränkte Erkenntnis des Vorhandnen. 
Aus bloßer Vernunft kömmt keine Philosophie, denn Philosophie ist 
mehr, denn blinde Forderung eines nie zu endigenden Fortschritts in 
Vereinigung und Unterscheidung eines möglichen Stoffs. ( 157 
These statements explain why Hölderlin feels it necessary to call for the re- 
evaluation and reinstatement of the aesthetic within the philosophical enterprise. 
The claim being made here is that it is only through the aesthetic that 
philosophy will be able to return to address all areas of concern. The aesthetic 
presentation provides an access to the Absolute which is denied to the purely 
theoretical enterprise. This explains the radical jump to which I alluded earlier 
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which occurs in the middle of the System-Programme fragment as it turns from 
purely theoretical issues regarding the status of the subject of the system to a 
discussion which places the aesthetic firmly at its centre. In order for the 
authors to be able to claim that the system has universal validity, the 
theoretical, practical and aesthetic spheres must all be considered and 
incorporated. Furthermore the necessary supremacy of the latter is acknowledged 
when it is stated that "only in beauty are truth and goodness of the same 
flesh". Hence the jump to the discussion of the aesthetic which occurs at the 
centre of the system is not to be understood as a radical disjuncture which 
fractures the coherence of the whole, but rather it is the move which is 
necessary to ensure this coherence. (161 
However it is now necessary to take a step back from the details of these 
texts and to return to the wider question posed at the beginning of this 
section; namely how is Hölderlin's use of the aesthetic to be understood? What 
function does it play within his thought? In the foregoing discussion I 
highlighted the reasons why the aesthetic becomes important to the philosophers 
of the last decade of the eighteenth century. The move towards consideration of 
the aesthetic occurs because of the inadequacies which are perceived in aspects 
of the existing theoretical discussions, in particular with regard to how the 
relationship between theoretical, conceptual discourse and the Absolute is 
understood. Hölderlin summarises his disquiet concerning purely theoretical 
modes of understanding in comments he makes in a letter to Schiller, written on 
September 4th 1795. He writes, 
I am attempting to develop, for my own use, the idea of an infinite 
progress of philosophy, and I am attempting to prove that what 
must be continually demanded of any system, the union of subject 
and object in an absolute I (or whatever name one wishes to give to 
it), is undoubtedly possible on the aesthetic level in intellectual 
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intuition, but not on the theoretical level except by means of an 
infinite approximation, like that of the square of the circle. 
Immortality is just as necessary to realise a system of thought as 
it is to realise a system of action. 
Ich suche mir die Idee eines unendlichen Progresses der Philosophie 
zu entwickeln, ich suche zu zeigen, daß die unnachläßliche Forderung, 
die an jedes System gemacht werden muß, die Vereinigung des 
Subjekts und Objekts in einem absolutem - Ich oder wie man es 
nennen will - zwar ästhetisch, in der intellektualen Anschauung, 
theoretisch aber nur durch eine unendliche Annäherung möglich ist, 
wie die Annäherung des Quadrats zum Zirkel und daß, um ein System 
des Denkens zu realisieren, eine Unsterblichkeit ebenso notwendig ist, 
als sie es ist für ein System des Handelns. EI 71 
When these comments are placed alongside the remarks from Hyperion regarding 
the difference between a philosophy based solely on reason and the 
understanding and an aesthetically informed philosophy, it is possible to 
establish a clearer understanding of Hölderlin's conception of the place and 
function of the aesthetic. He feels that a purely conceptual system cannot 
address itself adequately to the possibility of intellectual intuition; it can only 
give "approximations. " Hence the statements made in the letter to Schiller 
which indicate Hölderlin's desire to show how an "aesthetic" formulation of the 
intellectual intuition can occur. 
How, though, does this view differ from those held by Hölderlin's 
contemporaries? and what prevents the accusation that he is merely replicating 
existing theories albeit in a more esoteric form? It is difficult to deny that 
Hölderlin is not influenced by his peers, specifically Schiller and Schelling. As 
I argued in the previous chapter, Schiller's influence is most apparent in the 
earlier work. Volume One of Hyperion dates from this period, and in certain 
respects, it contains many Schillerian themes and motifs. (t8] However the 
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differences between the two become most apparent in the discussions of Beauty. 
Schiller's understanding of the function of the idea of beauty is similar to 
that of the authors of the System-Programme fragment insofar as both view 
the idea of Beauty from a totalising perspective; i. e. the idea of beauty unifies 
all elements, thus abolishing internal difference. On the other hand, Hölderlin 
relates the Platonic idea of Beauty to the earlier Heraclitean formula of "the 
one differentiated in itself". This creates two very different conceptions of how 
the unity of the Beautiful is to be understood. The unity given by the 
Schillerian project is a strictly dialectical unity; i. e. beauty is understood as 
the "third", synthesising component of the triadic structure, which brings the 
other two conflicting parts together. The movement involved in this process is 
understood in terms of an onward progress in which the component parts are 
necessarily taken up, and incorporated into the third. Hence the dialectical 
movement is always aiming towards a totality, as is stated in the System- 
Programme fragment, the programme which is set out will be the culmination of 
all thought, "the very last and grandest of humanity's works. " This totality is 
one that is closed; the form of unity which is given is a unity of the Same, 
for all the component parts are brought together in the aesthetic. Hence all 
notions of difference are erased; the all-embracing "instructress of humanity", 
poesy, will ensure that "there will no longer be any philosophy, any history; 
the poetic art alone will survive... "[ 191 
"1n contradistinction to this, the form of unity perceived by Hölderlin is one 
that is characterised by difference and fission. This is exemplified best in the 
concluding passage of Hyperion, where Hölderlin develops an extended metaphor 
which illustrates his conception of a unity characterised by discordance and an 
absence of totality. He writes, 
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Like lovers' quarrels are the dissonances of the world. Reconciliation 
is there, even in the midst of strife, and all things that are parted 
find one another again. " 
"The arteries separate and return to the heart and all is one 
eternal, glowing life. " 
Wie der Zwist der Liebenden, sind die Dissonanzen der Welt. 
Versöhnung ist mitten im Streit und alles Getrennte findet sich 
wieder. 
Es scheiden und kehren im Herzen die Adern und einiges, ewiges, 
glühendes Leben ist alles. t20] 
When these statements are placed alongside the Heraclitean formulation of "the 
one differentiated in itself", the way in which such a unity is to be understood 
starts to become clear. Whilst the notion of the whole is still posited, this is 
not seen as a goal which must be worked towards; i. e. the Schillerian forward 
directed, dialectically mediated teleology is not operating here. Rather, as is 
indicated by the biological metaphors used in the passage from Hyperion, the 
unity which Hölderlin proposes is one that is living and dynamic. The sense of 
whole and unity that is employed here is one in which difference and conflict 
are sustained as such; there is no attempt to force a reconciliation of these 
oppositions. It is this emphasis on the importance of differentiation which 
separates Hölderlin's account from that of his contemporaries and which prevents 
him from being easily assimilated either to Schiller's dialectical schema or to 
the Idealist system of Schelling. In adopting the Heraclitean model as the basis 
of his understanding of the dialectical relation, Hölderlin makes the move which 
will not only isolate him from mainstream thought, but which also necessarily 
influences and informs the direction which his own work will take. It is outside 
the scope of this study to develop a full comparative analysis of the 
differences between the thought of Hölderlin and the Idealists. However, as this 
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interpretation develops it should become evident that although Hölderlin's work 
contains many elements similar to the thought of Idealists such as Hegel and 
Schelling, the conclusions which can be drawn with respect to his work are 
subtly different. Hölderlin can be distinguished from his contemporaries 
immediately by the observation that he is the theorist who takes the call for 
the reinstatement of the aesthetic to its most logical conclusion. Whilst his 
peers will discuss the "aesthetic" from a theoretical perspective, - e. g. using 
examples from fiction to substantiate theoretical claims121 ]- and will gesture 
towards the necessity of consideration of the aesthetic within their systems, 
Hölderlin takes a different and potentially more radical route. This is 
evidenced by the emergence of the so-called "poetological" writings which 
engage with the theoretical concerns of system thought. As Hölderlin states in 
the letter to Schiller which I quoted earlier, he is concerned to investigate 
"what must continually be demanded of any system, the union of subject and 
object in an absolute I". However this is undertaken from the perspective of the 
aesthetic; i. e. the ground upon which the discussion takes place is moved away 
from the purely theoretical "philosophical" texts, into the actual sphere of the 
aesthetic, namely into the discourse of the aesthetic, the poetical. These texts 
enact the conflation of the types of discourse which was demanded by the 
system-programme. Through the discussion of the poetic genres Hölderlin brings 
together all the components which have been outlined in this discussion. The 
concerns of the System-Programme fragment are joined with issues that arise 
out of Hyperion with regard to the Heraclitean formulation of the "one 
differentiated in itself" in order to work towards a new understanding of the 
aesthetic. The place where these concerns become most manifest is in the 
-103- 
discussions of the tragic form. To understand the full Implications of this move 
it is to these discussions of tragedy that I now wish to turn. 
3.3. The Poetological Writings. 
In this section I shall examine Hölderlin's treatment of the poetic forms and 
show how it is related to the wider theoretical concerns that I discussed 
previously. Many difficulties exist with the so-called "poetological writings"122) 
not least of which being the fact that many of the texts are incomplete, often 
contradictory and exist only as working drafts. It is therefore not possible to 
view them as constituting a finished body of work, or as providing a definitive 
account of Hölderlin's understanding of the relationship between poetic and 
philosophical theory. When these factors are taken into consideration, problems 
arise with respect to how these texts are to be approached from a critical 
perspective. Hence in what follows I shall concentrate on an analysis of one of 
the texts in detail, whilst informing this analysis with passages from other 
texts which help to illustrate Hölderlin's position at this time. In adopting this 
selective approach and, specifically, not examining all the texts from this period 
I can necessarily make no claim to a representative account of all the issues 
thrown up by these texts. Yet, because of their provisional nature, systematic 
coverage would anyway be illusory. None of the texts provide a fully coherent 
or polished "system" of thought, hence it is appropriate to engage them in an 
interpretation which brings together elements from several, apparently disparate, 
texts. 
- 
I intend to focus my discussion on the short text, On the Difference of the 
Poetic Modes. 1231 This text was written in the summer of 1800, and is 
Hölderlin's most succinct summary of the nature of the poetic modes and the 
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relationships between them. At the beginning of the text, the features of the 
three distinct modes are outlined in a schematic fashion. Hölderlin writes, 
The lyric, in appearance idealistic poem, is naive in its significance. 
It is the continuous metaphor of a feeling. 
The epic, in appearance naive poem, is heroic in its significance. It 
is the metaphor of great aspirations. 
The tragic, in appearance heroic poem, is idealistic in its 
significance. It is the metaphor of an intellectual intuition. 
Das lyrische dem Schein nach idealische Gedicht ist in seiner 
Bedeutung naiv. Es ist eine fortgehende Metapher Eines Gefühls. 
Das epische dem Schein nach naive Gedicht ist in seiner Bedeutung 
heroisch. Es ist die Metapher großer Bestrebungen. 
Das tragische, dem Schein nach heroische Gedicht ist in seiner 
Bedeutung idealisch. Es ist die Metapher einer intellectualen 
Anschauung. (24 
In this statement Hölderlin describes the individual components of the three 
poetic modes which constitute the basis of his analysis of the poetic process. 
Although the three modes exist independently of each other, a circular 
relationship between them can also discerned. The description of each of the 
modes comprises three elements; Hölderlin establishes the appearance of the 
mode, its significance, and of what it is a metaphor. Whilst the first two 
categories are self-explanatory, the third - of what the mode is a metaphor - 
is more problematic. This part of the description refers apparently to the 
ebntent of the form, and the relationship between the content and the wider 
context to which it refers. However this is not to be understood as a direct, 
unmediated relationship as is shown by the fact that it is described as a 
"metaphor", indicating that a displacement occurs between the mode, and the 
wider meaning which is attributed to it; i. e. each type of poetic mode gestures 
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towards this wider relevance but this is not given expressly within the work 
itself. Furthermore the modes comprise the same components, although each 
component performs a different function within each individual mode. For 
example, the "heroic" is given in the "appearance" of the tragic, whilst it 
constitutes "the significance" of the epic. Thus it is possible to establish a 
circular relationship between the different modes because there are a limited 
number of components which make up the modes which occur in a finite set of 
combinations within the poetic process as a whole. C25I Hölderlin's desire to 
understand the internal structure of the poetic forms can be related to the 
discussion in the previous chapter of the first letter to Böhlendorff regarding 
the necessity of learning the "rules" for the composition of a work. 
Hölderlin explains the interrelationships between the modes further in a very 
short, fragmentary text which is contemporaneous with the Differences essay. In 
this short text Hölderlin writes that, 
The tragic poet should study the lyric, the lyric poet the epic and 
the epic poet the tragic. For in the tragic lies the completion of the 
epic, in the lyric the completion of the tragic, and in the epic the 
completion of the lyric. For if the completion of all is a mixed 
expression of all of them, nevertheless in each one, one of the three 
sides stands out most. 
Der tragische Dichter thut wohl, der lyrischen, den lyrische den 
epischen, der epische den tragischen zu studieren. Denn im tragischen 
liegt die Vollendung des epischen, im lyrischen die Vollendung des 
tragischen, im epischen die Vollendung des lyrischen. Denn wenn 
schon die Vollendung von allen ein vermischter Ausdruck von allen 
ist, so ist doch eine der drei Seiten in jedem die 
hervorstechendste. 12 61 
This fragment suggests that a mutual complementarity exists between each of 
the modes, and that the ideal completed work should be seen to contain a 
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mixture of all three. Hence the poets should not confine themselves to 
specialising in one of the modes, rather they should learn both the individual 
nature of each mode and also the relationships between them. However this does 
not preclude the possibility of identifying the work with one of the specific 
modes, for even though it contains a "mixture" of all three, one mode is still 
dominant, thus enabling the work to be defined as "tragic" or "lyric. " 
A further distinction can be drawn between the modes which arises out of the 
final characteristic which Hölderlin describes, namely of what they are a 
metaphor. The lyric is seen as a "continuous metaphor of a feeling", the heroic 
as "the metaphor of great aspirations, " and the tragic as "the metaphor of an 
intellectual intuition". The difference between these three descriptions is 
important because it indicates that each of the modes has a different value for, 
and relationship with, the wider context towards which it gestures. 
Furthermore, it seems that the modes can be arranged hierarchically with the 
tragic mode placed highest since it is the metaphor of "an intellectual 
intuition". This remark suggests that in the tragic mode there is given the 
possibility for a relationship to the Absolute. However this apparently simple, 
factual statement raises more questions than it answers, for whilst it locates 
the site of the relationship between the philosophical and the poetical process 
within the tragic mode, at this point no other explanations are given. What 
significance, then, can be attributed to this remark? Furthermore, what 
justification can be given for choosing the tragic mode rather than the lyric or 
the epic, especially when the statements quoted above regarding the mutual 
interrelationship between the modes is taken into consideration? 
To start to answer these questions it is necessary to move momentarily away 
from this text, back towards the issues raised in the previous section, and 
-107- 
specifically to return to the discussion of how the idea of beauty is to be 
understood. In the previous section I argued that a difference can be observed 
between Hölderlin's characterisation of beauty in terms of the Heraclitean 
formula of the "one differentiated in itself" and that which is given by the 
authors of the System-Programme who view beauty as a concept which is all- 
encompassing, totalising and which eradicates difference. As a result of these 
characterisations, two different readings can be developed as to how Beauty - 
understood as the highest idea which unifies all the others - is to be realised. 
Whilst for the writers of the System-Programme fragment all elements of the 
system will be brought together in the general category of "poesy", Hölderlin's 
conception calls for a much more sophisticated response. In the discussion at 
the end of previous section I highlighted the biological metaphor which 
underlies Hölderlin's understanding of the "one differentiating in itself". This 
metaphor suggests the impossibility of being able to speak of the whole without 
the parts; the unity that is posited is a unity of unity and difference. How, 
though, is this to be thought in an aesthetic sense if it is assumed that the 
access to this unity can only be gained through the aesthetic sphere as is 
suggested by the letter to Schiller of the fourth of September 1796 which I 
quoted previously? How does this relate to the tragic? 
Answers to these questions can be found in a preliminary way in the second 
volume of Hyperion. Hölderlin prefaces this volume with a quotation from the 
chorus in Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus, "Not to born is best when all is 
reckoned in, but, when a man has seen the light, this is next best by far, to 
go back where he came from, quickly as he can. " This desolate assessment of 
humanity's condition is in stark contrast to the sentiments with which Volume 
One concludes. In the final letter of Volume One Hyperion and Diotima call for 
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the rejuvenation of Greece and Nature through the new spirit of Beauty which 
Hyperion will teach to all who are receptive. (271 However, at the beginning of 
Volume Two, Hyperion has returned to his previous melancholy. This change is 
summed up by the Sophoclean quotation which from the start casts a shadow 
over Hyperion's aspirations. This mood continues in the first letter of the 
volume which is set in the autumn after the triumphant visit to Athens. The 
visit is discussed in a reminiscent manner. Overall there is a sense that this is 
a time which has passed irrevocably into memory and which can never be 
recovered. Speaking of the past, Diotima laments, "We felt so glad then that 
the living green did not flee from us too, like the brook... yet now spring, too, 
is over the hills and away. " (Da tat es uns so wohl, daß uns das seelenvolle 
Grim nicht auch so wegflog, wie der Bach.. . aber nun ist er Cd. h. der FriihlingJ 
dennoch über die Berge. )1281. In response to these remarks, Hyperion speaking 
from the position of the present narrator replies, 
We smiled at these words, although sorrow was closer to us. 
So was our own bliss to depart, and we foresaw it. 
Oh Bellarmin, who then is allowed to say he stands fast, if even 
beauty reaches maturity out of its fate, if even the divine must 
humble itself, and mortality share itself with all that is mortal! 
Wir lächelten über dem Worte, wie wohl das Trauern ums näher war. 
So sollt auch unsre eigne Seligkeit dahingehe, und wir sahens 
voraus. 
Oh Bellarmin! wer darf denn sagen, er stehe fest, wenn auch das 
Schöne seinem Schicksal so entgegenreift, wenn auch das Göttliche 
sich demütigen muß, und die Sterblichkeit mit allem Sterblichen 
teilen! 129 
In this passage Hölderlin suggests that Hyperion has realised that the proposal 
with which Volume One ended - that "there will be but one Beauty; and man 
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and Nature will be united in one all-embracing divinity" - is unrealisable. In 
the light of the insights which Hyperion has gained, he sees this as an utopian 
ideal which has no possibility of actualisation. This new understanding occurs 
because Hyperion realises that the positive "solution" which had been proposed, 
failed to consider the empirical situation of the protagonists. It was an attempt 
to impose an ahistorical, theoretical solution onto a situation which is 
determined by the constraints of time and history. The proposals which are put 
forward in Volume One can be seen to be subject to the same objections as the 
"theoretical solution" which Höiderlin criticises in the letter to Schiller of the 
fourth of September 1796. Simply to posit the Idea of Beauty as a goal which 
can be worked towards, albeit through philosophical or aesthetic forms of 
education, is a hopeless enterprise. There is a need for a different 
understanding of the nature of the unifying idea of beauty to be developed 
which will recognise the limitations of human nature and thought. This is what 
Hölderlin is working towards in the passage quoted. Here Hölderlin considers 
the situation facing Hyperion from a temporal and historical perspective. 
Hyperion is shown to have become aware of his own mortality, thus gaining a 
new insight into the nature of the Beautiful. He realises that not only 
humanity, but also the Gods and Nature must be subject to fate. f307 All 
things, both natural and spiritual, must be considered from an historical 
perspective. Thus for the Gods and Nature to be understood by humanity, they 
must be subject to the same strictures. Hence as Hyperion states "the divine 
must humble itself, and mortality share itself with all that is mortal". That 
is, for the divine to mean anything to man it must enter history; it must 
becomes subject to the strictures of time. Also in order for humanity to gain 
an insight into its own situation it must realise it is necessarily subject to 
limitation and finitude. In turn this also changes how the idea of Beauty is 
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understood, for it is realised that it too can only be understood from a 
temporal perspective. Hence Hölderlin comments that "beauty reaches maturity 
out of its fate". This means that Beauty can only be understood in relation to 
the way it is manifest in the world. It cannot be understood as an abstract 
ideal concept which thought tries to grasp and comprehend, rather it can only 
be understood in respect to how it is manifest in specific instances which 
necessarily always fall short of the Ideal. However this does not mean that the 
notion of beauty is diminished, rather it simply offers alternative possibilities 
as to how it is to be construed. Hölderlin demonstrates this different, more 
historical. understanding in a letter to his sister, written in 1798, the year 
before the publication of the second volume of Hyperion. He explains to her 
that, 
... everything has its time, and that summer is essentially as 
beautiful as spring, or rather that neither one nor the other is 
completely beautiful, and that beauty consists rather in all seasons 
of life together, precisely in their succession, rather than in one 
single season. 
... 
Daß alles seine Zeit hat, und daß der Sommer im Grunde so schön 
ist, wie der Frühling, oder vielmehr daß weder der eine, noch der 
andere ganz schön ist, und daß die Schönheit mehr in allen 
Lebenszeiten zusammen, so wie sie aufeinanderfolgen, besteht, als in 
einer einzigen. 131 
What is offered here is a dynamic understanding of beauty which is similar to 
the heart and arteries metaphor which occurs at the end of Hyperion. No one 
thing can be considered beautiful in itself, rather what is of importance is the 
process o f succession and change which allows each part to be given value. 
Hence as Hölderlin writes, beauty "consists in all seasons of life together, 
precisely in their succession rather than in one single season". This remark 
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suggests also that the dynamic nature of this process makes it impossible by 
definition to achieve an understanding of beauty in itself. That is, there is no 
transcendent Idea of beauty, or perhaps more correctly, even if a transcendent 
Idea of beauty is presupposed, no point of unmediated access can ever be 
achieved. There is no point outside the temporal sphere, outside the process 
itself, from which the succession can be viewed. Hence the component elements 
can only gain value and meaning through the acknowledgement of the progression 
from one to another. Thus, in a wider perspective, this helps also to explain 
Hölderlin's move towards consideration of the individual poetic forms. For if the 
Absolute can only be understood from a historical perspective - i. e. if an 
awareness of the necessary temporal dimension of any viewpoint must be 
acknowledged, - then the move towards consideration of individual instances, 
rather than a universal theoretical stance, becomes more understandable. The 
realisation of the necessity of the historical perspective of any understanding 
can be related to the argument that I established in the previous chapter with 
regard to how the relationship between Greece and Germany is to be viewed. It 
relates specifically to the idea that one must, and can only, speak from the 
perspective of the present. Just as it is impossible to work towards the 
reinstatement of Greek models of art, it is equally problematic to propose the 
birth or rejuvenation of an ideal realm of Beauty. Thus it can be seen that this 
acknowledgement of the unavoidable necessity of developing a historical form of 
understanding, problematises how the call for the rebirth of poetry which is 
made in the System-Programme fragment is to be brought about. 
Having established how Hölderlin's understanding of the nature of Beauty alters, 
it is now necessary to return to the problem of how this relates to the tragic 
mode. What is specific to the tragic mode which enables it to be seen as the 
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"metaphor of an intellectual intuition"? In the above discussion I showed how 
Hölderlin moves away from arguing for the possibility of an immediate relation 
with the Absolute as Beauty. Rather, the Absolute must necessarily always be 
presented via its contact with the temporal sphere. The necessity for a mediated 
relation to the Absolute can be used to explain why the tragic presents the 
metaphor of an intellectual intuition. Hölderlin denies the possibility of the 
immediacy which is entailed in the theoretical understanding of intellectual 
intuition. Therefore in the aesthetic presentation, through the work itself, a 
mediated relation with the Absolute is proposed. This is the reason why 
Hölderlin explains this relation in terms of metaphor. When metaphor is 
considered structurally it can be understood as a device which operates 
relationally. The metaphoric process presupposes a displacement in the "literal" 
meaning of terms; the two terms are juxtaposed by the copula "is", which 
brings forth a new "meaning". The sense of the metaphor lies in neither of the 
terms in themselves, rather it exists as a hitherto unstated relational third 
term which is sited in limbo between the other two. This is why Hölderlin is 
able to make use of metaphor in his discussion of intellectual intuition, for the 
form of relationship given in the metaphoric process describes how access to 
the Absolute is given. The Absolute can only be presented through its contact 
with the temporal sphere, through the aesthetic process. Yet in this contact its 
nature is necessarily altered insofar as its unity can only be gestured towards, 
intimated. Just as in the metaphoric process, the "meaning" of the metaphor 
cannot be seen to lie in either of the two terms of which it comprises, in the 
metaphoric relation between the tragic mode and the intellectual intuition, the 
intuition can only gain meaning and value through its relation with the mode in 
which it is allowed to come to expression. 
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Hölderlin summarises this idea succinctly in a letter to his friend Neuffer, 
written on November 12,1798. Here he writes that, 
The pure can only present itself in the impure.. . and does so 
precisely because the noble itself, just as it comes to expression, 
bears the colour of the fate in which it originated. 
Das Reine kann sich nur darstellen im Unreinen... und zwar darum, 
weil das Edle selber, so wie es zür Äußerung kömmt, die Farbe des 
Schicksals trägt, unter dem es entstand. 132) 
The "pure" - i. e. the Absolute, the divine, the ideal of Beauty, all these terms 
are now synonymous - is incapable of revealing itself as itself. Rather it can 
only be given via a mediated relationship with that which it is not. This occurs 
through the necessity that it must become subject to time, it has to "bear the 
colour of the fate in which it originated"; i. e. for the Absolute to "come to 
expression", it has to be mediated through the present, and in so doing it 
becomes tainted. It can never be given as immediate, hence there cannot be 
direct access to the Beautiful in itself, or the Divine in itself. Rather all that 
is given is the "metaphoric" relationship with the Absolute. How though is this 
specifically related to the tragic? 
Two answers can be given, one general the other more specific. Firstly, the 
whole process of the necessary relation between the Absolute and the finite can 
be understood as one that is tragic. The Absolute can only be understood in 
and through its relation to time and history. In terms of the idea of Beauty, 
this means that it is only through the destruction of Beauty that its true 
nature is revealed, albeit indirectly. The ambiguous nature of this process is 
more evident in the original German text. The term Schicksal, which appears 
with great frequency throughout these texts can mean both fate and destiny. 
Thus the "fate" of the Absolute - its necessary subjugation to time - is also 
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its destiny understood in the futural sense. As I will show in the analysis 
which follows, the "destiny" of the Absolute is that it must transcend its 
unity, it must become subject to time. This move is entirely necessary and is 
already anticipated in Hölderlin's structuring of the nature of the Absolute. 
This is because the unity of the Absolute is not to be understood as a 
totalising, transcendent concept. The term "Absolute" does not refer to a static 
concept, rather it refers to the process of constant engenderment. The unity of 
the Absolute must constantly be sundered. This is what is shown in and 
through the tragic mode. t33] The tragic mode is the site in which this process 
is most clearly enacted. Hence the reason why Hölderlin claims that the tragic 
mode presents "the metaphor of an intellectual intuition. " In order better to 
understand the relation between the tragic mode and the intellectual intuition, it 
is necessary now to return to the Poetic Modes essay, and to examine the 
specific discussion which arises there. After examining the characteristics of 
the lyric and epic modes, Hölderlin returns to discussion of the tragic. He 
reiterates the schematic formulation of the relation between the different 
characteristics of the mode which was given at the beginning of the essay and 
then states that the tragic, 
... must be founded on an intellectual intuition which cannot 
be any 
other one than that unity with everything living which, to be sure, 
is not felt by the limited soul, only intimated in its [the soul's] 
highest aspirations, yet which can be known by the spirit. 
... muß Eine intellectuale Anschauung zum Grunde liegen welche 
keine 
andere seyn kann, als jene Einigkeit mit allem, was lebt, die zwar 
von dem beschränkten Gemüthe nicht gefühlt, die in seinen höchsten 
Bestrebungen nur geahndet, aber vom Geiste erkannt werden 
kann ... (341 
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In this statement Hölderlin emphasises how the tragic mode is central to his 
understanding of intellectual intuition. From this passage it is clear that 
Hölderlin's understanding of intellectual intuition differs from the Fichtean 
schema which I outlined in the previous section. The term "intellectual 
intuition" is not seen to refer to an act undertaken by an individual agent 
which founds his or her identity. Rather - as may be expected from Hölderlin's 
insistence that the tragic mode is "the metaphor of an intellectual intuition" - 
this formulation problematises Fichte's assertion that the intuition is the 
founding act of the system. [35]. The "limited soul"; i. e. the human subject, the 
poet, can only "intimate", gesture, towards this intuition through his or her 
work, through their "highest aspirations. ". However, as is also stated, this 
intuition can be "known by the spirit". The question that arises is what is 
meant here by the term "spirit". In another, contemporaneous, text On the 
Operations of the Poetic Spirit, Hölderlin offers a much longer explanation of 
how he understands this term and its relationship to the individual poet. At 
the beginning of this text he writes, 
Once the poet is in control of the spirit, once he has felt and 
appropriated, has held fast and assured himself of the communal 
soul which is common to everyone and proper to each, once he is 
furthermore certain of the free movement, of the harmonious 
alternation and progressive striving wherein the spirit tends to 
reproduce itself within itself and within others... 
Wenn der Dichter einmal des Geistes mächtig Ist, wenn er die 
gemeinschaftliche Seele, die allem gemein und jedem eigen ist, gefühlt 
und sich zugeeignet, sie vestgehalten, sich ihrer versichert hat, wenn 
er ferner der freien Bewegung, des harmonischen Wechsels und 
Fortstrebens, worinn der Geist sich in sich selber und in andern zu 
reproduciren geneigt ist... 13 61 
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In this passage the spirit is defined as the "communal soul", as that which is 
proper to all people, but also it is that with which they cannot have an 
immediate relation. Rather the spirit is seen as an autonomous unity, capable of 
"reproducing itself within itself and within others". This characterisation 
suggests that the "poetic spirit" is to be understood as another of the 
synonyms for the Absolute. This is clarified later when it is stated that the 
spirit can be defined in terms of a necessary conflict between the two poles of 
unity and differentation. 1371 This can be linked back to the formulation of the 
unity of Beauty as the "one differentiating in itself" which is given in 
Hyperion. Furthermore it can also be related to the comments made previously 
that the unity of the Absolute must be constantly transcended; i. e. the Absolute 
is to be understood as a process rather than a static entity which must be 
worked towards and attained. As Christoph Jamme argues in his article Hegel 
and Hölderlin, the unity of the Absolute - the "oneness" of the spirit - cannot 
be understood as referring to a static determination of Being. Rather, Jamme 
contends that, 
Hölderlin develops a new thought: 
I /This being not merely is something, but that it becomes 
something. Its essence is "premonition" (Ahnung) and "longing" 
(Sehnsucht); it intuits (ahnt) its future development in existing 
things, whereby it intuits (Anschaut) itself. 
2/ There is an "excess of inwardness" (fibermass des Innigkeit), and 
"excess of spirit in oneness" (tibermass des Geistes in der 
Einigkeit). In other words, there is a Oneness that must proceed out 
of itself because otherwise it cannot "feel itself", cannot become 
conscious of itself. 1381 
These processes can both be seen to be occurring in Hölderlin's description of 
the movement of the "poetic spirit". They are effected through the aesthetic 
production. The aesthetic work - i. e. the tragic mode - is essential for this 
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process. Hölderlin clarifies this point in the essay On the Operations of the 
Poetic Spirit, when he observes, 
However since the poetic spirit cannot know the world in itself nor 
of itself, an external object is necessary, and indeed such through 
which the individuality, among several neither merely opposing nor 
merely relating but poetic characters which it can assume, be 
determined to assume some specific one... 
Da er [der Geist] aber sie [die Welt] nicht durch sich selbst und an 
sich selbst erkennen kann, so ist ein äußeres Object nothwendig und 
zwar ein solches, wodurch die reine Individualität, unter mehreren 
besondern weder blos entgegensezenden, noch blos beziehenden sondern 
poetischen Karakteren, die sie annehmen kann, irgend Einen 
anzunehmen bestimmt werde... 1391 
Here the relationship between the poetic spirit, the poet and the work is made 
most explicit. The spirit must become manifest through the work of art. The 
point of contact between the poet who has an "intimation" of the spirit, and 
the spirit itself, is the work, and in particular the tragic form. Furthermore, 
this is to be understood as a two way process, for through the engagement 
with the process of the poetic spirit, the poet enters into a relation with the 
Absolute. Hence as is later stated, man's destiny [Bestimmung] is to seek to, 
Know himself as a unity contained within the divine - harmoniously 
opposed and, vice versa, the divine, unified, harmonious opposed 
within himself as unity. For this is possible only in beautiful, 
sacred, divine sentiment... 
... daß er sich als Einheit in Göttlichem - 
Harmonischentgegengeseztem enthalten, so wie umgekehrt, das 
Göttliche, Einige, Harmonischentgegengesezte, in sich als Einheit 
enthalten erkenne. Denn dig ist allein in schöner heiliger, göttlicher 
Empfindung möglich. [40] 
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This passage can be seen to encapsulate the threefold relationship between 
humanity, the Absolute and the work. The reciprocal nature of this relationship 
is made clear. Both man and the divine strive to achieve unity through the 
recognition of their mutual interdependence. This is mediated via the aesthetic 
realm, via a "beautiful, sacred, divine sentiment". However the possibility that 
this unity may actually be achieved is brought into question by the qualification 
that is added to this statement, for man's striving towards this unity is 
described as a "vain" (vergebens) striving. This remark again highlights the 
dynamic nature of this process, which prevents the unity from being understood 
as a goal towards which the process is aiming. Rather all that can ever be 
given is the process, the continual flux and movement of the component parts. 
There is no point "outside" this process from which a universal judgement or 
claim can be made. This also helps to explain why the tragic mode gives only 
the "metaphor" of an intellectual intuition. For although the tragic mode can be 
viewed as the "site" around which this process rotates, it can never be 
understood to provide a ground, or point of unification. The tragic mode is 
itself part of the process and therefore it has no foundational privilege. The 
form of unity given through intellectual intuition is gestured towards in the 
tragic mode, but the intuition itself cannot be presented directly. By definition 
immediate access to the Absolute cannot occur, because the mode itself is the 
site of mediation. It is the point at which the Absolute enters temporality, 
enters history, thereby automatically instituting division into the whole. The 
unity of the Absolute is a paradoxical unity for it is defined in terms of 
fission and internal division. Furthermore, it is only through division that the 
unity can be intimated. This point is summarised by a remark in the Difference 
of Poetic Modes essay where Hölderlin states that, 
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The unity present in the intellectual intuition manifests itself as a 
sensuous one precisely to the extent that it transcends itself .... in 
this striving for separation of the divisible infinite, which in the 
state of highest unity of everything organic imparts itself to all 
parts contained by this unity, in this necessary arbitrariness of 
Zeus there actually lies the ideal beginning of the actual separation. 
Die in der Intellectualen Anschauung vorhandene Einigkeit 
versinnlichet sich in eben dem Maaße, in welchem sie aus sich 
herausgehet... in diesem Streben des theilbaren Unendlichen nach 
Trennung welches sich im Zustande der höchsten Einigkeit, alles 
organischen, den in dieser enthaltenen Theilen mittheilt, in dieser 
nothwendigen Willkür des Zeus liegt eigentlich der ideale Anfang der 
wirklichen Trennung. (41 
When the unity of the Absolute is manifest in the tragic mode it necessarily 
must transcend itself, and thus is presented as a "sensuous unity"; i. e. it 
becomes divided into component parts, it is manifest through the tragic form. 
The unavoidability of this process, the necessity of the Absolute to transcend 
itself and be understood in relation to time, is highlighted by Hölderlin's use 
of the oxymoronic phrase the "necessary arbitrariness of Zeus" to describe this 
process. In Greek mythology Zeus is the God who overthrows the unity of the 
heavens through the killing of his father Chronos, as an act of vengeance for 
the swallowing of his brothers. t423 As a result of this killing, the leadership 
of the universe is split between the Gods who each control a realm, thus 
bringing about its division into separate spheres. This act of division destroys 
the former unity, introducing both a difference between the realms of sky and 
sea, earth and heaven and the problem of how these separate realms are able to 
interact. In this act of division there "lies the ideal beginning of the actual 
separation"; i. e. this is explanation for all separation within the temporal 
sphere. It explains the incomplete, unfulfilled nature of humanity's experience 
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insofar as it is never able to gain access to the Absolute in an unmediated 
manner. Likewise, it also explains the subjection of the Absolute to time and 
history. 
However this "real separation" also refers to the poetic process itself, for 
Hölderlin uses this as the starting point for understanding the underlying 
structure of the tragic form itself. He states, 
From here the separation proceeds until the parts are in their most 
extreme tension, where they resist one another most strongly. From 
this conflict, it returns into itself, namely where the parts... cancel 
one another and a new unity originates. 
Von diesem gehet sie fort bis dahin, wo die Theile in ihrer 
äußersten Spannung sind, wo diese sich am stärksten widerstreben. 
Von diesem Widerstreit gehet sie wieder in sich selbst zurük, 
nemlich dahin, wo die Theile... sich aufheben, und eine neue Einigkeit 
entsteht. [4 31 
In this passage it is clear that Hölderlin is referring to the actual dramatic 
structure of the tragic form. The form is developed out of the conflict between 
the protagonists, there is a struggle between opposing forces albeit manifest in 
human or "divine" form. However here Hölderlin also proposes that a form of 
reconciliation or unification emerges out of this struggle, the opposing forces 
"cancel one another and a new unity originates. " How though, is this "new 
unity" to be understood, when throughout this discussion I have argued for the 
impossibility of the realisation of unity understood as totality? An answer can 
be given, if it is accepted that in this text two separate levels of argument are 
occurring and at this point the two become conflated. The first argument is a 
philosophical, primarily ontological argument concerning the relation between the 
Absolute and the subject and the possibility of interaction between the two, 
which is resolved - although not in a positive sense - via the aesthetic 
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process. The second argument is primarily poetological and can be characterised 
as an attempt to provide a structural analysis of the nature of the poetic 
forms. These two arguments necessarily must meet in the discussion of the 
tragic form because of the fact that it is described as "the metaphor of an 
intellectual intuition". However, as I argued earlier, the metaphoric nature of 
the relationship between the form and intellectual intuition precludes any 
suggestion that the latter is actually "given" in the tragic form. Hence the 
"unity" which is mentioned above, must not be understood as referring to the 
possibility of the achievement of the intellectual intuition itself through the 
aesthetic work, but rather must be seen as part of the description of the 
structure of the tragic form. When the above passage is read as an outline of 
the structure which underlies the tragic form, then the "new unity" which is 
achieved can be seen as the interpretation which can be given at the end of the 
drama. A reading can occur which incorporates the tragic form as a whole, it 
is given at the end in the light of the insights which have be gained. However 
this is not to deny the existence of an intrinsic link between the two levels of 
argument in this text. In fact, the link is made explicit in the statement that I 
quoted earlier when Hölderlin remarks that "in this striving for separation of 
the divisible infinite... there actually lies the ideal beginning of the actual 
separation. " The Absolute's need to transcend its unity, to move outside itself 
is the underlying premis of the tragic form, and is enacted within it. The 
structure of the tragic form can be seen to mirror the process of the Absolute, 
as encapsulated in the biological metaphors in Hyperion, whereby it moves 
outside itself, only to return to itself. However, again, the "metaphoric" nature 
of this process must be reiterated insofar as the unity which is achieved occurs 
only hypothetically. It occurs in the realm of "real separation" - i. e. in time - 
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thus the ideal reconciliation and unification can only be intimated. It, in itself, 
cannot be realised. 
In this chapter I have shown the theoretical presuppositions which underlie 
Hölderlin's understanding of the poetic modes. How, though, can this theory be 
related to Hölderlin's attempts to write a tragic drama? To answer this 
question it is now necessary to turn to closer analysis of Hölderlin's drama 
Empedocles and the two theoretical texts which accompany it, The Ground to 
Empedocles and Becoming in Dissolution. 
-123- 
Chapter 4. 
The Example of Emnedocles. 
4.1. Introduction. 
Whilst preparing the drafts of the second volume of Hyperion for publication, 
Hölderlin was already contemplating writing a tragic drama based around the 
life and death of the Greek philosopher, poet and statesman Empedocles. In 
fact, Empedocles is mentioned briefly in the final chapters of Hyperion. Hyperion 
recalls how, in the depths of despair after the death of Diotima, he followed in 
the footsteps of Empedocles and went to the summit of Etna to contemplate his 
fate. (1 > However, in relation to Hölderlin's own attempts to write the "modern" 
tragedy of Empedocles, it is apposite to note that Hyperion decides he should 
not - or perhaps cannot - undergo the same fate as Empedocles. He is full of 
"uncertainties" and doubts and feels that the ultimate act of suicide cannot be 
justified. He lacks sufficient faith in himself and in his beliefs to undertake 
such an act. Hyperion's inability to follow Empedocles into the mouth of Etna 
can be seen to prefigure the problems which Hölderlin faces in completing his 
drama. During the period between the commencent of the first draft and 
abandonment of the entire project in late 1799, Hölderlin writes three different 
drafts of the drama and two accompanying essays in which he tries to explain 
the theoretical premises with which he is working. None of the drafts of the 
drama are in any way complete; in fact each draft is successively more 
fragmentary. The theoretical essays also remain incomplete, suggesting that 
Hölderlin could not resolve the problems he was confronting from either a 
poetic or theoretical perspective. 
In this chapter I shall limit discussion to the two theoretical essays, The 
Ground for Empedocles and Becoming in Dissolution. Whilst the dramas 
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themselves, and the differences between them, are extremely interesting, it is 
outside the scope of this study to discuss them in detail. 12] Rather, my concern 
lies in showing how Hölderlin's theoretical understanding of the tragic form is 
developed and problematised by his attempt to relate his theoretical beliefs to 
the practical task of creating a drama which reflects and enacts these beliefs. 
I shall first discuss The Ground for Empedocles. This text was written in 
between the second and third drafts of the drama, and is Hölderlin's clearest 
attempt to relate his theoretical position to the details of the dramatic 
presentation. After highlighting the problems and impasses which this text 
creates for the Empedocles project, I shall then examine Becoming in 
Dissolution. On first reading this text does not seem to be related directly to 
the Empedocles project for it is very abstract and it is only in the final 
paragraphs that Hölderlin mentions the tragic drama. However, as I intend to 
show, this text can be read as the culmination of Hölderlin's poetological 
project for within it, the limits of the project are confronted. The position 
which Hölderlin must then confront will, as I shall show in Chapter 5, force 
him to seek to adopt an alternative way of approaching the tragic drama. 
4.2. The Ground for Empedocles. 
The Ground for Emyedocles can be divided into two main sections. First, there 
is an introductory passage and the "General Ground". In this section of the 
text Hölderlin provides a purely theoretical discussion of the nature of the 
_tragic 
modes. Secondly, there is the specific "Ground for Empedocles" in which 
Hölderlin relates the theoretical discussion of the tragic modes to the 
Empedocles project. I shall examine these two sections in turn, highlighting the 
way in which they relate to the discussion in the previous chapter, whilst also 
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attempting to pinpoint the problems inherent in the project which lead to its 
eventual failure. 
At the beginning of the text Hölderlin establishes the features which are 
central to the tragic mode. He writes, 
The tragic ode begins in the highest fire; the pure spirit, the pure 
inwardness has transcended its border, it has not sufficiently 
moderated those connections of life which are necessary and which, 
as it is, already strive for contact.. . and thus through the excess of 
inwardness, there has originated a discord which the tragic ode 
figures forth right at the outset in order to depict the pure. 
Die tragische Ode fängt im höchsten Feuer an, der reine Geist, die 
reine Innigkeit hat ihre Grenze überschritten, sie hat diejenigen 
Verbindung des Lebens, die nothwendig, also gleichsam ohnediß zum 
Contact geneigt sind.. . nicht mäßig genug gehalten, und so 
ist durch 
Übermass der Innigkeit, der Zwist entstanden, den die tragische Ode 
gleich zu Anfang fingirt, um das Reine darzustellen. 131 
Here Hölderlin shows how the unity of the Absolute must necessarily be 
transgressed, the Absolute must "transcend its borders" In order for it to 
become manifest and known in the temporal realm. The tragic form is the 
medium which demonstrates this process. The Absolute - "the pure spirit" - is 
characterised by an "excess of inwardness", hence it must always attempt to 
overcome this limitation. The tension inherent within Hölderliin's conception of 
the Absolute is here made clear, for the process which he describes can only 
_ 
operate at extremes. The tragic ode "begins in the highest fire"; i. e. in order 
for the pure to be depicted it can only be presented through its extreme 
opposite, through extreme differentiation. Hence the tragic ode "figures forth" 
discord; conflict is an essential element of the tragic. However, as Höiderlin 
then makes clear, the conflict is only part of the tragic process, its ultimate 
aim is to gesture towards the way in which the parts can be reconciled back 
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into a whole. For the whole to be presented it must be split into, and appear 
as, its opposite. Then via the poetic process itself, through the tragic 
presentation, the unity of the whole is suggested. This is not to be understood 
as a purely circular process, in which the reconciliation attained is identical to 
that which is presupposed at the beginning of the process. Rather, in coming 
into contact with its opposite, in presenting itself via what it is not, the unity 
which is attained at the end of the process is necessarily different, for it is 
aware of, and acknowledges the process itself. Hölderlin outlines the form of 
dialectic which is presupposed by this process when he writes, 
... [the ode] must transcend the extremes of differentiation and non- 
differentiation into that quiet thoughtfulness and sensitivity where it 
must necessarily feel the struggle of a more forced thoughtfulness, 
hence has to accept its initial tone and character as opposites and 
has to transcend towards the latter... 
... sie [d. h. die tragische Ode] muß aus den Extremen des 
Unterscheidens und Nicht-unterscheidens in jene stille Besonnenheit 
und Empfindung übergehen, wo sie freilich den Kampf der einen 
angestrengteren Besonnenheit nothwendig, also ihren Anfangston und 
eigenen Charakter als Gegensaz empfinden, und in ihn übergehen 
muß... (41 
The process describes the way in which the tragic ode holds in tension the 
"extreme of differentiation" and "non-differentiation" which brings forth a 
third stage which is characterised by "quiet thoughtfulness and sensitivity" 
where the necessity of the oppositional process is recognised as such and is 
hence reconciled. However, the reconciliation which occurs here is not a 
totalising solution for it recognises the necessity of difference. The unity which 
is achieved is a unity of unity and difference, which arises out of "the 
experience and knowledge of heterogeneity" ("aus der Erfahrung und Erkenntaiß 
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des Heterogenen") and is inherent to the process. Furthermore, this recognition 
ensures the open ended nature of the process, and allows for its continuation. 
Hölderlin makes the relationship between this theoretical explanation of the 
process which underlies the tragic ode, and the poetic process itself much 
clearer in the second section of the text entitled "General Ground". Here he 
distinguishes between the tragic ode, the tragic poem, and the tragic dramatic 
poem. This distinction between the three different poetic forms can be 
associated with the three types of poetic mode - the lyric, the epic, and the 
tragic, - which I discussed in the previous chapter. [ 51 Furthermore, as may be 
expected from the argument which I there established, Hölderlin considers that 
it is in the latter - the tragic dramatic poem - that the relationship with the 
Absolute is most clearly demonstrated. Hölderlin proceeds to outline the 
differences between the three tragic forms by referring to how they are able to 
present the necessary "inwardness" of the Absolute. He argues that in the 
tragic ode this is demonstrated primarily through the ode's form and its 
"direct effects". In the tragic poem these aspects become more pronounced, a 
more "profound inwardness" is displayed because "the sensation is no longer 
expressed in an immediate manner; it is no longer the poet and his own 
experience which appear". ("Die Empfindung drückt sich nicht mehr unmittelbar 
aus, es ist nicht mehr der Dichter und seine eigene Erfahrung, was erscheint") 
This insistence that the poet should not present his or her own experience 
directly through the work is taken to extreme in the characterisation of the 
tragic dramatic poem. In this form the poet expresses the "divine" which he 
"senses and experiences in his world". However, in order for this to occur the 
poet must deny his or her own experience of the relationship with the unity of 
the divine. Hence Hölderlin writes, 
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... yet to the extent that this image of inwardness always denies and 
must deny its ultimate foundation... the less the image can express 
the sensation in an immediate manner; it must deny it with regard 
to form as well as to subject matter; the subject matter must be a 
more daring and foreign parable and example of it; the form must 
bear more the character of the opposition and separation. 
... aber wie dieses Bild der Innigkeit überall seinen lezten Grund in 
eben dem Grade mehr verläugnet und verläugnen muß... um so weniger 
kann das Bild die Empfindung unmittelbar aussprechen, es muß sie so 
wohl der Form als dem Stoffe nach verläugnen, der Stoff muß ein 
kühneres fremderes Gleichniß und Beispiel von ihr seyn, die Form 
muß mehr den Karakter der Entgegensezung und Trennung tragen. [61 
Here the effects of the imperative that the unitary nature of the Absolute must 
necessarily be denied in its presentation are made clear. This is exemplified 
through both the subject matter and the form of the tragic drama. Hölderlin 
argues that the subject-matter of the drama must be "Another world, other 
events, foreign characters", but yet there must also be an "intrinsic kinship of 
the parable with the basic subject matter". However to make this "kinship" 
apparent it is necessary that the form of the drama is able to present the 
relationship in the most "lively" manner; i. e. the tragic-drama is necessarily 
structured around conflict. The relationship between the mode of presentation 
and that which is presented - between the poet and the Absolute - is described 
as an, "analogical relationship". This remark can be related to the discussion in 
the previous chapter concerning the "metaphoric" relationship between the tragic 
form and the intellectual intuition. Both the analogical and the metaphorical 
relationship presuppose an unstated third term in which the actual "meaning" of 
the relation is given. However in order for this third term, the underlying 
"meaning" of the work, to be presented the relation between the two component 
parts must be in the most extreme tension. Hence the demand that the subject- 
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matter of the drama must be as "foreign" as possible. Hölderlin outlines the 
full effects of this process when he writes, 
... tragedy is dramatic with regard to its subject matter and form, 
i. e. it contains a third, more foreign subject matter, different from 
the poet's own mood and world, which he selected because he 
considered it sufficiently analogical to convey into it and preserve in 
there, like a vessel, his total sensation... Precisely because he 
expresses the deepest inwardness, the tragic poet denies altogether 
his individuality, his subjectivity, and thus also the object present 
to him, he conveys them into a foreign personality, into a foreign 
objectivity. 
... 
das Trauerspiel seinem Stoffe und seiner Form nach dramatisch, 
d. h. es enthält einen dritten von des Dichters eigenem Gemüth und 
eigener Welt verschiedenen fremderen Stoff den er wählte, weil er 
ihn analog genug fand, um seine Totalempfindung in ihn 
hineinzutragen; und in ihm, wie in einem Gefäße, zu bewahren... Eben 
darum verläugnet der tragische Dichter, weil er die tiefste Innigkeit 
ausdrückt, seine Person, seine Subjectivität ganz, so auch das ihm 
gegenwärtige Object, er trägt sie in fremde Personalität, in fremde 
Objectivität... (71 
In this passage, Hölderlin isolates the reasons why the dramatic form is chosen 
as the most suitable for conveying the "foreign". In the drama the poet 
becomes invisible for in the dramatic presentation a totally different "world" is 
presented. This is not to deny the existence of a relation between the two, for 
this is inherent in the presupposition of an analogical link between the dramatic 
presentation and the world of the poet. This explains Hölderlin's statement that 
the poet's world is transported and preserved in the dramatic presentation "like 
a vessel". However, the nature of the analogical relation is such that the world 
which is created on the stage is separated from the world of the poet insofar 
as the dramatic presentation has its own internal logic which does not 
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necessarily correspond to anything outside of itself. For example the drama 
defines its own internal time-scale, its own location, its own conventions as to 
what can logically be presented or occur. Furthermore, whilst the characters 
who appear in the drama may speak the words written by the poet, the poet 
himself is never presented - hence Hölderlin's comment that in the work the 
poet "denies altogether his individuality, his subjectivity. " In the staging of 
the tragic drama, in the presentation of the poet's thoughts via the third 
person actor, the poet loses any sense that it is his or her self that is being 
presented. Hence the work gains an autonomy of its own, it loses any claim to 
being the possession of one individual subject. Furthermore in the actual 
structure and staging of the drama, the "extreme of differentiation" which is 
intrinsic to Hölderlin's understanding of the process of the "poetic spirit" is 
also attained through the individual characterisation. As Hölderlin states, the 
poet conveys his or her thoughts into "a foreign personality, into a foreign 
objectivity", hence their thoughts are spoken through multiple voices, through 
each individual character who, in the staged presentation, gains an autonomy, a 
subjectivity of their own. The tragic-drama, when viewed as a text written by 
the poet is a singular entity, but when it is presented as a dramatic entity, it 
is fissured automatically into component parts as new individuals, new 
personalities are constructed and given on the stage; hence the claim that the 
tragic-dramatic form enacts the "extreme of differentiation". 
Hölderlin's insistence on the necessity of the presentation of the "foreign" in 
the tragic drama contains resonances of the issues which arise in the first 
letter to Böhlendorff which I discussed in Chapter 2. Although this letter was 
written two years after the Ground, I think that parallels between the two 
texts can be found, particularly with respect to the way in which the relation 
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between that which is "one's own" and that which is "foreign" is understood. 
In both texts, Hölderlin is aware of the displacement which is necessary in 
order for the relationship with that to which one is closest to be presented. 
Paradoxically this closeness can only be given through the relationship that is 
developed with the foreign. Hence, in relation to the arguments of the letter to 
Böhlendorff this means that one can only understand "one's own" through 
developing a relation with that which is foreign. Similiarly, in the discussion of 
the tragic-dramatic form, it is only through the presentation of the "foreign 
personality, "foreign objectivity" that the nature of the Absolute can be 
intimated. However in the Ground, it appears that Hölderlin's concern lies 
primarily in establishing the relationship in purely theoretical terms. This 
discussion takes place on a theoretical level which is informed by an awareness 
of the necessity for it to be historically specific and situated but Hölderlin is 
as yet unaware of the full implications of this imperative. However as I now 
intend to show, the need to think historically becomes more acute and 
problematic when Hölderlin moves to discuss the specific example of the drama 
Empedocles, and to relate the theoretical system which I have just outlined to 
the way in which it is manifest through the actual drama. For when the focus 
of the discussion is placed upon the specific figure of the hero of the drama - 
in this case Empedocles - the issues of the relation between the foreign and 
the national, the Greeks and Modernity, start to come to the fore and become 
intertwined. Furthermore, I think it is no accident that these issues arise 
within the context of the discussion of the relevance of a specific dramatic 
tragedy. 
In the first paragraph of the second section which is entitled "Ground for 
Empedocles", Hölderlin restates the argument he has put forward previously 
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using slightly different terminology. He redefines the reciprocal relation between 
humanity and the Absolute in terms of the relation between nature and art, 
using the Aristotelian formulation that art (techne) is the perfection of nature 
(phusfs)181 However Hölderlin's understanding of this relation differs from 
Aristotle's in that he insists on the mutual reciprocity of this relationship: 
each side "compensates for the shortcomings of the other". This mutual 
compensation enables the completion, perfection, (" Vollendung") of the whole to 
be attained. However the nature of this completion, of this whole, is 
problematic because "this life exists for sentiment, not for knowledge. ". In 
order for this unity to be known through knowledge - for humanity to be able 
to fully comprehend the nature of the Absolute -a more radical process must 
occur. Rather than a state of mutual reciprocity between both elements being 
proposed where each side complements the other, a more dynamic process must 
be entered into so that the "opposed sides interchange". They transcend their 
own borders 
... until through the progression of the opposed reciprocal effects the 
two originally united [principles] meet again as in the beginning, 
only that nature has become more organic through the forming 
cultivating man, through the formgiving drives and forces as such, 
whereas man has become more aorgic, universal, infinite. 
... bis durch den Fortgang der entgegengesezten Wechselwirkungen die 
beiden ursprünglich einigen sich wie anfangs begegnen, nur daß die 
Natur organischer durch den bilden cultivirenden Menschen, überhaupt 
die Bildungstriebe und Bildungskräfte, hingegen der Mensch 
aorgischer, allgemeiner, unendlicher geworden ist. 19 
Through the process described here, each side becomes subject to the nature and 
constraints of the other, thereby gaining a fuller awareness of the nature of 
the whole which they together constitute. (lO] This movement can be related to 
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that described earlier, where the Absolute must necessarily transcend its unity, 
moving to the extreme of differentiation, and in so doing creating a new 
determination of the nature of the relationship between unity and difference. In 
undergoing this process, both elements are necessarily changed so that the unity 
which is achieved is necessarily different to that which is presupposed at the 
beginning. The radical nature of this process is indicated by Hölderlin's use of 
the terms "Bildungstriebe" and "Bildungskräfte". As I argued in Chapter 2, 
these terms refer to the active, forward moving drives which motivate the 
progress of the culture and which are to be differentiated from the given, 
"positive" elements which hinder this progress. Hence the term "Bildung" refers 
here not only to the formgiving elements of this process, but also to the 
underlying drive to education and culture, which is inherent within it. II1I 
However, it is at this point that Hölderlin brings a new element into the 
discussion of the process, which reintroduces the question of the relationship 
between this dialectic movement and tragedy. Having discussed the nature of the 
process of continual division and reconciliation and the form of knowledge which 
is attained, he writes, 
In the middle there lies the struggle and death of the individual, 
that moment when the organic discards its subjectivity, its 
particular existence which had not become an extreme, when the 
aorgic discards its universality not, as in the beginning by way of 
an idealistic fusion, but in real, supreme struggle.. . at this birth of 
the highest hostility the highest reconciliation appears to be the 
case. 
In der Mitte liegt der Kampf, und der Tod des Einzelnen, derjenige 
Moment, wo das organische seine Ichheit, sein besonderes Daseyn, das 
zum Extreme geworden war; das aorgische seine Allgemeinheit nicht 
wie zu Anfang in idealer Vermischung, sondern in realem höchstem 
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Kampf ablegt... dieser Geburt der höchsten Feeindseeligkeit die 
höchste Versöhnung wirklich zu seyn scheint. [ 12] 
In this passage Hölderlin suggests that the struggle between the two opposing 
elements is exemplified in the drama through the actions of one individual - the 
tragic hero. An individual, the central figure of the tragedy, comes to embody 
the struggle between the opposing elements, between nature and art. The two 
opposing sides are brought in to relation with each other through the "struggle 
and death" of the individual, In this process the "highest reconciliation" 
appears to occur. However the provisional nature of this reconciliation is 
highlighted, not only by the conditional language which is used to describe the 
process, but also by the fact that later in the description Hölderlin describes 
the "uniting moment" as a "Trugbild", a phantasm. Again the dynamic nature of 
this process is made clear insofar as there is no moment of stasis. 
Reconciliation is offered, but this occurs simultaneously with the moment of 
highest struggle, with the death of the individual. How, then, is this process 
to be understood? How is it demonstrated through the tragic form? 
Hölderlin does not provide direct answers to these questions, for after outlining 
in detail the process I have described above, he alters the emphasis of the 
discussion, beginning the next paragraph by addressing the figure of Empedocles 
directly. He writes, 
Thus Empedocles is a son of his heaven and of his time, of his 
fatherland, a son of tremendous oppositions of nature and art in 
which the world appeared before his eyes. A man within whom those 
oppositions are united so intimately that they become one within 
him... 
So ist Empedokles ein Sohn seines Himmels und seiner Periode, seines 
Vaterlandes, ein Sohn der gewaltigen Entgegensezungen von Natur und 
Kunst in denen die Welt vor seinen Augen erschein. Ein Mensch, in 
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dem sich jene Gegensäze so innig vereinigen, daß sie zu Einem in ihm 
werden ... 
11 31 
In turning the discussion from the general to the particular, Hölderlin places 
the figure of Empedocles at the centre of his exposition of the nature of the 
tragic form. Furthermore the relation between Empedocles and his society is 
immediately made apparent; he embodies all the forces which are at play within 
his society, he is the only individual who is. capable of sustaining its 
contradictions. However, it can also be noted that Empedocles can only achieve 
his role and destiny within the society through his death. Hence a few 
paragraphs later it is not surprising to discover Hölderlin describing 
Empedocles as "das Opfer", i. e. a victim or sacrifice. The double-edged 
significance of this term can be understood better by relating it to the previous 
discussion of the ambiguous nature of the term "Schicksal", fate or destiny, 
which also appears with increasingly regularity in this discussion. Just as 
"Schicksal" can be interpreted positively or negatively - in fact the two are 
also not necessarily mutually exclusive - so too can the term "das Opfer". 
Empedocles is described as "a victim of his time", yet this victimisation is 
necessary in order for his society to realise itself. Hence the sacrificial 
connotations of this term, for in becoming a victim, for dying for his society, 
he is also apparently offering solutions for the problems of his society and 
time. Hölderlin clarifies the relationship between "das Opfer" and "Schicksal" 
when he writes, 
the destiny of his epoch, the tremendous extremes out of which he 
grew... demanded a sacrifice where man in his entirety becomes actual 
and visible as that wherein the destiny of his epoch seems to 
dissolve, where the extremes seem to unite actually and visibly in 
one but therefore are united too closely... 
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das Schiksaal seiner Zeit, die gewaltigen Extreme in denen er 
erwüchs... (es) erforderte ein Opfer, wo der ganze Mensch das 
wirklich und sichtbar wird, worinn das Schicksal seiner Zeit sich 
aufzulösen scheint, wo die Extreme sich in Einem wirklich und 
sichtbar zu vereinigen scheinen, aber eben deswegen zu innig 
vereiniget sind... (141 
The figure of Empedocles unites the tensions and oppositions of his society. He 
exemplifies the struggle between the conflicting claims of art and nature, the 
organic and the aorgic. In order for the "extreme tensions" of his epoch to be 
resolved, an individual is needed who can be seen to actually sustain these 
contradictions. However, as Höiderlin makes clear in the above passage, in 
becoming involved in this process, the individual necessarily has to be 
annihilated. They must perish <"untergehen") so that the wider, more universal 
significance of the act can be realised. Then the actions of the individual can 
be viewed from the perspective of the process as a whole. The necessity that 
the death of the individual is seen to exemplify the process as a whole can be 
related to the comments which were made in the previous chapter concerning the 
relationship between the idea of Beauty and the way in which it can be manifest 
in and through the realm of the finite. These arguments can be seen as a 
development of Bellarmin's statement in Hyperion that "beauty reaches maturity 
out of its fate". Here this process is identified specifically with the tragic 
form. Hölderlin expands this point when he writes, 
... all tragic individuals who in their characters and utterances are 
all more or less attempts to solve the problem of destiny, and who 
are cancelled to the extent that they are not universally valid 
unless, on the other hand, their role, their character and its 
utterances present themselves as something transient and momentary, 
so that the one who seemingly solves destiny most completely also 
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presents himself most clearly in his transitoriness and, in the 
progress of his attempts, most evidently as victim. 
... allen tragischen Personen, die alle in ihren Karakteren und 
Äußerungen mehr oder weniger Versuche sind, die Probleme des 
Schicksaals zu lösen, und alle insofern und in dem Grade aufheben, 
in welchem sie nicht allgemein gültig sind, wenn nicht anders ihre 
Rolle, ihr Karakter und seine Äußerungen sich von selbst als etwas 
vorübergehendes und augenbliklichesdarstellen, so daß also derjenige, 
der scheinbar das Schiksaal am vollständigen löst, auch sich am 
meisten in seiner Vergänglichkeit und im Fortschritte seiner Versuche 
am auffallendsten als Opfer darstellt. ( 15I 
From these statements it is clear that Hölderlin does not intend these comments 
to refer simply to the individual example provided by Empedocles, but to all 
tragic figures. The fate/destiny of the tragic individual is intricately bound up 
with a wider fate/destiny which, in terms of Hölderlin's theory, is to be 
understood as the relation between the Absolute and history. In fact it is this 
latter relation which gives the individual who is involved in the process the 
status of being a tragic individual. The conflict which occurs does not simply 
take place on the level of the individual subject, rather the individual is being 
used to embody the wider, more important conflict between the two opposing 
forces of nature and art. Hence, in one sense the individual is, in themself, 
unimportant for they are understood to be nothing more than a conduit for this 
struggle. However, conversely they are also of the utmost importance for it is 
only through this individualisation of the struggle, through its portrayal in the 
actions of the tragic individual, that the contact between the two sides is 
manifest. Hence the statements that I made earlier regarding the status of the 
work of art as the site of mediation between the Absolute and the subject can 
be narrowed down further by stating that it is the tragic individual who is the 
locus for the interaction between the opposing sides. Furthermore, as Hölderlin 
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reiterates it is only through the tragic individual's death that this relationship 
becomes apparent. The "transitoriness" of this relationship is crucial, for it is 
this which gives it specificity. The relationship between the Absolute and the 
individual can only be manifest and understood from a historical perspective. 
However, as a consequence of this each tragic individual is only able to "solve" 
the problem of destiny for their own time, their own history. Therefore 
although the "found solution must transcend into the universal" this does not 
ensure that a universal solution per se has been given, rather it is only one 
specific moment within an ongoing process. Each tragic individual may be seen 
as an attempt to "solve the problem of destiny", but the solution which occurs 
is specific both to that individual and to their time. In the rest of the Ground 
Hölderlin proceeds to emphasise the necessity of considering the specificity of 
each tragic individual by linking the theoretical framework which he has earlier 
outlined to specific aspects of Empedocles' story and character. The discussion 
that follows arises out of the statement that precedes this analysis: "Thus his 
time is individualised in Empedocles". Hölderlin illustrates this point by 
examining the different conflicting positions embodied by Empedocles. 1161 
It is this analysis of the specific tragic individual which is perhaps one of the 
clues to understanding the failure of the Empedocles project as a whole. As I 
have argued throughout this section, Hölderlin repeatedly emphasises the fact 
that the tragic individual must be seen to embody the problems and 
contradictions of their own time. This demand for historical specificity is 
essential to the wider argument in which the discussion of the tragic individual 
is placed. The question which therefore arises out of this imperative concerns 
the relationship between Hölderlin's own time and the figure of Empedocles. Is 
Empedocles a suitable tragic individual for Hölderlin's own time? The answer 
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that comes immediately to mind is negative, for it appears untenable that the 
story of an ancient Greek can have relevance to the modern time. However this 
answer is too quick for it ignores the remarks which are made in the "General 
Ground" which I discussed earlier concerning the poet's need to express his or 
her "own mood and experience" through choosing "analogical, foreign subject 
matter". The poet's own time can only be portrayed by means of analogy and 
displacement, it requires "a third, more foreign subject matter, different from 
the poet's own mood and world". This need for displacement explains Hölderlin's 
choice of Empedocles as the subject for his tragic-drama, and thus prevents any 
quick answers as to the failure of the Empedocles project from being given. 
However, even if it is accepted that Hölderlin's choice of Empedocles as the 
subject of his drama fits his own theoretical premises, another question based 
upon these premises can be asked. This concerns the suitability of the choice of 
Empedocles as the "foreign subject matter" which will allow the poet's own 
world to be conveyed. Does a suitable "analogical" relationship exist between 
Hölderlin's own mood and world and that of the drama he creates? The 
incompletion and failure of all three drafts indicates not. However, this negative 
answer creates more questions than it solves, for it does not give any 
explanations as to why the analogical relationship cannot be developed in this 
case. Does the failure point towards the unsuitability of Empedocles story as an 
analogy of the modernity experienced by Hölderlin? Or does it point towards a 
more fundamental problem with the theoretical premises upon which Hölderlin 
bases his understanding of the role of the tragic individual? Furthermore, even 
if the latter question is proved to be wrong, who could be seen to be the 
tragic-individual, who is able to embody the "solutions" for the problem of 
"Schfcksal" within Hölderlin's modernity? 
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At the present, I shall delay attempting to provide answers to these questions 
for they introduce many new issues and problems. However, what emerges from 
this discussion is that these questions are related intrinsically to the issues 
that were raised in the previous chapters regarding the relation between 
Germany and Greece, Antiquity and Modernity. What is at stake in these 
questions is the problem of how Hölderlin can start to understand the nature of 
his own time, specifically how the intrinsic relation between the work of art 
and the time, the historical situation, out of which it emerges is to be 
understood. It is in this point that the relationship with the previous chapters 
becomes most apparent, for the issues raised are similar to those which arise 
out of the question as to what constitutes the "modern" and the "national" 
for Hölderlin. Furthermore as I suggested at the end of the second chapter, it 
is perhaps no accident that in the first letter to Böhlendorff, Hölderlin makes 
the remarks concerning the nature of modern tragedy directly after discussion 
of the relationship between Antiquity and Modernity. 
However, before these questions are addressed directly, I want to examine 
Hölderlin's text Becoming in Dissolution which was written directly after he 
abandoned the final draft of Empedocles. I think that this text holds the key 
to understanding why Hölderlin moves away from attempting to write his own 
drama and turns to the translation of Sophocles. 
4.3. Becoming in Dissolution. 
My discussion of Becoming in Dissolution will again be necessarily selective, for 
I do not intend to provide a close reading of this text. Rather I wish to use 
the analysis of this text to highlight some of the problems which are latent in 
the previous discussions and which have a direct relevance to both the 
Empedocles project and the subsequent theoretical Remarks. From a broader 
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perspective, I want also to relate these problems to the wider themes and 
concerns of this study. In particular I want to show the relationship which 
exists between the problems which are raised within these texts and the earlier 
discussion of Aristotle's conception of mimesis. 
In the previous chapter I outlined Hölderlin's systematised understanding of the 
mutually reciprocal relation between the poetic work and the wider philosophical 
theory which it both informs and underpins. The question I wish to consider 
with respect to Becoming in Dissolution concerns the status of the process 
which has been described. In the previous discussion I highlighted the problems 
inherent in Hölderlin's description of the role of the tragic hero, arguing that 
the moment wherein the hero fulfils his function within the wider theoretical 
framework becomes problematised by its transitory, illusory and hence "non 
foundational" status. The process which is described is a dynamic one, where 
the "meaning" of the actions of the hero can only be understood in relation to 
the process as a whole. However the question which arises from this 
formulation is whether it is possible to gain a vantage point from which to 
survey the process as "a whole", for surely by definition, there is no "outside" 
of the process itself from where such metastatements can be made. A similar 
problem exists with respect to the theoretical texts such as On the Operations 
of the Poetic Spirit. Here the immediacy which is integral to the process which 
is described, is called into question by its own structure. This is illustrated 
most - clearly by the statement that the tragic mode is the metaphor of the 
intellectual intuition. As I argued earlier, the displacement which is suggested 
by this formulation is integral to the process itself. However, in turn, this 
challenges its claims to foundational status. 
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Hölderlin addresses these problems in the essay Becoming in Dissolution. Like 
many of the texts discussed so far, this text exists only in a fragmentary 
provisional form. It dates from 1800, directly after Hölderlin abandoned the 
third and final draft of Empedocles, and is written in the margin of this 
manuscript. t17l Hence it must be seen as an integral part of the Empedocles 
project. However, unlike the Ground to Empedocles, the text is not concerned 
primarily with the project of the construction of the tragic drama, but rather 
addresses the wider issue of how the theoretical processes underlying the drama 
can be understood. In this text Hölderlin brings together the issues which he 
has raised earlier in the Operations essay, with the questions that have arisen 
out of the Empedocles project concerning the relations between the individual 
and the Absolute, the finite and the infinite, and the position from which this 
process is to be viewed. 
The links with the Empedocles project become apparent in the first paragraph of 
the text. Hölderlin describes the "particular relation of reciprocity" that exists 
between nature and man which, when the two are considered together, constitute 
"a special world that has become ideal". It is clear that this relation is 
similar to that between nature and art which is described in the Ground. The 
constitutive elements are implicated within a mutually reciprocal relationship 
where each requires the other in order to overcome their limitations and to 
create a new, higher, but equally reciprocal, configuration. Hence the movement 
o4' the Absolute, of spirit, is constituted through the constant figuring and 
reconfiguring of its constituent elements. This is a process which is in constant 
flux for although a "new world" is brought forth in the relation between the 
component elements, this "world" is in its turn automatically taken up into 
another "new yet also particular relation". This movement is identified as a 
I 
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process of continual decline/dissolution and positive becoming. However, these 
component elements of the process do not constitute separate, singular events - 
there is not a moment of becoming which is then followed by a subsequent 
decline - rather the events are concurrent, they cannot be considered apart from 
each other. Hölderlin explains this movement when he states, 
For the world of all worlds, the all in all which always is, only 
presents itself in all time - or in the decline, the instant or, more 
genetically, in the becoming of the instant and in the beginning of 
time and world, and this decline and beginning is - like language - 
expression, sign, presentation of a living yet particular whole which 
in its effects becomes like the former ones... 
Denn die Welt aller Welten, welche immer ist und seyn muß, deren 
Seyn als das Alles in Allen angesehen werden muß, stellt sich nur 
in aller Zeit - oder im Untergange oder im Moment, oder genetischer 
im werden des Moments and Anfang von Zeit und Welt dar, und 
dieser Untergang und Anfang ist wie die Sprache, Ausdruck Zeichen 
Darstellung eines lebendigen aber besonderen Ganzen, welches eben 
wieder in seinen Wirkungen dazu wird ... 
1181 
The process described in this statement outlines how the Absolute, defined as 
"the world of all worlds, the all in all which always is", becomes manifest in 
and through the temporal world. It can only be presented as time, for in a 
certain sense, it can be nothing other than this time: "the all in all... only 
presents itself in all time". As Hölderlin then explains the "decline, the 
instant" and "the becoming of the instant" are all inextricably linked together. 
Each moment contains, within flux, all three possibilities; hence each moment 
creates time and world anew. It is this process in itself which constitutes the 
Absolute. The Absolute is not to be viewed as an object which can be attained, 
as a transcendental goal which can be worked towards. Rather the Absolute is 
simply the process of continual becoming, the movement of decline and becoming 
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of each instant in time. Hence, as Hölderlin, states each moment is to be viewed 
as "expression sign presentation of a living yet particular whole". The process 
of signification operates like a language; it provides a complex series of 
indicators, references towards the whole, but it can never provide the whole in 
itself. Just as language can never bring the objects to which it refers to 
presence - in fact, it questions the possibility of achieving "presence" 
understood as pure presence, the presentation of the thing in itself - the 
process which Hölderlin is here describing also undermines any suggestion that 
the Absolute can be grasped "in itself". The fact that Hölderlin describes this 
process in terms of an analogy with the structuring of language, is important 
for it again brings the question of mediation and transmission into the 
discussion. 1l9i Whilst on the surface it may appear that what is offered here 
is another alternative transcendental system, the emphasis which is placed on 
the materiality of the process can be seen as a recognition, however tentative 
and undeveloped, of the tension inherent within any claim to provide unmediated 
access to the Absolute. The "whole" which Hölderlin describes is both "living 
and particular"; it is only presented in the particular instant, in a certain 
configuration and manifestation. Furthermore, what is presented is only a "sign" 
an "expression" of the whole. Here there is a recognition of the mediated 
nature of what is presented, or perhaps more accurately, a recognition that 
there is nothing apart from this mode of presentation. However, this is not to 
be understood as a limitation or fault. for what is of most importance is the 
process; the individual moment of presentation is only one particular instant 
which will be necessarily surpassed. Hölderlin continually reiterates the primacy 
of process over stasis. At the beginning of the next paragraph he writes, 
The decline or transition of the fatherland (in this sense) is felt in 
the parts of the existing world so that at precisely that moment 
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and to precisely that extent that existence dissolves, the newly- 
entering, the youthful, the potential is also felt. For how could 
dissolution be felt without union; if, then, existence shall be felt 
and is felt in its dissolution, then the unexhausted and inexhaustible 
of the relations and forces must be felt more by dissolution than 
vice versa. . 
Dieser Untergang oder Übergang des Vaterlandes (in diesem Sinne) 
fühlt sich in Gliedern der bestehenden Welt so, daß in eben dem 
Momente und Grade, worinn sich das Bestehende auflöst, auch das 
Neueintretende, Jugendliche, Mögliche sich fühlt. Denn wie könnte die 
Auflösung empfunden werden ohne Vereinigung, wenn also das 
Bestehende in seiner Auflösung empfunden werden soll und empfunden 
wird, so muß dabei das Unerschöpfte und Unerschöpfliche, der 
Beziehungen und Kräfte, und jene die Auflösung mehr durch diese 
empfunden werden, als umgekehrt ... C201 
In this statement Hölderlin again emphasises the close association between 
dissolution and becoming, stressing how this movement is not to be viewed as a 
continual process of decline, but rather that it is the process of dissolution 
which also guarantees the emergence of the new. It is only through the 
dissolution of that which exists that "the newly-entering, the youthful" is 
given. This motif of the new emerging through decline underlies all of 
Hölderlin's theoretical works. It can be associated explicitly with the earlier 
discussion of Hyperion and the notion that the idea of beauty can only be 
manifest through its decline, and also the suggestion in the letter to Neuffer of 
November 12th 1798 that the "pure can only present itself in the impure. "1211 
Hence it is clear that the term dissolution must not be understood negatively; 
dissolution is not simply a necessary stage in the process, a state which allows 
the new to emerge, rather it is, in itself, an integral element of the new. This 
explains Hölderlin's statement that "existence shall be felt and is felt in its 
dissolution". It is only through the decline of the instant that the 
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"unexhausted and inexhaustible of the relations and forces" can be felt. In 
dissolution, then, the future is offered. However, this future is not fixed or 
preordained - dissolution does not presuppose any idea of determination - rather 
what is given is the potential for the future. Hence the description of the 
relation of the forces and relations which are in play as "unexhausted and 
inexhaustible". Rather than being understood as a form of limitation and 
control, dissolution opens up a multiplicity of possibilities for the future. It 
ensures continual progression from instant to instant. Hölderlin summarises this 
process succinctly when he comments, 
However, the possible which enters into actuality as that actuality 
itself dissolves, is actualised and brings about the sensation of 
dissolution as well as the recollection of that which has been 
dissolved. 
Aber das Mögliche, welches in die Wirklichkeit tritt, indem die 
Wirklichkeit sich auflöst, diB wirkt, und es bewirkt sowohl die 
Empfindung der Auflösung als die Erinnerung des Aufgelösten. 122] 
This statement encapsulates the movement which has been described above. 
Through the dissolution of the existing actuality, that which was present as 
potential itself becomes actualised. This movement is acknowledged through the 
"sensation of dissolution and the recollection of that which is dissolved". This 
description again emphasises the material nature of the process. Dissolution is 
not simply an intellectual notion, a hypothetical occurrence, but refers to an 
actual event which is perceived through sensation. This point is reinforced by 
the continued use of terms denoting feeling and sensation in the previous 
paragraph; e. g. "Empfinden" and 'defdhlen". However the dynamic nature of this 
process ensures that the "new" state which is gained is automatically also 
involved in the dissolution. In terms of the actual on-going process as it has 
been outlined hitherto, no point of stasis can be achieved. It is difficult 
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therefore to see how any form of reflection can occur which will allow the 
process to be identified as such. For if all that occurs is the simultaneous 
process of becoming and dissolution, how can a position be found from which it 
can be spoken about? A provisional answer to this problem is provided in the 
final statement of the above quotation where Hölderlin argues that the sensation 
of dissolution is accompanied by "the recollection of that which has been 
dissolved". This addition of the concept of memory and recollection complicates 
the definition of the process of becoming and dissolution, for it introduces the 
possibility of reflection. In allowing "the recollection of that which has been 
dissolved" to be part of the process of the dissolution, Hölderlin is able to 
introduce continuity into the system. Rather than the process being seen as a 
blind movement from moment to moment which is totally non-reflexive and 
lacking in coherence, the inclusion of recollection allows the possibility that 
meaning may be constructed. For if dissolution is accompanied by recollection of 
what has occurred, then explanations and narratives may be constructed which 
give weight and meaning to the present. The present can be explained by 
recourse to what has occurred before. 
In the paragraphs which follow, Hölderlin outlines the function of recollection 
in greater detail, and it becomes clear that this concept is fundamental to the 
process he describes. He argues that there are two forms of dissolution, which 
he names the "so-called actual dissolution" ("sogenannte wirkliche Auflösung") 
and "idealistic dissolution" ("idealische Auflösung"). The former refers to the 
actual process itself as it occurs within and through time, in fact it is that 
which constitutes time. It is the basic movement from moment to moment which 
is inherent to the process. The latter - the idealistic - refers to the process 
when it is understood reflectively, when the movement is seen in relation to a 
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wider theoretical schema, where the process gains explanation and meaning. The 
difference between the two can be characterised with respect to how they are 
defined. The "so-called actual dissolution" is simply process per se; by 
definition no reflection can occur. However in the "idealistic dissolution" the 
process can be identified as "process", the movement from moment to moment 
defined as "time", and qualities and definitions can be attributed to what 
occurs. This takes place because of the function of recollection within the 
process; through recollection, reflection occurs and hence awareness of what is 
recollected is gained. Hölderlin also appears to suggest that there is a 
difference in how the two forms of dissolution are experienced. The "actual 
dissolution" is described as "an object of fear" (ein Gegenstand der Furcht), 
which is experienced in terms of pain and suffering. This is because what is 
presented through the process, appears as a "real nothing" (da hingegen die 
Avfldsung an sich, ein Bestehendes scheint, reales Nichts"). (23] However, no 
explanation is given as to what is meant by the term "real nothing", despite 
the fact that it appears regularly within the text. 1241 One possible 
interpretation can be achieved by comparing the definitions of the two forms of 
dissolution. It can be argued that the actual dissolution is described as a "real 
nothing" because, due to its lack of reflectivity, it is unable to convert the 
actual lived experience into "experience" understood in the idealistic sense of 
recollecting - hence assimulating - that which has occurred. This lack of 
reflectivity means that the actual dissolution cannot be talked of conceptually, 
for the moment that this occurs, the dissolution is understood from the 
perspective of idealistic dissolution. Hence "actual dissolution" cannot be defined 
theoretically, or, at the very least, anything which is said is a distortion of 
the experience, for by definition, no value or meaning can be attributed to it. 
This explains Hölderlin's difficulty in defining the term from a theoretical 
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perspective for it is impossible to discuss on a theoretical level, because in so 
doing it is automatically elevated to the level of the idealistic dissolution. To 
define is in a certain sense to control and limit; the actual dissolution is 
always in opposition to limitation, hence Hölderlin's description of it in terms 
of fear and pain, for it is precisely that which is outside the control of 
conceptual thought and which threatens its authority. 
This interpretation can be substantiated further by examining what is stated 
concerning the idealistic dissolution, for, as may be expected, Hölderlin here 
provides a much more detailed explanation. He argues that the process of 
dissolution which has been described possesses its own "peculiar character 
between being and non-being". This state is common to both forms of 
dissolution. However, the idealistic dissolution is distinguished from the actual 
through the way in which this latter state is transformed through the process 
of recollection. Hölderlin explains how recollection occurs when he writes that 
in the state between "being and non-being", 
... the possible becomes real everywhere, and the actual becomes 
ideal, and in the free imitation of art this is a frightful yet divine 
dream. In the perspective of ideal recollection, then, dissolution as a 
necessity becomes as such the ideal object of the newly developed 
life, a glance back on the path that had to be taken, from the 
beginning of dissolution up to that moment when, in the new life, 
there can occur a recollection of the dissolved and thus, as 
explanation and union of the gap and the contrast occurring between 
present and past, there can occur the recollection of the dissolution. 
This idealistic dissolution is fearless. (p. 97) 
... wird überall das Mögliche real, and das wirkliche ideal, and diß 
ist in der freien Kunstnachahmung ein furchtbarer aber göttlicher 
Traum. Die Auflösung also als Nothwendige, auf dem Gesichtpuncte 
der idealischen Erinnerung wird als solche idealisches Object des 
neuentwikelten Lebens, ein Rükblik auf den Weg, der zurükgelegt 
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werden mußte, vom Anfang der Auflösung bis dahin, wo aus dem 
neuen Leben eine Erinnerung des Aufgelösten, und daraus, als 
Erklärung und Vereinigung der Lüke und des Kontrasts, der zwischen 
dem Neuen und dem Vergangenen stattfindet, die Erinnerung der 
Auflösung erfolgen kann. Diese idealische Auflösung ist furchtlos. 1253 
In these statements Hölderlin suggests that through "the perspective of ideal 
recollection", the process which has been undergone is recalled and a narrative 
is constructed; an explanation is given in which a "meaning" is attributed to 
the actual dissolution - hence this becomes "the ideal object of the newly 
developed life". In a certain sense, through the act of recollection the nature of 
the past is determined; the past is made static, its meaning "fixed", 
"solidified". Hence the statement that there is gained the recognition that this 
was the "path that had to be taken". The dynamic state of dissolution, the 
movement from moment to moment is understood as a necessary process. In this 
"fixing" of the process it is transformed from the meaningless, frightening, 
undetermined movement of actual dissolution into an explainable and necessary 
occurrence. Thus the "idealistic dissolution is fearless". This statement is 
double-edged for it refers both to the neutralisation of the process - in the 
transformation from actual to ideal dissolution the horror of the "real nothing" 
is removed - and also to the fact that the perspective of ideal dissolution is 
one that is insurmountable, it is a position of power and control. From this 
perspective the past can be explained, and meaning given to events. Hence as 
Hölderlin then writes, 
The beginning and end point is already posited, found secured; and 
hence this dissolution is also more secure more relentless more bold, 
and as such it therefore presents itself as an reproductive act by 
means of which life runs through all its moments and in order to 
achieve the total sum, stays at none but dissolves in everyone so as 
to constitute itself in the next... Thus, in its recollection, dissolution 
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fully becomes the secure relentless daring act which it is because 
both of its ends stand firmly. 
Anfangs- und Endpunkt ist schon gesezt, gefunden, gesichert, 
deswegen ist diese Auflösung auch sicherer, un aufhaltsamer, kühner, 
und sie stellt sie hiemit, als das was sie eigentlich ist, als einen 
reproductiven Act, dar, wodurch das Leben alle seine Puncte 
durchläuft, und um die ganze Summe zu gewinnen, auf keinem 
verweilt, auf jedem sich auflöst, um in dem nächsten sich 
herzustellen.. . Also in der Erinnerung 
der Auflösung wird diese, weil 
ihre beeden Enden vest stehen, ganz der sichere, unaufhaltsame ktihne 
Act, der sie eigentlich ist. 1261 
In recollection the process of dissolution becomes fixed, as Hölderlin states the 
"beginning and end points" are "found and secured". Recollection demarcates the 
limits of the process of dissolution, it defines its boundaries, organising that 
which is to be recalled. This does not mean that recollection is a static, 
soldified act which attempts to halt the process of dissolution, for only the 
limits, the "ends" of the process are determined. Between the "beginning and 
end points" the process of dissolution and continual movement still occurs. 
Hölderlin makes this clear when he states that the idealistic dissolution 
"presents itself as a reproductive act by means of which life runs through all 
of its moments". As I stated earlier, the process of dissolution is identical in 
both the actual and idealistic dissolutions. What differs is the way in which 
the process is experienced and understood. This is highlighted by the fact that 
the idealistic dissolution is described as a "reproductive act", where the actual 
dissolution is recalled on the level of the idealistic dissolution. What, though, 
is meant by the term "reproductive act" when it is applied to the process of 
recollection? Does this suggest that something akin to a process of mimesis is 
operating here? Is recollection a mimetic act? I want to argue that the answer 
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to these questions is positive and that Hölderlin's account of idealistic 
dissolution contains a mimetic component. 
Earlier in the text, Hölderlin connects his description of the process of 
idealistic dissolution with "the thoroughly original [nature] of any truly tragic 
language, the forever-creative" ("das durchaus originelle jeder ichttragischen 
Sprache, das fmmerwährendschöpfrische"). This association implies that the 
process of dissolution allows for the emergence of the "thoroughly original" 
tragic language. It is described as "forever-creative" because the continual 
process of dissolution provides it with a constant source of new material as 
each experienced moment becomes taken up into the idealistic dissolution. The 
process of recollection is thereby understood as a creative act. For although as 
Hölderlin states it "moves from the infinite-present to the finite past", this 
apparently "backwards" move must also be seen as the creative act which occurs 
within, and for, the "infinite-present". The recollection that occurs through the 
reproductive act is not an attempt to retrieve or return to what has occurred 
previously, rather it is through this act that the present is created and gains 
weight and meaning. It is what secures the present against the threat which is 
posed by the "actual dissolution", which is still always on-going. However 
through recollection this threat is held at bay. Recollection creates a narrative 
which gives the present meaning; by assimulating, recalling the past, continuity 
is ensured. Earlier I argued that the mimetic act is not to be understood as a 
static imitation or reproduction of an already existing entity, but rather is to 
be defined in terms of an active, creative process. This is substantiated by 
Ricoeur's definition of the process which I discussed in Chapter one: "Imitation 
or representing is a mimetic activity inasmuch as it produces something. -the 
action is the "construct" of that construction that the mimetic activity consists 
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of. "1271 It can be seen that this definition fits the process of recollection as 
it has here been described. Ricoeur's analysis emphasises the productive element 
of mimesis which creates the objects of the mimetic relationship through the 
process of construction. Similiarly, recollection constructs the past for the 
present; through the act of recollection that which has dissolved is recalled in 
order to secure meaning for the present. Furthermore, I would go so far as to 
argue that not only is a notion of mimesis operating here, but it also 
presupposes and entails a cathartic component. As I stated earlier, the move 
from the actual to the idealistic dissolution through the introduction of 
recollection, alters the experience of dissolution from one of fear and pain to 
one that is "fearless". Through recollection the experience is neutralised and 
controlled. This can be seen to be analogous to the cathartic experience 
understood as a form of purification or purgation, whereby the sentiments of 
"fear and pity" become transformed through representation to produce pleasure. 
In both cases, through reproduction the threat, the horror is contained and 
controlled. Through the reproductive act, the "re-presentation", a framework 
which guarantees meaning and coherence is put into place. In Hölderlin's system, 
recollection operates as catharsis, for once both "end points" are secured, that 
which was fearful and unnameable is excluded and transformed. 
Having established that recollection entails a form of mimetic production, a 
subsidary question needs to be addressed before it is possible to assess the 
full implications of this analysis for other aspects of Hölderlin's theoretical 
writing. This question concerns the relationship between the theoretical 
formulation of recollection that Hölderlin establishes in Becoming in Dissolution 
and the work of art. On what level does recollection take place? Is it an action 
attributed to a subject, or does it occur through textual production? The 
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remarks that Eiölderlin makes in this text are ambiguous, but appear to 
suggest that the process of recollection can occur through both, often in a 
manner that is interconnected. The reason for this ambiguity lies in the fact 
that the process of recollection is also that which constitutes the individual as 
subject. Therefore it is difficult to speak of an individual who recollects, for 
it is only through this act that the "I" is constituted. Hence at the end of the 
text Hölderlin describes the relationship between the present - the infinite new 
- and the recollection which accompanies this moment - the finite old - in 
terms of a "tragic union" where, 
... there develops then a new 
individual in that the infinite-new 
individualises itself in its own appearance by acquiring the 
appearance of the finite old 
... entwikelt sich dann ein neues Individuelles, indem das 
Unendlichneue, vermittelst dessen, daß es die Gestalt des endlichalten 
annaham, sich nun in eigener Gestalt individualisirt. «87 
In this process the "new individual" is created through identification with that 
which is given in recollection. However, as Hölderlin then proceeds to show, this 
is only one moment in an ongoing process whereby the "new individual" 
automatically then itself enters into opposition with that out of which it has 
arisen. (291 Although Hölderlin will refer to this positing using the Fichtean 
terminology of the "I" and the "Non-I", this is not to be understood as the 
act which founds the system, but rather is one moment in an continually 
alternating process. The "individual" which is given through this process is not 
grounded in this moment. It cannot be understood as a moment of origin in the 
Fichtean sense. Rather the status of the "individual" in this system is always 
in question. As I will argue later, this has profound implications for other 
aspects of Hölderlin's theoretical position. However before these implications can 
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be outlined in any detail, it is necessary to return briefly to the relationship 
between recollection and the work of art, for it must not be forgotten that the 
ideas expressed in Becoming in Dissolution are inextricably linked to the 
Empedocles project. At various points in the text Hölderlin seems to suggest 
that the process of idealistic dissolution is enacted in the construction of the 
work, in particular the tragic work. In a passage that I quoted earlier, 
Hölderlin states that the peculiar character of dissolution between "being and 
non-being" is demonstrated in the "free imitation of art" where it is a 
"frightful yet divine dream. " Later in the essay Hölderlin also connects the 
process he has described with the tragic form, and explains why it cannot be 
related to either the lyric or the epic forms. These remarks suggest that there 
is an intrinsic relationship between the tragic form and the process of 
dissolution, whereby the process is enacted in and through the structure of the 
tragic form. The tragic form provides the paradigm example of the process of 
dissolution and becoming which Hölderlin perceives to underlie all life. Through 
this form the process of dissolution is transformed from the state of "actual 
dissolution" to that of "idealistic dissolution". This point can be substantiated 
further by relating these remarks to those which have been outlined earlier 
concerning the nature of the tragic form. Throughout this chapter I have shown 
how Hölderlin's poetological and theoretical concerns are inextricably bound to 
his analysis of the tragic form. Therefore it is not surprising that the 
description of the process of Idealistic Dissolution is given in terms of its 
manifestation in and through the tragic form. For if it is correct to argue 
that this process of becoming and dissolution is to be understood as the 
process of the Absolute, the movement of the "poetic spirit", then, as has been 
argued earlier, this must necessarily occur in and through the work. The 
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"work" is the site of mediation which brings the terms into relation and in 
which the "presentation of a living yet particular whole" is given. 
Does this mean, though, that this process occurs only within the work, or is 
the tragic work being employed as an example of a more universal process? An 
answer to this problem can be found by examining how the term "work" is to 
be understood. If the term is taken to refer simply to the "work of art" 
understood as an individual entity - e. g. the tragedy Empedocles - then it is 
clear that Hölderlin's theory is inherently limited and is unable to fulfil its 
own claims. However, if the term "work" is broadened so that it refers to the 
process of production, understood as not limited simply to individual works of 
art but rather as indicative of the creative process as a whole, then an 
alternative understanding may start to be developed. 13 01 This wider 
interpretation is based upon the claim I made earlier that recollection is to be 
understood as a mimetic act. In this context, mimesis is viewed in terms of 
poiesis; i. e. as a form of production. Recollection occurs in and through 
language; this can be substantiated by the definition I quoted earlier where 
Hölderlin links the process of dissolution to "the thoroughly original nature of 
any truly tragic language, the forever-creative" ("Das durchaus originelle jeder 
achttragischen Sprache, das immer währendschöpfrische"). It is in and through 
language that the process of dissolution comes to be understood. Language is 
the medium in which, and by which, dissolution is given. It is the "forever- 
creative" (das immerwährendschupfrische") nature of language that generates 
recollection, that produces and gives meaning to dissolution. Hence language 
itself is primary to the processes described. If it can be accepted that the 
"work" is understood to refer to the operations of language itself, to its 
definition as "forever-creative", to its productive "poietic" capacity, then 
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Hölderlin's theory can start to be re-evaluated. First this wider definition of 
"work" enables the positing of an intrinsic relationship between the subject and 
the "work". Earlier I argued that the subject is constructed through 
recollection. In terms of this broader understanding of the "work", this then 
means that the subject is understood to be constructed in and through the 
operations of language. The coherence and continuity of the subject - the "I" - 
through time is premised upon the generative process of recollection. Therefore 
the subject is to be understood as an entity which is constructed in and 
through language. [31) This then challenges the possibility that recollection is 
to be understood as an act undertaken by an autonomous subject for it is 
through recollection that the subject is constituted. Furthermore, because of the 
dynamic, ever on-going nature of the process of recollection, no point of stasis 
is achieved and thus the "subject" can never be grounded. All that is given is 
the on-going process of construction of "meaning" in and through language. 
However the "meaning" and "knowledge" which is gained is necessarily self- 
referential and self-validating. The status of the claims that are made are 
validated by the presuppositions inherent in the system. This is because of the 
cathartic element that is present in the process of recollection. As I argued 
earlier, recollection is a process of control and ordering; it transforms the 
chaotic, unstructured experience of dissolution, imposing onto it an ordered 
theoretical explanation. However, what must not be forgotten is that the 
explanation of the process is itself part of the process of control and 
limitation. Recollection constructs its own status and validity through the 
explanation of its operation. Hence Hölderlin's text is itself caught up in the 
process which is being outlined. By definition the process of recollection must 
also be inherent within the development of Hölderlin's own explanation. Thus the 
process is inherently self-referential, and its claims ungrounded. There is no 
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point external to the system from where the process can be objectively 
described, for any description is always already caught up in the mechanism 
which it is attempting to outline. Furthermore, if this process occurs only at 
the level of language this in turn challenges any transcendental claims that are 
made by the system. This is because although the system may wish to assert 
these claims, they are automatically brought into question by the necessarily 
"retrospective" nature of the process by which they are made. Any claim is 
always made through the filtering mediation of recollection, which is an activity 
that occurs only through language, and thus is inherently unstable. 
Does this analysis mean that Hölderlin's whole project is therefore inherently 
flawed? The response to this question is dependent upon what Hölderlin's 
"project" is conceived to be. If it is assumed that Hölderlin's texts are 
intended to provide an analysis and explanation of a theoretical schema which 
will provide clear-cut answers concerning epistemological and ontological 
problems then it is clear that the project has failed. However throughout this 
discussion Hölderlin's antipathy to this form of thought has been made clear. 
The project of developing an "infinite progress of philosophy"C321 is one that 
underlies all of his work. Inherent to this conception of the "project" is a 
belief in its open-ended nature. Rather than positing a transcendental goal 
which must be worked towards, Hölderlin's project is consummated in the actual 
operation of the process. This consummation is not the sterile act of 
achievement - the seizing of the goal of "enlightenment" or "knowledge" - but 
rather one that replicates itself at every stage of the process. For those who 
demand answers and solutions this "system" may appear inherently 
unsatisfactory, for as was argued above, even the explanation of the process can 
itself be called into question. However, I want to argue that it is exactly this 
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point that makes Hölderlin's thought so provocative and ultimately problematic. 
In taking the question of textuality seriously - in acknowledging the medium of 
thought and the process of its construction - Hölderlin uncovers many of the 
impasses that will later prove critical to philosophical thought. Throughout this 
discussion I have highlighted the way in which Hölderlin continually refers to 
the process of recollection in terms of a "reproductive act" and I have shown 
how this is intrinsically linked to the work, understood as the creation in, and 
of, language. It is this emphasis which is placed upon language which creates 
the inherent tensions and problems within Hölderlin's thought. For as Hölderlin 
himself states in his explicit linkage of the process of dissolution with 
language, this language is defined not simply in terms of being "forever- 
creative", but also it is described as "truly-tragic" (ichttragischen). Why is 
the "forever-creative" also the "truly-tragic"? How is the term "tragic" in 
this context to be understood? One answer is simple and relates to the problem 
of the lack of ground or origin which is inherent within Hölderlin's position. 
This position is "truly-tragic" insofar as there is no possibility of stasis 
being attained and certainty gained. In positing process over stasis Hölderlin 
condemns thought to constant instability and deferment of certainty. Any 
certainty is gained only through recollection, and as this analysis has shown, 
this process is itself brought into question. For although recollection is 
supposed to provide stability to the process, by its very nature, its own claims 
must necessarily be challenged. Recollection provides an interpretation, a 
narrative but like all narratives its claims to recall the "facts" is necessarily 
open to question. This is why the "forever-creative" language is also the 
"truly-tragic", for this basic uncertainty is intrinsic to the process of 
recollection. No guarantee can be given of the "correctness", the "authenticity" 
of that which is recalled, created. Recollection offers simply one interpretation 
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among a myriad of possibilities. Two facts enable it to be conjectured that 
Hölderlin himself was perhaps only too aware of these latent problems. First, 
this text is one of Hölderlin's last attempts to . outline 
his position in a 
philosophical, theoretical form. After this he returns to writing poetry, in 
particular the later odes and hymns which contain meditations on the problems 
with which the theoretical writings wrestle. (33l Secondly, when Hölderlin again 
attempts to outline his position in a theoretical manner in the Remarks on 
Oedipus and Antigone, he isolates Sophocles from the other tragedians, for 
Sophocles knows how to depict man's understanding as a "wandering below the 
unthinkable". This phrase may apply equally as well to Hölderlin's own thought. 
Recollection is a response to the "unthinkable" but, yet, it to does not provide 
the necessary answers and solutions that Hölderlin requires. 
In order, therefore, to understand the full implications of Hölderlin's theoretical 
position I now will turn to a clo ser examination of the Remarks. For it is in 
these texts that the full extent of the problems which underlie Hölderlin's 
position . can be found. The crisis which is latent in the formulation of 
recollection becomes manifest when Höl derlin returns to consider the problem of 
the relationship between Greece and Germany from the perspective of his 
translation project. 
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Chapter 5. 
Hölderlin, Greece and Tragedy. 
5.1. Introduction 
It is in Hölderlin's final productive years - namely the period from 1801-4 - 
that his interest in the dual problems posed by Germany's relation to Greece 
and the task of writing a tragedy converge in the project of translating 
Sophocles drama's Oedipus Rex and Antigone. From an early age, Hölderlin 
displays an interest in translating Greek works into German, [! ] but it is only 
after the failure of the Empedocles project that he turns to the task in 
earnest, not only engaging in the Sophocles translations, but also embarking on 
the translation of Pindar's Odes. 12] In this chapter my interest lies not in the 
details of these translations - interesting and important though they are - but 
rather in attempting to understand how this project as a whole brings to a 
crisis the problems that have emerged in the previous chapters concerning the 
mimetic relation to Greece and the project of writing a "modern" tragedy. This 
crisis occurs because Hölderlin's translation project is not to be understood as 
a "mere" attempt to render the Greek intelligible in the German. Rather all the 
theoretical and poetological issues and concerns that I have outlined. previously 
are brought to bear on the process of translation. Thus the project of 
translation is not a merely incidental in relation to Hölderlin's other work - 
note that the greatest of the hymns are also written at this timeC31 - but 
rather is pivotal to understanding how Hölderlin attempts to solve the problems 
and impasses that his earlier work has highlighted. This point is confirmed by 
the fact that Hölderlin also offers accompanying Remarks in which he outlines 
some of the ideas which underlie his interpretation and translation. C41 It is 
these Remarks on Oedipus and Remarks on Antigone which will be the main 
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focus of this chapter. My aim is to explore in greater depth some of the issues 
raised in these Remarks in order to throw light on the issues discussed 
previously and to attempt to offer some conclusions into the insights contained 
- however tentatively or obliquely - within Hölderlin's work. However before 
turning to examine the texts in detail, I want first to confront the the question 
of why Hölderlin attempts the translation project at all. What concerns - 
theoretical or otherwise - underlie Hölderlin's translation of Sophocles? 
5.2. The Task of the Translator 
In his seminal text The Task of the Translator, Walter Benjamin isolates 
Hölderlin for particular mention, making the following comments. He writes, 
It is the task of the translator to release in his own language that 
pure language which is under the spell of another, to liberate the 
language imprisoned in a work in his re-creation of that work. For 
the sake of pure language he breaks through decayed barriers of his 
own language... In [Hölderlin's translations of Sophocles] the 
harmony of the languages is so profound that sense is touched by 
language only the way an aeolian harp is touched by the wind. (53 
These comments could be used equally well to summarise Hölderlin's views on 
the function of translation, for he is not interested in simply providing a one 
to one version of the Greek, whereby the "success" of the translation depends 
on its accuracy in relation to the transmission of the individual "meaning" of 
the original words. Rather Hölderlin conceives of the process of translation as 
an opportunity to render the work in such a way as to make it able to "speak" 
to a new community of readers and listeners. Hence, as Benjamin says the "task 
of the translator" is a creative task, a task of liberation, in which the 
translator creates a new work through the "re-creation" that occurs in the act 
of translation. A mimetic process therefore underlies the project of the 
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translator. This mimetic process is not to be understood as the static imitatio 
conception of mimesis, rather it is the more active, creative Aristotelian process 
of mimesis understood in terms of poeisis that is invoked. This point provides 
the first, and most important connection with the arguments presented in 
previous chapters. In moving to translations of Greek texts, Hölderlin is still 
engaged in the issue of the mimetic relation between Greece and Germany, 
though he approaches the problem from a new perspective. Many of the ideas 
and concerns which emerged from the underlying presence of the mimetic relation 
- both in the specific discussions of the relation to Greece and the tragedy - 
also surface within the project of translating Sophocles. Hölderlin himself 
points towards some of these continuing connections in comments that he makes 
in letters to his publisher, Friedrich Wilmans. On September 28th 1803 he 
writes, 
I hope to present Greek art, which is foreign to us because of 
national convenience and defects with which it always surrounded 
itself, in a more lively fashion than the public is accustomed to. To 
accomplish this I will highlight the oriental more than did the 
Greeks who denied it, and I will improve on their artistic defects 
where they occur. 
Ich hoffe, die griechische Kunst, die uns fremd ist, durch 
Nationalkonvenienz und Fehler, mit denen sie sich immer herum 
beholfen hat, dadurch lebendiger, als gewöhnlich dem Publikum 
darzustellen, daß ich das Orientalische, das sie verläugnet hat, mehr 
heraushebe, und ihren Kunstfehler, wo er vorkommt, verbessere. 161 
These remarks can be linked directly to the issues that arise out of the 
discussion of the first letter to Böhlendorff. It is clear that Hölderlin is again 
drawing attention to the split that he perceives in the art of a culture between 
that which is natural to it and that which is foreign. Hölderlin's desire to 
"highlight the oriental" which the Greeks "denied", arises out of the argument 
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given in the letter to Böhlendorff concerning the difficulties of gaining access 
to, and using, that which is natural. If the terminology of the Böhlendorff 
letter is interposed here it can stated that it is through highlighting the 
oriental that Hölderlin is able to show the "fire from heaven" and "sacred 
pathos" which was natural for the Greeks, but which they were unable to gain 
access to, and employ manifestly, in their art. Therefore through the act of 
translation Hölderlin is intending to allow the unstated of the text to speak; in 
other words, translation frees the Greek work from the constraints which its 
own time imposed. However this act of translation also has a function in the 
modern world. Implicit in Höiderlin's argument is the assumption that the 
Moderns also need this act of translation in order to allow the Greek text to 
have meaning for the modern. However this does not suggest that the Greek 
text must be merely made intelligible to the Germans, for this would not allow 
the "oriental" aspect of the text to be brought forth. In fact this approach - 
which is simply blind imitation and appropriation - is exactly what Hölderlin 
warns against in the letter to Böhlendorff, for as he states there, it is not 
possible simply to imitate the Greeks in the hope that this will allow the 
modern work to achieve greatness. Rather the text must be approached in such a 
way that it can be given a voice which will speak to the German people in a 
new way; hence the text must be presented in a "more lively fashion than the 
public is accustomed to". It is this imperative which caused Hölderlin's 
translations to be pilloried when they appeared originally, for on first sight 
they seem to lack the rigour and accuracy in relation to the original which is 
demanded of a so-called faithful translation. 177 However when the theoretical 
imperatives which underlie the translations are taken into consideration the 
reasons for their (apparent) idiosyncrasies can start to be discerned. For as 
Benjamin argues in the passage that follows the earlier quotation, the act of 
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translation cannot be simply understood as a desire to want to turn the 
original language be it "Hindi, Greek, English into German" rather what is 
required is the reverse process; namely the motivation underlying the process of 
translation must be a desire to turn German into "Hindi, Greek, English". [87 
Very similar sentiments underlie Hölderlin's own understanding of the process of 
translation. Translation is not simply the revival of the dead corpse of a text, 
an attempt to breathe life into a moribund entity by giving a new audience 
access to it. Rather it is an active process of creation - as Benjamin states it 
is a "liberating act" which "re-creates" the work. When the process of 
translation is understood in this way then explanations for Hölderlin's decision 
to translate Sophocles tragedies can start to be developed. 
These explanations can be derived by further consideration of how Hölderlin's 
project of translation can be understood as a mimetic process which carries 
through some of the demands of his earlier theoretical position, particularly 
with respect to the problem of creating modern tragedy. As I argued in 
relation to the letter to Bbhlendorff, in order for the work to have relevance, 
and be representative of the modern it must recognise the importance of the 
Greeks, but also it must not be paralysed by their example; for apart from the 
"living relationship and skill" the moderns cannot have anything "identical with 
them". However the problem of attempting to write a modern tragedy has been 
shown in the "failure" of the Empedocles project. Therefore if, as I think it is 
correct to assume, Hölderlin is still concerned with finding a way of allowing 
the tragic form to function in the Modern, then the Sophocles translations can 
be seen as an attempt to approach the problem from a different perspective. In 
the earlier discussion of the Ground to Empedocles, I mentioned Hölderlin's 
description of the relationship between the mode of presentation and that which 
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is presented as an "analogical relationship": the poet chooses as the subject for 
his or her drama "Another world, other events foreign characters" but there is 
always an "intrinsic kinship" between this world and the world of the poet. In 
the conclusion of the discussion of the Empedocles project, I questioned whether 
its failure could be attributed partially to the absence of this "intrinsic 
kinship" between poet and subject matter; i. e. the narrative of Empedocles does 
not have an intrinsic relation to the modernity of the poet. Can, however, the 
process of the translation of Sophocles be viewed as another attempt to forge 
the "intrinsic kinship" between poet and work in order to enable the tragedy to 
have relevance for modernity? On the surface it may appear that there are few 
similarities between the actual act of creating a drama, and the project of 
translating one that already exists. Yet, if it is accepted that the task of 
translation which Hölderlin undertakes is itself a creative task, then the 
possible plausibility of such a connection can start to emerge. If, for the sake 
of the argument being developed here, it is assumed that the failure of the 
Empedocles project is due in part to the absence of this "intrinsic kinship" then 
it is perfectly possible to suggest that Hölderlin turns to the translations of 
Sophocles in order to attempt an alternative approach to the impasses he has 
reached. The reason for the choice of a translation of Sophocles as offering an 
alternative can be linked to the arguments that have arisen out of the 
discussion of the letter to Böhlendorff. The point that is of particular 
relevance to this argument concerns the necessity of acknowledging the 
importance of the Greeks whilst at the same time not remaining in slavery to 
their ideas and forms. If it is accepted that Hölderlin's translations are not 
simply an attempt to revive the Greek text in the German, but rather 
presuppose an active process of creation whereby the German language is 
brought closer to the Greek, thereby creating a reciprocal relationship between 
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the texts, then it can be argued that Hölderlin is attempting to develop a 
relationship which is very similar to the "intrinsic kinship" that is essential to 
the theoretical process described in the Ground. Therefore, although it first 
may appear that there is a discontinuity between the earlier, more theoretical 
writings and project of translating Sophocles, a subtler, more intrinsic, link can 
be proposed. The theoretical presuppositions which underlie the methodology of 
Hölderlin's translations are necessarily similar to the process of poetic 
composition as outlined in the Ground. This point can be emphasised by 
returning to Benjamin's description of Hölderlin's translations, quoted at the 
beginning of this section, where the relation between the original text and the 
translation in Hölderlin's work is described using the metaphor of the relation 
between the wind and the strings of the aeolian harp. This metaphor fits 
exactly with the way in which Hölderlin conceives of the "intrinsic kinship" 
between the subject matter and the form in which it is presented, for although 
both are distinct entities, their actual meaning and significance can only he 
given and understood through the process of their interaction. In translating 
Sophocles, Hölderlin develops a new text which transforms the Greek into 
German, but which also simultaneously gives new meaning and relevance to the 
German and Greek texts, via their close yet unstated relationship. This 
relationship occurs because the translation process is understood in terms of a 
creative mimetic/poietic relation in which , again using Ricoeur's formulation, 
"the action is the "construct" of that construction that the mimetic activity 
consists of"r91. This formulation again highlights the importance of the present 
as the site of the mimetic activity; thus the significance of Hölderlin's 
translations for his own modernity. The translations transpose the Greek texts 
into the Modern, thereby creating a text which necessarily is a reflection of, 
and reaction to, the time in which it was conceived. Therefore the translations 
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must be understood as being of, and for, Hölderlin's time. Hölderlin's 
translation project cannot be understood as separate or secondary to other 
aspects of his work. Both the poetry written at this time, and the translations 
are addressing the same problem, namely they are attempts to find or create a 
voice which can reflect Hölderlin's experience of his own modernity. 
In the light of this final point I want to suggest a further - much more 
speculative and tentative - connection between the project of translation and 
Hölderlin's earlier more theoretical work. At the end of the previous chapter I 
highlighted the importance that Hölderlin placed upon the concept of 
"Erinnerung" in relation to the creative process. I argued that it is through 
"Erinnerung" that the poetic process occurs: In fact, it is the process which 
underlies the whole of Hölderlin's theoretical schema. The previous discussion of 
"Erinnerung" was conducted on an abstract level, and although I made brief 
allusions to the role that the concept played in Hölderlin's poetry, I did not 
offer any explanations as to how the concept operated on a more practical level. 
However, I now want to suggest that the project of translation can itself be 
considered part of the process of "Erinnerung"; i. e. the project of translating 
Greek into German is an act which allows the Greek work to be re-called for 
the modern. In the previous discussion of "Erinnerung" I highlighted the fact 
that Hölderlin's definition of the concept presupposed a mimetic component; it is 
described as "a reproductive act". Furthermore it was reiterated that it was a 
process that occurred in and through language. It can be seen that there are 
resonances and similarities between this description of the re-productive act 
which creates and gives weight and meaning to the experience of the present and 
the analysis of the task of translation which I have given above. Through the 
translation of the Greek text into the German, Hölderlin is enabling the memory 
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of the Greeks to be retained. However this is not a simple act of recalling the 
lost historical past, which still retains a distinction between that which is 
defined as the past and hence inaccessible and alien, and the present time. 
Instead, Hölderlin translates the Greek for the present, in order to challenge 
the present's complacency regarding its own belief in its self-knowledge and 
security. Translation, understood as part of the process of recollection, is a 
task which is undertaken in order to allow the acknowledgement of the 
necessary links with that which is past, but its structure also points towards 
the necessary displacement and discontinuity between past and present, antiquity 
and modernity. This is because, as Hölderlin will state in the Remarks on 
Antigon, translation must operate in such a way as to bring the Greek text 
"closer to our mode of representation". If the Greek text is to have a meaning 
for the Modern, it must be recalled, re-created in a manner which allows it 
speak to the Modern time. Hence the transpositions and dislocations between the 
original text and the translations, again point to the necessary gulf between 
the Greeks and the Moderns. If translation is considered to be part of the 
process of "Erinnerung", then it reinforces the idea that the past which is re- 
called, remembered through the act of recollection, is one that is created and 
fictionalised. There cannot be any possibility of the process being understood as 
the retrieval of the origin or ground of the present. Instead this act points 
towards the absence of any such possibility. 
It is premature to attempt to draw any conclusions concerning the effects of 
this connection between the process of "Erinnerung" and the task of translation. 
However it is clear that if in the course of the project of translating 
Sophocles, Hölderlin uncovers some of the "answers" to the questions he has 
been wrestling with concerning how he is to understand the nature of his own 
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modernity - i. e. if the translation of Sophocles opens up a diagnosis of the 
nature of the malady of the modern which directly affects the aims and 
intentions of the poetological project - then this may in turn point towards the 
possible problems inherent to the process of "Erinnerung". 
Before these problems can be addressed it will be necessary to examine the 
issues that are raised in the Remarks. In the course of this discussion I think 
I have shown that the issues which underlie the project of translation are 
inextricably linked to Hölderlin's earlier concerns. Therefore, in discussing the 
Remarks I wish to pursue the continuity between the Remarks and the earlier 
work. Hölderlin is still engaged with similar issues; in particular the 
possibility of finding the relevance of tragedy to the modern. 
5.3. The Remarks on Oedipus and Antigone. Preliminary Comments. 
The Anmerkungen zum Oedipus and Anmerkungen zum Antigone were intended 
initially to form part of a much larger theoretical work which would accompany 
the Sophocles translations and in which Hölderlin would present his 
interpretation of the dramas. However, as with so many of Hölderlin's projects, 
this larger work never materialised. Any attempt to understand Hölderlin's later 
interpretation of the function of tragedy has therefore to rest upon these two 
short, but extremely dense, texts. As many commentators have pointed out, the 
two texts are constructed in an identical manner. rioi In the first section of 
each, Hölderlin describes the technical structure of the tragic form and how 
this is related to its content. In the second section he gives an analysis of 
specific passages of the dramas in order to outline his own interpretation of 
the work and to show how this affects the process of translation. Finally, in 
the third section, Hölderlin offers an interpretation of the wider significance of 
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the tragedy. In the Remarks on Oedipus this is described in terms of the 
relationship between Man and God as shown through the structure of the 
tragedy. In the Remarks on Antigone, the argument is related to the 
relationship between Modernity and Antiquity and the necessary changes that 
must be made to the drama in order to give it relevance to Hölderlin's 
experience of his own time and country. As the texts share these structural 
similarities, I intend to examine them together in order to highlight the 
comparisons and distinctions between them. As I suggested earlier these two 
texts bring together two main themes within Hölderlin's work - the relation 
between Antiquity and Modernity, and the status of the tragic form - and 
therefore the analysis will need to establish whether these texts offer any new 
insights into the problematic nature of the mimetic relation which is both 
internal to these themes, and which also draws them into relation with each 
other. This is because the translation project, in its attempt to render the 
Greek into the German whilst at the same time making the German more Greek, 
necessarily brings together not only the "structural" problem of Greece's 
relation to Germany, but also transposes the questions concerning the internal 
structure of the Greek tragic form and the status of the dramatic 
representation discussed in chapter one into the discussion, necessarily 
complicating the analysis. The issues which are brought together in the Remarks 
can be summarised in a schematic manner by stating that these texts provide 
the focus for the discussions of the "vertical" mimetic relationship between 
Greece and Germany and the "horizontal" relationship between the internal 
components of the tragic dramatic structure. However this schematisation does 
not describe adequately the complexity of the relationships, for they cannot be 
considered as existing in separate spheres. They must necessarily interact and 
thereby affect and influence each other. Although it may initially appear easy 
-172- 
to categorise the main theme of each of the sections of the Remarks it will 
soon become apparent that the "technical structure" of the tragedy cannot be 
considered in isolation from the arguments given in the third section concerning 
the wider significance of the tragic form. All elements of Hölderlin's analysis 
are necessarily interrelated. However, in the interests of clarity I will examine 
each of the sections in turn, giving an analysis which will allow the links to 
develop in a cumulative manner. 
5.3. The Technical Structure of Tragedy. 
Hölderlin begins his discussion of the technical structure of tragedy by 
establishing the reasons as to why this should be considered important. He 
argues that in recent times works of art have been judged according to the 
effect which they engender, rather than with respect to how they are 
constructed. This argument contains the assumption that it is the lack of 
external criteria For judgement - based upon rules of structure and form - 
which has led to the denigration of both the work of art and the position of 
the artist within society. Hence the artist is treated as being superfluous or 
additional to the needs of the society; they are considered to provide mere 
entertainment and pleasure rather than being part of its basic constitution. In 
order to rectify this state of affairs Hölderlin argues that poetry should be 
elevated to the status of "the mechane of the ancients". This demand is 
tempered by the admonition that this request should not be understood as a 
simple advocation of the return of Greek ideals and values, for "the difference 
of times and institutions" must also be taken into consideration. This is, of 
course, a qualification which is implicit in all of Hölderlin's discussions of the 
use of the Greek "model". The type of link between the Greeks and the Moderns 
which Hölderlin wants to establish is clarified by his statement that, 
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Modern poetry, however, lacks especially training and craftsmanship, 
namely that its mode of operation can be calculated and taught, and 
once it has been learned, is always capable of being repeated 
reliably in practice. 
Der modernen Poesie fehlt es aber besonders an der Schule und am 
HandwerkmäBigen, daß nemlich ihre Verfahrungsart berechnet und 
gelehrt, und wenn sie gelernt ist, in der Ausübung immer zuverlässig 
wiederhohlt werden kann. t 11 
In order for modern poetry to achieve greatness it must comply with certain 
rules of composition and structure. These rules are not arbitrary, rather they 
are set down in advance and must be adhered to by the artist. Both 
Aristotelian and Platonic theory are present in Hölderlin's demand for the need 
for rules for the "lawful calculation" of poetry. The link with Aristotelian 
poetics is clear and connects with the debate mentioned earlier about whether 
the work of art must be judged in accordance with the effects it creates - the 
"Wirkungsästhetik" of the Sturm und Drang writers - or whether it is 
measured against external, universal rules of composition; i. e. as is exemplified 
by the Aristotelian model. [ 12) The Platonic element arises in the presuppositions 
which underlie the theory. In arguing for specific rules and laws of poetic 
composition it is proposed that they will enable the "beautiful" to be 
engendered. How this notion of beauty is to be understood is problematic. 
Whilst it may initially be supposed that this remark is referring to a static 
transcendental idea of beauty, it must be remembered that throughout his 
earlier work, Hölderlin argues against a static understanding of the ideal of 
beauty. For although beauty is posited as the highest idea in and through 
which everything is united, this can be only understood in relation to a process 
of decay and decline. There is no unmediated access to the idea. It is this 
modified understanding of the Platonic theory which underlies Hölderlin's 
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description of the "lawful calculation... through which beauty is engendered". The 
laws of composition which are outlined do not provide a guarantee for the 
creation of the "beautiful" work of art, rather they are part of the process of 
the bringing forth of the Absolute in which the artist is engaged. The work is 
the site of mediation, it brings together the divergent elements which make up 
the process of the aesthetic Absolute. The laws of composition are necessary in 
order for the process to obtain direction and meaning, for if the work of art 
is seen as the site of mediation - in the case of tragedy it is "the metaphor 
of an intellectual intuition" - then certain rules must be observed which will 
allow the tragedy to function and be recognised as tragedy. The processes 
which Hölderlin has described in the earlier essays such as On the Operations 
of the Poetic Spirit take place within the constraints of specific art forms - in 
fact the constraints of the form are part of the process. Hence the necessity 
for the establishment of "certain and characteristic principles and limits" 
("... besonders sicherer und karakteristischer Prinzipien und Schranken'). 
The reasons for the emphasis which is placed upon the necessity for rules and 
calculation becomes clearer when Hölderlin then proceeds to make a distinction 
between the content of the work and the "lawful calculation". Hölderlin argues 
that the content of the work - its "living meaning" ("der lebendige Sinn") - 
cannot be determined in the same manner as the technical structure of the work. 
The full power of the work of art arises out of the relation ("Zusammenhange') 
which develops between the content and the technical structure of the work, its 
"calculable law" ("kaikuiablen Gesetze"). Therefore it can be seen that in the 
completed work of art neither form nor content can be considered separate from 
one another. The work of art is created in and through the relation and tension 
between the constituent parts, which although necessarily distinct, must be 
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brought into relation with each other. As I will show in the course of this 
analysis one of the most important, and potentially problematic, elements of 
Hölderlin's understanding of the tragic form is the emphasis which is placed 
upon the relation between form and content. The issue which underlies the 
emphasis placed upon relation relates back to the question which has arisen 
throughout this study concerning the relation between the parts and the whole; 
i. e. how the individual particular instance relates to both another instance and 
also to the universal. 
After outlining the intrinsic relationship between form and content, Hölderlin 
turns to establishing the characteristics of the "law, the calculation" of the 
tragic form. He states that the component elements of the work "representation, 
sensation and reason, appear in different successions yet always according to a 
certain law. " No indication is provided as to how these elements are manifest 
within the work, although it could be inferred that they refer to the qualities 
attributed to the different forms of poetry in the Differences essay. Thus the 
statement that these elements "appear in different successions" could be 
interpreted as referring to the various configurations of the qualities associated 
with poetic forms and styles within different works of art. The law of the 
lyric is necessarily different to that of the tragic, yet as was argued earlier, 
each of the forms necessarily includes elements of the others. However, 
although each of the forms includes elements of the others, one form is always 
dominant. Which form is understood to be dominant is determined by the 
underlying "calculable law" of the form. Thus, as Hölderlin then states, the 
law of tragedy exists "more as a state of balance than as mere succession". 
This suggests that tragedy is a form that is internally cohesive; its internal 
logic guarantees the coherency of the structure. Hölderlin then makes the 
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following statement which is intended apparently to follow on from, and clarify, 
the previous remark concerning the balanced nature of the law of tragedy. He 
writes, 
For indeed, the tragic transport is actually empty and the least 
restrained. 
Thereby in the rhythmic sequence of the representations wherein 
transport presents itself, there becomes necessary what in poetic 
metre is called caesura, the pure word, the counter-rhythmic 
rupture; namely in order to meet the onrushing change of 
representations at its highest point in such a manner that very soon 
there does not appear the change of representation but representation 
itself. 
Der tragische Transport ist nemlich eigentlich leer, und der 
ungebundenste. 
Dadurch wird in der rhythmischen Aufeinanderfolge der 
Vorstellungen, worinn der Transport sich darstellt, das, was man im 
Sylbenmaaße Cäsur heißt, das reine Wort, die gegenrhythmische 
Unterbrechung nothwendig, um nemlich dem reißenden Wechsel der 
Vorstellungen, auf seinem Summum, so zu begegnen, daß alsdann nicht 
mehr der Wechsel der Vorstellung, sondern die Vorstellung selber 
erscheint. [ i3 
In these few complex sentences Hölderlin outlines why the law of tragedy is 
identified as balanced. In the tragic form it is necessary for the on-going 
movement of representation to be broken in order for the structure of the 
drama to be controlled. This moment of rupture is described in terms of the 
device of the caesura, which in poetic metre is an interruption in the rhythm of 
a line of verse, - most importantly in the classical hexameter - creating a 
break and disturbance. However it is clear from the manner in which Hölderlin 
describes the function of the caesura within the tragic form that in this 
context the term acquires new weight and meaning. This is because the caesura 
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is equated with the "pure word", i. e. it is the moment at which there does not 
appear "the change of representation, but representation itself. " How does 
Hölderlin intend this moment of "representation itself" to be understood? One 
possible explanation could be to link the moment of the caesura with the tragic 
Transport that is mentioned previously. Hölderlin is apparently employing the 
term Transport in its 18th century French meaning associating it with rapture 
and ecstatic enthusiasm which removes the subject from normal experience into a 
state of loss of control and absence of boundaries. This sense of the term is 
still present in the contemporary English use of the term when it is used in 
the context of someone or something being "carried away"; i. e. "transported" by 
an experience. Thus in the use of this term, Hölderlin suggests that in the 
tragic presentation the effect of the succession of representations is so 
powerful that an experience akin to "transport" is created. However in order to 
impose control upon this effect, the structure of the tragic form contains a 
device which halts, literally "caesuras", the tragic "transport". This device 
occurs at the "highest point" in the drama, and it is at this point that 
"representation itself" is given. The moment of the "representation itself" is 
equated with a moment of cleavage and absence. However what is the nature of 
this representation if it can be only be described as absence? Does this indicate 
that within these remarks there is an implicit critique of the possibility of 
pure presentation? 
Before this question can be addressed directly it is necessary to describe 
Hölderlin's own description of the function of the caesura in more detail. In the 
paragraphs that follow the introduction of the concept of the caesura, it is 
clear that Hölderlin's employment of the term is primarily technical. The 
problem of the nature of the representation that occurs at the moment of the 
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caesura is not confronted in a direct manner. Instead Hölderlin proceeds to 
discuss the function of the caesura in terms of the way it creates an internal 
balance within the structure of the work, through the control of the succession 
of the rhythm of representation. Although the argument is conducted with 
reference to the technical structure of the work, it necessarily must refer 
implicitly to the action occurring within the individual work. This bond between 
content with structure again highlights the intrinsic relation between these two 
elements, relates to the discussion of Ricoeur's analysis of Aristotelian mimesis 
in Chapter One. In the course of this discussion I emphasised the correlation 
which Ricoeur establishes between mimesis (imitation of action) and muthos (the 
process of emplotment, "the organisation of the events"). Both terms are 
understood in a dynamic manner and thus an equivalence between them is 
established. This equivalence can be summarised by Ricoeur's statement that 
"Imitating or representing is a mimetic activity inasmuch as it produces 
something, namely the organisation of events by emplotment". E 14) The process of 
representation cannot be divorced from that which is produced, which, in terms 
of the Aristotelian theory, is the plot, "the organisation of events". A similar 
form of equivalence underlies the connection between structure and content within 
Hölderlin's work. The position of the caesura is dependent upon the rhythm of 
representation". The rhythm is not independent of the content of the work, 
rather it is engendered through the relation of the content ("der lebendige 
. Sinn") to the structure ("das Kalculable gesetz'). Therefore the caesura occurs 
in different places within different works; in Antigone the caesura lies nearer 
the end of the play, whilst in Oedipus it occurs towards the beginning. In 
Antigone the caesura's function is to "protect" the ending of the work from the 
beginning. In Oedipus it is the reverse; the first half must be "protected" 
against the second half. Thus the caesura can be understood as that which 
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creates and sustains the tension between the two halves of the drama. This 
point is clarified further by the identification of the speeches of Tiresias with 
the moment of caesura. Although Hölderlin does not make the link explicit, it 
can be seen that Tiresias' intervention can be identified with the Greek dramatic 
device of Peripeteia, the moment of the complete reversal of events. After 
identifying the speeches of Tiresias with the moment of the caesura, Hölderlin 
describes the nature of the intervention: 
He enters the course of fate as the custodian of the natural power 
which, in a tragic manner, removes man from his own life-sphere, 
the centre of his inner life into another world and into the excentric 
sphere of the dead. 
Er tritt ein in den Gang des Schicksaals, als Aufseher fiber die 
Naturmacht, die tragisch, den Menschen seiner Lebenssphäre, dem 
Mittlepuncte seines innern Lebens in eine andere Welt entrückt und in 
die exzentrische Sphäre der Todten reißt. (t5] 
The speeches of Tiresias constitute a radical break in the drama, whereby the 
protagonist is violently removed from one "life-sphere" into another world. It 
is the point at which their fate is revealed, although as in the case of Oedipus, 
they can still refuse to recognise or succumb to it. After Tiresias has spoken 
there can be no return to the prior state of affairs, the rhythm of the action 
is irretrievably altered. 
Having outlined how Hölderlin describes the technical function of the caesura, it 
is now necessary to return to confront the question of its wider significance 
and meaning. It is clear that in the context of the Remarks it is in tended that 
the caesura is only to be considered as a technical device, introduced to 
describe the mechanism which ensures the internal equilibrium of the tragic 
form. However elements are present within this description which widen its 
significance and introduce broader questions concerning the nature of 
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representation itself. To understand the exact nature of this problem it is 
necessary to return to the description of the constituent elements of the poetic 
modes given in the Differences essay and in particular to attempt to relate the 
statement given there that the tragic mode is the "the metaphor of an 
intellectual intuition" with the remarks concerning the caesura. At first sight it 
appears difficult to establish any connections between the ideas expressed in 
these two texts, for there appears to be no point of common reference apart 
from their shared interest in tragedy. In fact it could even be suggested that 
Hölderlin's apparent refusal to engage with the question of the nature of the 
"representation" itself indicates that by this late stage in his work he has 
moved away from any attempt to present theoretical "philosophical" issues in a 
poetological form. [16] If this point of view is accepted then the statements 
concerning the figure of the caesura can be read as referring merely to facets 
of the technical presentation of the staged drama. However, even if the text is 
read solely on this level, questions start to arise which challenge the 
possibility of a "simple" reading being given. This is because even if it is 
assumed that Hölderlin is "merely" discussing the nature of dramatic 
representation, it is clear that he is exposing - intentionally or otherwise -a 
fundamental aporia concerning the nature of the process of representation. This 
aporia arises out of the fact that the moment in which "representation 
[Vorstellung] itself" appears is equated with the caesura; i. e. the moment of 
cleavage and rupture. Therefore even from the perspective of the staged 
dramatic presentation [Darstellung], this statement seems to present a challenge 
to the conventional (ultimately Platonic) notion that a representation is 
necessarily a representation of something. This problem becomes more acute 
when it is related to Hölderlin's earlier formulation that the tragic mode "is 
the metaphor of an intellectual intuition". This is because one might assume, 
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given the arguments which Hölderlin presents in his earlier writings, that the 
moment of "representation itself" could be equated with the possibility of 
intellectual intuition; i. e. it would be the foundational moment wherein the 
object (here representation) is present to itself. However what is suggested by 
the description of the moment of the cesura is that the tragic presentation, 
rather than pointing towards the possibility of the grounding of the 
transcendental subject through the representation in itself, instead points 
towards the abyssal nature of the process of representation. Rather than the 
representation being given as present to itself - i. e. as the moment of pure 
unmediated self-presentation - all that is given is a moment of unmediated 
absence which undermines any possibility of certainty. 
The validity of this interpretation can be developed further by examination of 
a short, fragmentary text, The Significance of Tragedles[ M which is 
contemporaneous with the Remarks. In order to see how the logic of Hölderlin's 
argument in this text relates to the problem under discussion it is necessary to 
quote the text in full. Hölderlin writes, 
The significance of tragedies can be understood most easily by way 
of paradox. Since all potential is divided justly and equally, 
everything original appears not in original strength, but in fact, in 
its weakness, so that quite properly the light of life and the 
appearance attach to the weakness of every whole. Now in the 
tragic, the sign in itself is insignificant, without effect, yet the 
original is straightforward. Properly speaking, the original can only 
appear in its weakness; however to the extent that the sign is itself 
posited as meaningless = 0, the original, the hidden found ation of 
any nature, can also present itself. If nature properly presents 
itself in its weakest manner, then the sign when nature presents 
itself in its most powerful manner is = 0. 
Die Bedeutung der Tragödien ist am leichtesten aus dem Paradoxon 
zu begreifen. Denn alles Ursprüngliche, weil alles Vermögen gerecht 
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und gleich getheilt ist, erscheint zwar nicht in ursprünglicher Stärke 
nicht wirklich sondern eigentlich nur in seiner Schwäche, so daß 
rechteigentlich das Lebenslicht und die Erscheinung der Schwäche 
jedes Ganzen angehört. Im Tragischen nun ist das Zeichen an sich 
selbst unbedeutend, wirkungslos, aber das Ursprimgliche ist gerade 
heraus. Eigentlich nemlich kann das Ursprimgliche nur in seiner 
Schwäche erscheinen, insofern aber das Zeichen an sich selbst als 
unbedeutend =0 gesezt wird, kann auch das Ursprüngliche, der 
verborgene Grund jeder Natur sich darstellen. Stellt die Natur In 
ihrer schwächsten Gaabe sich eigentlich dar, so ist das Zeichen wenn 
sie sich In ihrer stärksten Gaabe darstellt = 0.118 
The "paradoxical" logic of this text can be linked to that of the earlier 
Homburg writings which I discussed in the previous chapter. In particular there 
are resonances of the statement made in the letter to Neuffer of November 12th 
1798 which I discussed in Chapter 3, that the "pure can only be presented 
through the impure". However in this fragment this idea is presented as 
intrinsic to the process of tragic dramatic representation: in attempting to 
ascertain the "significance of tragedy" Hölderlin highlights how the tragic 
drama is the site in which this notion is realised. The argument which is 
presented in this fragment focusses upon the manner in which the structure of 
the dramatic presentation allows the Absolute - in this fragment described in 
terms of "the original" ("das Ursprimgllche') - to be manifest. Hölderlin 
argues that it is in the moment at which the sign is most insignificant that 
the "hidden foundation of any nature can present itself". This is explained 
using the strange phrase that it is the point at which the "sign = 0"; i. e. it 
is the moment of the breakdown of the process of representation, for the sign 
loses all value, it is characterised by an absence. Thus in this moment of 
absence, "nature presents itself in its most powerful manner. " The parallels 
between the process described in this text and moment of the caesura are 
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evident. In both texts it is the moment of the breakdown of the traditional 
structure of representation - the moment at which the sign =0- which is also 
understood as the site of the manifestation of "representation itself" or "the 
original". What, therefore, can be inferred from these texts concerning the 
structure of the process of representation? Furthermore what does this imply 
about the process of the presentation of the Absolute, and the foundation of 
the subject through speculative thought? 
Two equally problematic conclusions can be drawn, one concerning the nature of 
dramatic presentation, the other, the wider issue of Hölderlin's overall 
theoretical project. First, with regard to the issue of the nature of the 
dramatic presentation, it can be seen that in calling into question the 
possibility of "representation itself", Hölderlin reopens the problem of the 
status of the dramatic image. This is because the hierarchy of object of 
representation and representation is broken down, so that the problem of what 
lies "behind" the presentation is reintroduced. The traditional Platonic schema 
whereby a representation is necessarily a representation of something else, is 
questioned by the fact that "representation itself" is described in terms of 
absence; in the terminology of the above fragment, the "sign = 0", it is 
presented in its "weakest manner". This introduces the possibility that there 
may never be anything other than the event of presentation, because it 
challenges the assumption that there is "something" behind the other instances 
of presentation. Therefore this also questions the accuracy of using the 
terminology of truth and falsity in relation to a representation - under the 
Platonic schema a representation is only an image and thus is of secondary 
importance - rather it can only be discussed in terms of presence and absence. 
Furthermore, these terms cannot be understood as stable referents, for the 
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status of that which is presented is always indeterminate. This is because on 
the one hand, something is given in the dramatic presentation -a figure stands 
before us on the stage - whilst, on the other, no claims can be made as to the 
status of the figure; its "presence" is ontologically indeterminate. It is at this 
point that the second, wider conclusion can be introduced. If the Platonic 
schema of truth and falsity is called into question, then this necessarily also 
challenges the status of the autonomous subject who is viewing the drama. Once 
the divisions which separate the subject from the representation are broken 
down, there are no independent criteria to separate that which is presented 
from the observer of the presentation. All become participants on the stage of 
representation. Whilst it may be argued that from a "common sense" point of 
view this argument is fallacious because we all can distinguish between a 
representation on stage and the subject, the "I" who observes, this criticism is 
incorrect insofar as it is based upon the Platonic premise of a rigid 
differentiation between appearance and reality, and also presupposes the notion 
of an independent transcendental subject. What Hölderlin's text points towards is 
the difficulty in sustaining the notion of an independent, self-grounded, subject. 
This is illustrated most clearly by re-evaluating the statement that the tragic 
mode "is the metaphor of an intellectual intuition" in the light of the 
arguments that have arisen in the course of the discussion of the Remarks. If 
the statement is seen to refer to the tragic mode as a whole - i. e. the overall 
structure of the tragedy is interpreted as a metaphor of the process whereby 
intellectual intuition might occur - then it appears that the point at which the 
subject should be grounded is defined in terms of absence. Even in the work of 
art, in the positing of an aesthetic Absolute, there can no be possibility of 
certainty or ground. This is because the aesthetic presentation necessarily calls 
into question the possibility of pure presentation - the premise upon which the 
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idea of the possibility of intellectual intuition is based. However this does not 
necessarily mean that there is a conflict and contradiction between the 
statement that the tragic mode "is the metaphor of an intellectual intuition" 
and the arguments which point towards the impossibility of the achievement of 
this form of intuition in the Remarks. It could be suggested that the tragic 
mode is precisely "the metaphor of an intellectual intuition" insofar as it 
demonstrates the problems which are inherent to the project of establishing the 
autonomy of the subject through speculative thought. Hölderlin's understanding 
of the dramatic presentation points towards the need for a different 
understanding of the status of the subject and of the relationship to that 
which eludes the process of representation. Up till now I have referred to the 
moment of the caesura as a moment of absence. However in the light of this 
discussion, such terminology is problematic insofar as it still retains elements 
of the Platonic notion of "something" which is not present. Instead I want to 
suggest that perhaps in the figure of the caesura we are given the seeds of an 
alternative to the traditional forms of conceptual thinking, a way of marking 
that which lies outside of the grasp of conceptual thought without subsuming it 
back into traditional categories. It is this different form of relationship which, 
I would suggest, Hölderlin starts to gesture towards in the final two sections 
of the Remarks, and to which I shall now turn. 
5.5. The Meeting of Man and God. 
It is in the third section of the Remarks on Oedipus that Hölderlin gives his 
fullest description of the tragic presentation and the processes which it 
contains. The comments made in this section start to establish how, and why, 
the tragic form can be seen to provide a different understanding and access to 
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that which lies outside and eludes the processes of conceptual thought. In the 
presentation of the tragic form there is an opening onto a radical otherness; 
what is given is a world in which the conventional - yet essential - constraints 
and barriers are removed and the consequences of such unleashing are violently 
demonstrated. Hence Hölderlin commences the third section with the statement, 
The presentation of the tragic rests principally on the fact that 
this enormity - the manner in which God and man couple, and how 
the power of nature and what is innermost to man become one in 
wrath - comprehends itself through the boundless becoming-one 
purifying itself through boundless separation. 
Die Darstellung des Tragischen beruht vorzüglich darauf, daß das 
Ungeheure, wie der Gott und Mensch sich paart, und gränzenlos die 
Naturmacht und des Menschen Innerstes im Zorn Eins wird, dadurch 
sich begreift, daß das gränzenlose Eineswerden durch gränzenloses 
Scheiden sich reinigt. (19 
The language of this statement immediately establishes the full force underlying 
the tragic form. The process which is contained within its confines and 
constraints is described by the German term "das Ungeheure" which has 
connotations of something which is "tremendous" "overwhelmingly powerful" or 
"mighty", but also "monstrous" and "an enormity". In this context the term 
does not refer to an object or thing, but rather to a state of affairs, 
specifically the process wherein the God and man couple. (20] This event is das 
Ungeheure because it is a violation of the boundaries which necessarily must 
constrain and limit both sides. The sense of this violation can be understood 
through the translation of das Ungeheure as "an enormity" for this latter term 
originates from the latin ' enormis' , -57' meaning "out of", "norms" meaning 
"rules". (211 Therefore the process wherein God and man couple is precisely an 
"enormity" for it is the breaking out of, the transgression of the normal rules 
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which delimit their separate natures. The presentation of the tragic form is das 
Ungeheure because it shows the consequences of the transgression of normal 
constraints and boundaries; in fact, the presentation becomes the site of the 
transgression. In the course of the presentation of the tragic form, God and 
man "couple" ("sich paart"); i. e. the boundary separating the infinite and the 
finite is removed and they are conjoined. The aberrant nature of this coupling 
is compounded by the fact that the term "sich paart" also has sexual 
connotations, referring to the mating of animals. Thus this coupling is also das 
Ungeheure in the sense of an aberration; two different forms are brought 
together, creating an event which is a monstrosity, transgressing the natural 
boundaries. 
How is this coupling - the uniting of man and God in wrath - to be 
understood? It could be assumed that this process is simply an intensified 
version of the process outlined in the Ground to Empedocles. Using the 
terminology of that essay one might argue that "man" can be equated with the 
Organic and with the realm of art, whilst "God" can be associated with nature 
and the Aorgic. As was argued in relation to the Ground, these two component 
elements are necessarily in opposition to each other, but it is only through 
their "interchanging" ("verwechseln") - the dialectical process whereby each 
passes over into the other thereby gaining exposure to the opposing condition - 
that the "higher unity" of the opposition can be attained. On a first reading of 
the above passage it could be assumed that Hölderlin is describing an identical 
type of relationship and process. The two opposing forces - man and God - are 
brought together in the tragic presentation, they unite and through this act 
their separation and individual identity is reinforced, albeit on a higher level. 
Hence Hölderlin's description of the process as the "boundless becoming one 
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purifying itself through boundless separation". However this formulation does 
not appear to offer the same degree of reconciliation as is given by the 
description of the process in the Ground. This is because the transgression 
involved is much more violent and unnatural. In the Ground each side of the 
equation of Nature and Art needs to pass over into the other in order to gain 
completion. In the Remarks on Oedipus, the unity gained through the joining of 
man and God is described in terms of "wrath" ("der Zorn")1221; the conjoining 
of man and God occurs only through immense struggle and at the highest 
degree of intensity. However, it is through this struggle that das Ungeheure 
"comprehends itself" ("sich begreift'). This might suggest that this act of 
comprehension could be equated with the higher form of understanding gained 
through the process described in the Ground. The problem with this 
interpretation concerns the form that the "self-comprehension" takes. What form 
of reconciliation is achieved in the "boundless becoming one purifying itself 
through boundless separation", particularly if we recall that this process is 
defined as das Ungeheure, with all the connotations that this term contains? 
Whilst it is clear that Hölderlin is suggesting that some form of reconcilation 
occurs through this process, it is problematic to simply assume that this can 
be interpreted as the achievement of a higher understanding or fulfillment, 
similar to that which is posited in relation to the process described in the 
Ground. In the later text the process is described in terms of violent 
transgression and violation. It is an extreme act which challenges and destroys 
the limits of reason, thus preventing the reconcilation from being understood in 
conceptual terms. The process of reconcilation, of self-comprehension, is a 
purifying act, but no indication is given as to how this purification can be 
understood. All that is stated is that the process is the "boundless becoming- 
one purifying itself through boundless separation". This description indicates 
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the necessary continuity and dynamic nature of the process but does not provide 
any explanation as to its actual nature. The process of "self-comprehension" is 
internal to das Ungeheure; it is that which motivates and ensures its 
continuation, but its actual nature cannot be defined. In fact, it is problematic 
even to attempt to discuss this self-comprehension in conceptual terms, for it is 
precisely that which calls into question the efficacy and potentiality of 
conceptual thought. 
At this point in the text Hölderlin provides no further account of how this 
process of purification can occur. Instead he turns to explaining how this 
process is made manifest in the structure of the tragic dramatic form. The 
arguments and explanations he puts forward refer specifically to the structure 
of Oedipus Rex and the interpretation of the "meaning" of the drama which he 
has given in the previous section. In this section he has argued that Oedipus' 
destiny arises out of his desire to know the "truth" concerning his own 
identity, and the fact that he interprets the words of the oracle "too 
infinitely" and is tempted into "nefas". 1231 That Is, Oedipus is not satisfied in 
simply gaining a practical, "civil" ("bürgerliche") solution to the problems 
facing his country. Rather he must find the specific answer, he attempts to 
offer retribution for the crime that has been committed, thereby taking on the 
role of the priest. This is why Hölderlin states that Oedipus is tempted into 
nefas, for in engaging in this quest he aspires to the role of the Gods, thus 
entering into opposition with them. Not only does he want to acquire certainty 
of knowledge, he also desires to be able to act as the arbitrator of destiny 
and fate. However, such a role is not allowed to man, and this incessant desire 
to "know" leads to his destruction. This is because the quest gains a momentum 
of its own, as Hölderlin writes, 
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Hence... the wonderful wrathful curiosity, because knowledge - after 
it has torn through its barriers - as if intoxicated in its 
magnificent harmonious form, which can remain, for the time being is 
spurred by itself to know more than it can bear or contain. 
Daher.. . die wunderbare zornige Neugier, weil das Wissen, wenn es 
seine Schranke durchrissen hat, wie trunken in seiner herrlichen 
harmonischen Form, die doch bleiben kann, vorerst, sich selbst reizt, 
mehr zu wissen, als es tragen oder fassen kann. 124] 
Oedipus is taken over by the desire for knowledge and certainty as to the 
identity of the killer of Laius and the bringer of the plague on the city. 
However this also necessarily must involve him in a quest to "know" himself. 
This desire can never be sated, for this form of absolute knowledge which he 
seeks belongs only to the Gods. The desire to know gains a momentum of its 
own which forces the normal constraints and barriers which protect man to be 
"torn through". Once these barriers have been transgressed, Oedipus is caught 
up in a process which he cannot control. In desiring complete knowledge - 
however unconsciously - Oedipus aspires to being a God. Therefore in Oedipus 
Rex it is through this desire to know that the process of the "coupling of man 
and God" occurs. In the structure of the tragedy this is shown by the 
juxtaposition of dialogue and chorus, and the manner in which the use of 
language and different poetic forms gradually build up until "Everything is 
speech against speech, one cancelling [aufhebt] the other. " The process whereby 
the speeches cancel each other, negating the validity of what has just been 
stated, removes the possibility that any overall stable meaning or interpretation 
can be achieved. The effect of this process is cumulatory, for although each 
new speech challenges or contradicts that which has gone before, it cannot be 
eradicated. Therefore the alternative opinions and interpretation build up, 
creating a chaotic interplay of possible explanations and opinions, none of which 
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can be verified independently in order to test their claim to truth or accuracy. 
Thus the drama has the overall structure of a "Ketzergericht", a court of 
inquisition, wherein man is tried for his transgression of the limits of reason 
and knowledge. 
However in the statements following the description of the structural 
composition of the tragedy, it appears that Hölderlin intends his analysis not 
only to apply to Oedipus Rex, but rather to the structure of the tragic form in 
general. This becomes clear when Hölderlin returns to discussing the way in 
which the tragic form portrays the relation of man and God. The description 
that is given suggests that if the drama has the structure of a court of 
inquisition it is not the actions of one individual which are under scrutiny; 
rather the whole process which underlies the "meaning" attributed to the 
actions of that individual is put on trial. For if the underlying "meaning" and 
value of the tragic form is premised on its being seen as the site in which the 
limits of reason and understanding are questioned - and it must not be 
forgotten that the tragic form is also "the metaphor of an intellectual 
intuition" - then the implications which can be drawn for the wider project of 
finding a way in which to approach that which lies outside of the boundaries of 
conceptual thought can start to be developed. This is because the questioning of 
limitation which occurs in the presentation of the tragic form can also be 
understood as a critique of conceptual thought. Thus the tragic form must also 
be seen to provide the potential for developing an alternative understanding of 
the relationship to that which lies outside of the limitations of conceptual 
knowledge. 
To start to understand how Hölderlin may be providing this alternative 
understanding it is necessary to work through the statements he makes in some 
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detail. Therefore, in order to follow the line of argument that is employed I 
will firstly quote the passage in full. Hölderlin writes, 
... in the scenes the frightfully solemn forms, the drama like a court 
of inquisition, as language for a world where under plague and 
confusion of sense and under universally inflamed prophecy in idle 
time, with the god and man communicating themselves in the all 
forgetting form of unfaithfulness so that the course of the world 
will show no rupture and the memory of the heavenly ones will not 
expire, because divine unfaithfulness is best to hold onto. 
At such moments man forgets himself and the God and turns around 
like a traitor, admittedly in a holy manner - In the most extreme 
limit of suffering there exists nothing but the conditions of time 
and space. 
In this [limit], man forgets himself because he exists entirely in the 
moment, the God because he is nothing but time; and either one is 
unfaithful, time because it takes a categorical turn in such a 
moment, and in it [i. e. time] beginning and end cannot be coordinated 
at all; man because in this moment he has to follow the categorical 
reversal and thus is entirely unable to resemble the beginning in 
what follows. 
... in den Auftritten die schröklich feierlichen Formen, das Drama wie 
eines Kezergerichtes, als Sprache für eine Welt, wo unter Pest und 
Sinnesverwirrung und allgemein entzündetem Wahrsagergeist, in 
müßiger Zeit, der Gott und der Mensch, damit der Weltlauf keine 
Lüke hat und das Gedächtniß der Himmlischen nicht ausgehet, in der 
allvergessenden Form der Untreue sich mittheilt, denn göttliche 
Untreue ist am besten zu behalten. 
In solchem Momente vergißt der Mensch sich und den Gott, und 
kehret, freilich heiliger Weise, wie ein Verräther sich um, - In der 
äußersten Gränze des Leidens bestehet nemlich nichts mehr, als die 
Bedingungen der Zeit oder des Raums. 
In dieser vergißt sich der Mensch, weil er ganz im Moment ist; der 
Gott, weil er nichts als Zeit ist, und beides ist untreu, die Zeit, 
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weil sie in solchem Momente sich kategorisch wendet, und Anfang und 
Ende sich in ihr schlechterdings nicht reimen läßt; der Mensch, weil 
er in diesem Momente der kategorischen Umkehr folgen muß, hiermit 
im Folgenden schlechterdings nicht dem Anfänglichen gleichen 
kann. 12 5] 
In the process described in this passage it is clear that the tragic presentation 
not only exposes the limits of man's experience, but also shows the limitations 
of the God. The tragic presentation reveals the nature of the God's relation to 
man and the mutual dependency of the two. Hence Hölderlin's statement that the 
tragic form shows the unfaithfulness of both God and man; in the course of the 
tragic presentation both overstep their limits and transgress the boundaries 
which separate them. Why, though, is the transgression of limitation described 
in terms of unfaithfulness? To what or whom are they being unfaithful? The 
answer to these questions lies in the statement that the act of unfaithfulness 
prevents the "course of the world" from showing any "rupture" and the 
"memory of the heavenly ones" not to expire. These remarks indicate that the 
act of transgression - the act of unfaithfulness - is actually that which 
sustains and reinforces the boundaries and limits between man and God. It is 
only through the act of transgression that the boundaries are recognised as 
such. Man and God are both unfaithful insofar as they overstep their own 
spheres - i. e. they are unfaithful to their own nature - but in turn this act 
reiterates their own role and position. How exactly is this unfaithfulness 
demonstrated? Hölderlin argues that the unfaithfulness arises out the act of 
"forgetting" which occurs in the course of the drama. Man forgets both himself 
and God, and "turns around like a traitor". This act of treachery can be 
equated with the transgression of limitation. Man forgets the boundaries which 
define the limits of his existence, overstepping the limits of reason and 
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understanding through his desire to "know". As a result he exposes himself to 
"the most extreme limit of suffering". How, though, is this limit to be 
understood? By what rules is it constituted and regulated? The answer to these 
questions can be found in the language which Hölderlin employs to describe the 
process which arises at the extreme limit. He states that at the extreme limit 
of suffering what is given is "nothing but the conditions of time and space". 
Also at this point both man and God undergo a "a categorical reversal" ("der 
kategorischen Umkehr"). Both these descriptions employ Kantian terminology. 
This might suggest that the limits of reason and understanding to which 
Hölderlin refers, are the limitations and constrictions of the Kantian system. 
How, then, can the process which Hölderlin describes be understood if it is 
interpreted in relation to the Kantian system? Hölderlin argues that at the 
most extreme limit of suffering, man "forgets himself because he exists entirely 
in the moment", God "forgets himself because he is nothing but time". At the 
extreme limit both God and man forget the limitations which the Kantian 
system imposes upon them, and transgress its boundaries. Through this act of 
transgression both man and God are freed from the traditional notions which 
circumscribe their own identity; hence the moment of forgetting is to be 
understood as a moment of liberation. However each is also instantly 
"unfaithful" to this moment. This is because although the limit of extreme 
suffering is understood as the site of transgression, this transgression is 
automatically annulled; man and God are brought back under the control of the 
constraints of the system. At the "most extreme limit" time is unfaithful 
"because it takes a categorical turn and in it [time] beginning and end can no 
longer be coordinated". That is, time subjects itself to the categories, to the 
pure concepts of the understanding. [ 2 63 This means that time becomes subject to 
the constraints of human understanding, it comes under the control of the "I", 
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and therefore can only be comprehended through the forms of understanding 
available to the "subject". Hence under the demands of the Kantian system, all 
that can be given is a representation of time, not time in itself. Time is 
unfaithful precisely because it cannot be given in itself, it can only be 
presented through its representation in relation to the human categories of 
understanding. However as Hölderlin states earlier in the passage this "all- 
forgetting moment of unfaithfulness" is also the manner in which God 
communicates himself to the world. In a certain sense, the God's subjection to 
the system, to limitation, is necessary for his presence can only be 
communicated in a mediate manner. God must necessarily be unfaithful to 
himself - to his true nature - in order for him to be known. In presenting 
himself as time, God communicates the absence of the Gods - i. e. the Gods 
understood in terms of the Greek Gods who have an immediate relation with 
man - from the world. The absence of the Gods, announced in the God's 
subjection to the categorical reversal, reinforces the radical cleavage and break 
between the Greek and Modern world views. 
Why, then, is man also unfaithful? Hölderlin states that "in this moment [man] 
has to follow the categorical reversal and thus is entirely unable to resemble 
the beginning in what follows. " That is, man must also be brought back under 
the constraints of the system, specifically he must become subject to the limits 
which are imposed by the "categorical reversal" of the God. In following the 
reversal of the God, man must also become subject to time; i. e. in Kantian 
terms, man can only be understood in relation to the pure form of intuition, 
time. This means that man must recognise himself as a necessarily limited being 
who is subject to finitude. This explains why man is "unfaithful" to himself, 
because in the Kantian system, the "I" can only be viewed as an empty logical 
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construction. Man is unfaithful to his own identity, for he cannot know himself 
as himself, he can only understand himself through his subjection to the form 
of pure intuition; i. e. he can only know himself as he appears in time. t271 The 
possibility that his identity can be self-grounded is denied, because in the 
Kantian system intellectual intuition could only be possible for a being that is 
not subject to time; i. e. an eternal, self-grounded being. [28] If this 
interpretation is accepted, what conclusions can be drawn concerning the 
underlying meaning of the tragic form? Hölderlin appears to be suggesting that 
the tragic form demonstrates the limits of the Kantian system. Although the 
tragic form reinforces the constraints of the Kantian system because man is 
shown to be a limited being who is necessarily subject to finitude, it also 
questions the system's own claims to truth and self-verification. In showing 
that the God can only be presented in time, Hölderlin implicitly challenges 
Kant's assumption that God is one of the regulative ideas of pure reason which 
are independent of the limitations of human understanding. 1293 This points 
towards an internal contradiction in Kant's system, and suggests that if God 
must be subject to time, then the whole project itself must also be considered 
to be subject to this limitation. Conceptual forms of thought are limited 
because they too are necessarily conceived by human understanding - i. e. they 
are conceived in time - and thus are subject to the contrictions of finitude. The 
"desire to know" which Hölderlin sees as motivating the tragic form, must be 
understood as conceptual thought's - i. e. system thought's - will to totality 
and completion. However, in this analysis, Hölderlin turns this desire to know 
against itself, and in so doing highlights its limitations and weaknesses. In the 
tragic form, the transgression of the limit of reason brings forth an awareness 
of its limit. In the course of the presentation, it is shown that the limits 
which constrain the actions of man and God arise out of the constraints of a 
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specific - conceptual - mode of understanding. What is shown by this 
interpretation of the function of the tragic form is the limits of the Kantian 
modes of thought. It is precisely this realisation that the limits which are 
demonstrated through the tragic form are the limits of a specific form of 
understanding which allows the possibility that the tragic form can also be 
seen to provide an alternative way of thinking the relationship between man and 
God. This is because this analysis implicitly challenges the claims that are 
made for the necessary superiority of conceptual thought. Earlier I stated that 
it was problematic to attempt to ascertain exactly the nature of the process of 
das Ungeheure, because it evaded the confines of conceptual thinking. However in 
the light of the analysis I have given here which has highlighted the inherent 
weakness of conceptual modes of thought, it could be suggested that it is 
precisely in examining the manner in which das Ungeheure functions, that an 
alternative way of approaching the process presented in the tragic form can be 
developed. This is because das Ungeheure provides the opening onto that which 
lies outside the constraints of conceptual thought for it is that which always 
evades it constrictions. 
However, before the possibility of an alternative reading is developed in any 
detail I want to relate the theoretical arguments given above to the way in 
which the tragic form is realised as a dramatic presentation. In particular it is 
necessary to link these arguments to the discussion in the previous section 
cöncerning the technical structure of the tragic form. It could be assumed that 
the moment of "categorical reversal" could be equated with the moment of the 
caesura, for Hölderlin's descriptions of both processes appear to share common 
characteristics and qualities. (303 Both occur at the moment of highest intensity, 
and they have a focal role in the construction of the overall argument. However 
-198- 
it is problematic to make this connection explicit because although it is possible 
to develop an extended analysis of the function of the caesura, Hölderlin makes 
clear that he is employing the term primarily in its technical sense and is 
using it to refer to a specific moment in the structure of the tragedy. Hence 
his statement that the caesura arises through the speeches of Tiresias. The 
process which I have just outlined is more general and refers to the hero's 
progression through the course of the tragedy. Therefore, whilst the caesura 
defines a specific moment in the unfolding of the tragedy, the whole process 
cannot be reduced to this one moment. Hölderlin makes this clear by the 
comments with which he ends the Remarks on Oedipus. After giving the 
description of the tragic process, including the moment of the categorical 
reversal, Hölderlin states "Thus Haemon stands in Antigone. Thus Oedipus 
himself in the middle of the tragedy of Oedipus Rex. " The description which is 
given in the final section of the Remarks on Oedipus must be read as a 
summary of the whole process which the tragic hero undergoes. The fate of 
both characters indicates the consequences of challenging the authority of the 
limits which separate man and God and demonstrates the effects of the 
categorical reversal most vividly. Once Oedipus is aware of the full effect of 
his transgression he blinds himself and is subsequently exiled from his country, 
whilst Haemon commits suicide having failed to save Antigone. This illustrates 
Hölderlin's statement that after the categorical reversal man is "entirely unable 
to resemble the beginning in what follows". After the main protagonist realises 
the full horror of the transgression that has occurred, the way in which he 
constructs and understands the narrative of his life irredeemably alters. The 
interpretation that has informed his actions prior to the moment of reversal is 
no longer correct, and cannot be reconciled with the insight which he is given. 
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Thus the links which connect the beginning and end of the narrative of his life 
are cut irreconcilably. 
In linking the analysis of the technical structure of the drama with the 
remarks concerning the "meaning" of the process I have focussed upon the 
details of the internal construction of the tragedy. It is necessary now to 
return to the wider question of how the tragic form also presents the 
possibility of developing an alternative understanding of the relation between 
man and God. At the beginning of this section I stated that in the presentation 
of the tragic form there is an opening onto radical otherness. In the light of 
the reading I have given of the Kantian overtones of Hölderlin's analysis of the 
tragic form, this description may seem singularly inappropriate. However I want 
to argue that an alternative relationship can be seen to be given, albeit in a 
more circuitous manner. Hölderlin's analysis concentrates upon the internal 
dynamics of the tragic form, showing how its tensions and contradictions 
constitute the coming together of the two opposing sides, man and God, the 
finite and the infinite. This analysis demonstrates the impossibility of the 
finite gaining knowledge of the infinite through its own limited resources; i. e. 
the tragic form can be understood as providing an illustration of the hubris of 
conceptual thought - hence the alternative interpretation of the statement that 
the tragic form "is the metaphor of an intellectual intuition" which I gave at 
the end of the previous section, namely that the tragic form is precisely the 
"metaphor of an intellectual intuition" insofar as the problems which are 
exposed in the course of the drama highlight the limits and failings inherent to 
this concept. However I want to suggest that when tragic drama is viewed as a 
whole - when, perhaps, it is viewed from the perspective of the aesthetic 
rather than the conceptual - then it becomes possible to see how the dramatic 
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presentation offers an alternative relation to that which evades conceptual 
thought. As I stated earlier, Hölderlin's description of the tragic process as 
das Ungeheure gestures towards the fact that the tragic presentation can never 
be reduced to, or controlled by, the constraints of conceptual thinking. However, 
in viewing the process in terms of an aesthetic process, i. e. in seeing it as a 
dramatic presentation in which the relationship between man and God is shown 
and explored, not reduced to a conceptual analysis - then the possibility of an 
alternative understanding starts to present itself. This can be developed by re- 
examining Hölderlin's statement that the tragic drama allows "the memory of 
the heavenly ones" to be held onto. The tragic form does not give an 
unmediated access to the infinite, it does not present the God directly, or 
achieve the actual apotheosis of the hero. Instead in the enactment of the drama 
a "memory" of the Gods is provided. This "memory" necessarily enforces the 
separation of man and God, but yet at the same time it guarantees that the 
Gods are remembered; i. e. the tragic form gestures towards a gap, an absence 
within the experience of the observer of the drama which cannot be fulfilled 
through their own limited strivings. The otherness exposed by the drama 
gestures towards that which is necessarily absent from the world of the 
present; it shows the impossibility of unmediated access to the Absolute, the 
Gods no longer walk this earth; rather as Hölderlin writes in Brod und Wein, 
"Though the gods are living/ Over our heads they live, up in a different 
world. " l"Zwar leben die Götter/ Aber über dem Haupt droben in anderer 
W'el t "). 131 ] Yet at the same time this very absence creates a space in which the 
Gods can - and, perhaps, must - be remembered. The form in which this 
remembrance can best take place is through the aesthetic presentation. The 
necessity of the centrality of the aesthetic presentation to Hölderlin's thought 
is again reinforced. The aesthetic presentation becomes the site in which the 
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alternative relation to the infinite is played out. This is most clearly evident in 
the later poetry, which refers constantly to the absence of the Gods, yet 
paradoxically it is this very absence which allows the poet to speak, thus 
creating an alternative intimatory relation with the Gods. (323 However the task 
of translating Sophocles can also be seen to be part of this process, for as I 
argued earlier, the underlying motive of the translations is to allow the Greek 
text to gain a relevance for Hölderlin's modernity. Sophocles' text can also be 
considered as a site in which an alternative - and perhaps, specifically, Modern 
- relation to the Gods can start to be established. Hölderlin suggests the form 
which this alternative relation should take, relating it specifically to his 
experience of his own modernity in the final section of the Remarks on 
Antigone. It is to this even more elusive part of these late texts that I will 
now turn. 
5.6. "... Wandering Below the Unthinkable... " 
At the beginning of the third section of the Remarks on Antigone, Hölderlin 
provides a summary of the processes which underlie the presentation of the 
tragic form. He states: 
As has been hinted at in the Remarks on "Oedipus", the tragic 
presentation has as its premise that the immediate god is wholly one 
with man (for the god of an apostle is more mediate, is highest 
. understanding in highest spirit), that the infinite enthusiasm grasps 
itself infinitely, that means in oppositions, in consciousness, which 
consciousness cancels out, dividing itself in a holy way, and the god, 
in the figure of death is present. 
Die tragische Darstellung beruhet, wie in den Anmerkungen zum 
Oedipus angedeutet ist, darauf, daß der unmittelbare Gott, ganz 
Eines mit dem Menschen (denn der Gott eines Apostels ist 
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mittelbarer, ist höchster Verstand in höchstem Geiste), daß die 
unendliche Begeisterung unendlich, das heißt in Gegensäzen, im 
Bewußtseyn, welches das Bewußtseyn aufhebt, heilig sich scheidend, 
sich faßt, und der Gott, in der Gestalt des Todes, gegenwärtig 
ist. 1337 
In these comments, Hölderlin expands his definition of the process of the tragic 
presentation, building on the description he has given in the Remarks on 
(ftdipus. The oppositional relationship described in this passage can be linked to 
the process where the man and God "couple" C 'sich paert't); the event which is 
described as das Ungeheure. As Hölderlin states, this event provides the basis 
of the interpretation of the tragic presentation; all consequent actions can be 
referred back to this moment. The other elements of the tragic presentation 
described in this passage can also be linked to the discussion of the Remarks 
on Oedipus. The process whereby "the infinite enthusiasm grasps itself 
infinitely, that means in oppositions" can be read as an alternative formulation 
of Hölderlin's statement that das Ungeheure comprehends itself through the 
"boundless becoming-one purifying itself through boundless separation". In both 
descriptions the process is self-perpetuating, moving onwards in a dialectical 
progression. In this progression, God and man come together, becoming wholly 
one, ("ganz Eines"). However, as was stated in the previous section, this coming 
together must be understood as a violation which cannot be tolerated, hence 
each cancels out the other. This act of cancelling out, paradoxically also 
reinstates the individuality of the component elements, for it forces them apart. 
However, as is suggested by the comment that "the God is present in the figure 
of death", this act of return cannot be understood as a restoration of their 
previous identities for once each side has become involved in the process - once 
man and God have met - their own natures are irreconcilably altered. Thus the 
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statement that "the God is present in the figure in death" can be interpreted 
as referring to the previous discussion of the effects of the "categorical 
reversal"; i. e. the God (time) is equated with death, because he can only make 
himself felt in and through time. God's communication of himself to man is a 
communication of the necessary finitude of man's existence. God's self- 
communication demonstrates the limited nature of man's existence, reinforcing the 
necessary division between God and man. 
Af ter giving his explanation of the process which underlies the tragic form, 
Hölderlin then complicates his analysis by reintroducing the problem of how the 
details of the tragic presentation must be altered in order for it to be relevant 
to the modes of thought and representation of his own time. He draws a 
distinction between the manner in which the scenes are presented in the Greek 
presentation and in the modern "re"-interpretation by focusing upon the way in 
which the "word" seizes the main protagonist, revealing their fate. The "word" 
can be equated with the pronouncements of Tiresias, wherein the nature of the 
transgression is revealed to society causing the mechanism of retribution to be 
brought into action. C34] Hölderlin argues that in the Greek mode of presentation 
the "word" is "more mediately factual" [mittelbarer factischi because it takes 
hold of the more sensuous body [den sinnlicheren Körper], whilst in the mode 
of presentation of the modern time, the word is more immediate because it takes 
hold of the "more spiritual body" ("den geistigeren Körper"). In the Greek 
presentation, the word must be viewed as "deadly-factual", because "the body 
which it seizes actually kills". ( "Das grlechischtragische Wort ist 
tödtlichfactisch, weil der Leib, den es ergreift, wirklich t: ödtet. ") In the Greek 
presentation, the "word" is mediate, because its decree can only be effected 
through the action of an agent, it does not attack the transgressor directly. 
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Rather it can only be carried out by another, hence the statement that "the 
body which it seizes actually kills". This process is illustrated by the actions 
of Creon in Antieone. Once Creon believes that Antigone has violated the laws 
of the city, he moves against her in order to bring about retribution for the 
transgression she has committed. However as the course of the tragedy unfolds. 
it is clear that the effects of the pronouncement of the "deadly-factual" word 
are not limited to the actions of Creon. Antigone also considers Creon guilty of 
transgression because by forbidding the burial of her brother he is violating 
the laws of the dead. Hence the ambiguity which arises in ascertaining who is 
guilty of violating the laws. This clash between two types of law - the 
religious and the civil - is conducted primarily on a linguistic level, each side 
accusing the other of misinterpreting the "word" of the law. The tragic 
conclusion of the drama - of the main protagonists, only Creon survives having 
witnessed the deaths of his wife and son, as well as Antigone - bears witness 
to Hölderlin's description of the "deadly-factual" nature of the Greek 
presentation. However, the argument that Hölderlin then proceeds to develop, 
indicates that this interpretation of the Antigone must be viewed as a 
specifically Greek understanding of the story, which must necessarily be 
modified in order to give it relevance to Hölderlin's modernity. Hölderlin writes, 
For us, because we stay under the more authentic Zeus, who not 
only inheres between this earth and the wild world of the dead, but 
also forces the progress of nature, which is eternally hostile to 
man, on its way to another world, more decisively onto earth, and 
because of this the essential and ""vaterländisch"" representations 
must be completely other, and our art must be ""vaterländisch"", so 
that their forms are selected according to our world view and their 
representations "vaterländisch" 
Für uns, da wir unter dem eigentlicheren Zeus stehen, der nicht nur 
zwischen dieser Erde und der wilden Welt der Todten innehält, 
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sondern den ewig menschenfeindlichen Naturgang, auf seinem Wege in 
die andre Welt, entschiedener zur Erde zwinget, und da diß die 
wesentlichen und vaterländischen Vorstellungen groß ändert, und 
unsere Dichtkunst, vaterländisch seyn muß, so daß ihre Stoffe nach 
unserer Weltansicht gewählt sind, und ihre Vorstellungen 
vaterländisch... [351 
From this passage it is clear that the difference between the Greek and Modern 
world views arises out of the fact that the Moderns "stay under the more 
authentic Zeus"; i. e. the difference between the two cultures is based upon their 
relationship with the Gods. What, therefore, does Hölderlin mean by the term 
"the more authentic Zeus"? The most obvious interpretation would be to suggest 
that Hölderlin is referring to the changes which must be introduced in order to 
make the drama correspond to the modern, necessarily Christian world-view. 
Zeus must be replaced by the Christian trinitarian conception of the Godhead. 
However this interpretation - to which many commentators adhere[361 - fits 
problematically with Hölderlin's description of the function of the "more 
authentic Zeus". Whilst it could be argued that the statement that the more 
authentic Zeus "inheres between this earth and the wild world of the dead" is 
a reference to the role of Christ as mediator between man and God, it is 
difficult to interpret the next statement that he "forces the progress of-nature, 
which is eternally hostile to man.. . more decisively onto earth" in a specifically 
Christian context. Whilst it would be foolish to attempt to deny entirely that 
Hölderlin is referring to the changes which the acknowledgment of the Christian 
world-view must bring to the interpretation, I want to suggest that in these 
statements Hölderlin is not concerned primarily with theological issues. Rather 
what is at stake are questions concerning man's experience of his relationship 
with his own time. Hölderlin's world-view is necessarily influenced by his 
Christian beliefs, but this does not mean that the interpretation he offers can 
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be automatically assumed to be an unproblematic affirmation of Christian 
doctrine. Instead, Hölderlin's interpretation must be seen as an attempt to come 
to terms with the uneasy relationship that exists between orthodox Christian 
beliefs and the prevalent ideas and mood which influence Hölderlin's experience 
of his own modernity. These two modes of thought are not necessarily 
compatible and, as is evidenced by much of his later poetry, one of Hölderlin's 
most persistent concerns is the attempt to find a way in which his experience 
of his own time can be reconciled with his faith. 1371 This uneasy relationship 
between Hölderlin's Christian beliefs and his interest in current modes of 
thought can also be discerned in the Remarks. As I argued in relation to the 
Remarks on Oedipus, Hölderlin's analysis suggests that in modernity, God can 
only be shown through unfaithfulness, through his exposure to time, whereby 
God then becomes defined through his absence. The focus of this analysis is 
concerned much more with humanity's relationship to the Gods rather than an 
attempt to reinstate the orthodox Christian viewpoint. Hence the statement that 
"we" exist under the "more authentic Zeus" can be interpreted as referring to 
the way in which the dominant mode of thought - i. e. Kantian thought - is 
able to present man's relation to the Gods. What this analysis shows is that in 
the forms of thought which are appropriate to Hölderlin's modernity - in fact, 
in a certain sense they can be seen to contribute to the creation of this 
modernity - man's relation to the God is always subject to the strictures and 
limitations of time. This relation is necessarily historically situated and 
determined. 
This interpretation is reinforced by statements that are made in the second 
section of the Remarks on Antigone. where Hölderlin outlines the changes which 
have to be made in the translation from Greek to German. He argues that in 
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order to bring the translation "closer to our mode of representation" one 
should change "Zeus" to "father of time or father of earth". This is because it 
is "his [i. e. Zeus'] character to reverse the striving from this world to the 
other into a striving from another into this world. " In describing Zeus as 
"father of time", Hölderlin is emphasising the way in which the God can only 
be shown in time. (38] The account which is given reiterates the necessity for 
the forms of representation to be appropriate for the era in which they arise. 
This can be linked to Hölderlin's statement that because "we" live under the 
"more authentic Zeus... the essential and vaterländisch representations must be 
completely other", so that the "forms are selected according to our world view 
and their representations vaterländisch". 1397 It is Hölderlin's understanding and 
experience of his own time which provides the justification for the change of 
terminology. It is clear that this argument is very similar to that put forward 
in the earlier discussion of the first letter to Böhlendorff. The main imperative 
of this letter - the demand that "we" can have nothing similar to the Greeks 
except "a living relationship and skill" - is reiterated through the demand that 
the "essential" and "'vaterländisch' representations must be completely other" to 
those of the Greeks. Hölderlin's world view is necessarily different to that of 
the Greeks. Therefore to translate Sophocles effectively - i. e. to make the text 
representative of Hölderlin's own time - he must alter the forms of 
representation in such a way as to make them "vaterländisch". When stated in 
this manner it appears that Hölderlin's task is not too problematic, for he must 
simply be able to reflect the concerns of his time. However here the admonition 
that occurs in the first letter to Böhlendorff must not be forgotten, for as 
Hölderlin warns "the free use of one's own is the most difficult". The demand 
that "our poetry must be vaterlandisch" is perhaps more problematic than it 
first appears, for hidden within this statement is the assumption that the 
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artist is able to discern clearly what is truly representative of their time. 
Furthermore, with respect to the process of translation, this also presupposes 
that the art form can be made to have a relevance for the time in which the 
translation is conceived. These issues are brought into the foreground when 
Hölderlin turns to characterising the changes which must be made to the Greek 
text so as to make it more "vaterländisch". He states, 
... since our poetry must be vaterländisch so that its themes are 
selected according to our world-view and their representations 
vaterländisch, for us, then, the Greek representations change insofar 
as it is their main tendency to grasp themselves, which was their 
weakness; on the other hand, it is the main tendency in the mode of 
representation of our time to "hit the mark", to have a destiny, 
since the absence of destiny, the dysmoron is our weakness... thus the 
Greek modes of representation and poetic forms are also more 
subordinated to the vaterländisch ones. 
und unsere Dichtkunst vaterländisch seyn muß, so daß ihre Stoffe 
nach unserer Weltansicht gewählt sind, und ihre Vorstellungen 
vaterländisch, verändern sich die griechischen Vorstellungen insofern, 
als ihre Haupttendenz ist, sich fassen zu können, weil darin ihre 
Schwäche lag, da hingegen die Haupttendenz in den Vorstellungsarten 
unserer Zeit ist, etwas treffen zu können, Geschick zu haben, da das 
Schiksaallose, das Suapopov, unsere Schwäche ist... Und so auch sind 
die grieschischen Vorstellungsarten und poetischen Formen mehr den 
vaterländischen subordinirt. (40] 
These enigmatic comments contain the root of the problem which Hölderlin 
confronts in his attempt to translate Sophocles in a way which will allow the 
texts to have a relevance for his own time. Again, the problem which these 
comments expose can be linked directly to the issues raised in the first letter 
to Böhlendorff, concerning the relationship between that which is foreign and 
that which is "natural" to the artist. As was stated earlier, Hölderlin argues 
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that it is only through appropriating that which is foreign to a culture that 
the artist is able to approach that which is most natural for them, because the 
"free use of one's own is most difficult". In these comments, Hölderlin 
reformulates these ideas in terms of the "main tendency" of each culture. In 
order for the culture to become representative of itself and its time, it must 
be able to identify that which is lacking, it must understand where its 
weakness lies. Hence Hölderlin identifies the main tendency of the Greeks in 
terms of their attempts to "grasp themselves", because they are aware that 
their weakness is their inability to comprehend their own nature. This analysis 
can be substantiated by the comments which Hölderlin makes in the letter to 
Böhlendorff. Here it is stated that the Greeks excel in that which is foreign to 
them, "their talent for presentation", but they cannot easily gain access to that 
which is natural for them, namely the "fire from heaven". However what 
Hölderlin seems to be suggesting in these later remarks on tragedy, is that in 
the tragedy the Greeks can be seen to be attempting to understand their own 
nature. The main tendency which is demonstrated in Greek tragedy is the 
Greeks' attempt to grasp that which is natural to themselves. However, an 
ambiguity is present in Hölderlin's comments which makes it difficult to decide 
whether this attempt to "grasp themselves" is to be considered a positive or 
negative trait. It could be argued that level of insight which is shown in 
tragedy indicates that it should be considered to be the art form which is 
truly representative of the Greek culture. Yet it must not be forgotten that 
Greek tragedy flourishes at a time of crisis for the Greek state, suggesting 
that the insights which it showed may also have been too much to bear. The 
"main tendency" of the Greeks - their desire to "grasp themselves" - may well 
be understood as a fatal weakness, which contributes to their demise. 
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After outlining the characteristics of the Greek art forms, Hölderlin then moves 
on to consider those of his own time. He states that the weakness of his own 
time is the "absence of destiny" ("das Schiksaallose"). 1411 Hence the main 
tendency of the contemporary artforms is "etwas treffen zu können, Geschick zu 
haben". It is extremely difficult to decide how these two phrases are to be 
interpreted for both are highly ambiguous and possess differing connotations. 
"Etwas treffen zu können" is a colloquial term which can be translated roughly 
using the English phrase "to hit the mark", or to "designate something", 
whilst "Geschick zu haben" could mean either "to have a skill" or "have a 
destiny, fate". The term "Geschick" also arises in the first letter to 
Böhlendorff, and in this context it was interpreted as meaning "skill". However 
in this situation I think that it is more appropriate to read it as referring to 
possessing a fate or destiny. Thus it can be suggested that Hölderlin's 
argument is that because the weakness of his time is the "absence of 
destiny/fate", ("das Schiksaallose") the main tendency of the artwork must be 
to create and reflect this absence. However, paradoxically it is through the 
articulation of this absence that an understanding of the Modern is reached, 
because in a certain sense it can be understood as giving meaning to the 
present. This act of giving meaning re-invests the present with a sense of its 
own fate, albeit that the concept of fate becomes rigorously redefined in order 
to allow it to reflect the contemporary worldview. Therefore Hölderlin's 
description of the main tendency of his time as "etwas treffen zu können" can 
be interpreted as referring to the way in which the work of art must attempt 
to articulate the exact nature of the present. It is for this reason that 
Hölderlin then states that in the process of translation, the Greek forms of 
representation must become "subordinate" to the "vaterlendisch". In order for 
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the work of art to represent and have meaning for its own time, it must 
reflect the artist's experience of his or her present. 
However this analysis still begs the question as to why Hölderlin considers the 
translation of Sophocles to be of such importance. Why, in an age which is 
characterised as "das Schiksaallose", does Hölderlin turn to translating Greek 
tragedy? On the surface it would appear that tragedy, in its Greek form - 
insofar as it presupposes a rigid societal structure in which concepts such as 
destiny and fate have meaning and power - is a singularly inappropriate art 
form to use to attempt to approach the questions of the nature of the modern 
era. The answer to this problem can be found through closer examination of the 
effects of making the Greek forms of representation "subordinate" to the 
Vaterlendisch. Throughout this discussion I have emphasised Hölderlin's demand 
that the translation is an attempt to allow the Greek text to address the 
demands and concerns of the present. Furthermore Hölderlin also makes clear 
that it is often necessary to gain a distance from that which one assumes to be 
representative of one's own time. Hence the cautionary remarks that are made in 
the letter to Blendorff concerning the naive appropriation of the Greek forms, 
because apart from the "living relationship and skill" we should have "nothing 
else in common with them". However this does not mean that the Greeks should 
be abandoned entirely, for as Hölderlin goes on to state "what is one's own 
("das Eigene") must be learned as well as that which is foreign. This is why 
the Greeks are so indispensable for us". When these comments are considered in 
relation to the statements made in the Remarks it is possible to begin to 
understand why the translation of the Greeks is still valuable. In translating 
the Greek, Hölderlin is provided with the opportunity of "learning" what is 
"one's own" C"das Eigene"). The Greek text is altered in order to allow it to 
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represent contemporary concerns, but also in this juxtaposition of the Greek and 
modern world views, a distance is gained from the "familiar" understanding of 
the present. The process whereby the Greek art forms are made "subordinate" 
to the "vaterländisch" ones is not to be understood as a complete eradication of 
the Greek. Rather in the translation of the tragedy, the Greek and 
vaterIi3ndisch forms of representation are brought into relation with each other, 
in order that the "familiarity" of the present forms of understanding and 
representation can be disturbed. The translation is used to highlight the 
concerns of the present, but at the same time it also challenges and questions 
these concerns. E4 21 This can be seen most clearly in the analysis which I have 
given of the way in which the process of the tragic presentation is 
reinterpreted in a Kantian framework. The tragic presentation becomes the site 
in which the limits of the claims of the Kantian forms of thought are tested 
out. Hölderlin's translation of both Oedipus and Antigone alters the focus of 
the drama by introducing the concerns of modernity. This is demonstrated best 
by Hölderlin's interpretation of Oedipus which becomes an exploration of the 
limits of human conceptual knowledge. Hence the demand that the Greek forms 
must become subordinate to the "vaterkindisch" is not to be read as a naive 
attempt to appropriate the Greek text for nationalistic ends. Hölderlin is not 
attempting to write the "Ur"-German tragedy. (4 3l Instead, the demand for 
"vateriindisch" representations must be viewed as a critical gesture, wherein 
the ideas and concerns of the age are explored in greater depth by transposing 
them into a "foreign" form and seeing how they fare. This interpretation is 
confirmed by the statements with which Hölderlin concludes the Remarks on 
Antigone. He states: 
For us such a form [die va terillndischel is suitable precisely because 
the infinite, like the spirit of the states and of the world, cannot 
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be grasped other than from an askew perspective. The vaterländisch 
forms of our poets, where there are such, are still to be preferred, 
for such do not exist merely in order to understand the spirit of 
the time but in order to hold onto and feel it once it has been 
comprehended and learnt. 
Für uns ist eine solche Form gerade tauglich, weil das Unendliche, 
wie der Geist der Staaten und der Welt, ohnehin nicht anders, als 
aus linkischem Gesichtpunct kann gefaßt werden. Die vaterländischen 
Formen unserer Dichter, wo solche sind, sind aber dennoch 
vorzuziehen, weil solche nicht blos da sind, um den Geist der Zeit 
verstehen zu lernen, sondern ihn festzuhalten und zu fühlen, wenn er 
einmal begriffen und gelernt ist. [441 
These remarks indicate that Hölderlin's belief in the value of the aesthetic 
presentation remains undiminished. The function of the vaterländisch forms of 
art is to provide an alternative way to approach the theoretical issues of the 
time. The comment that this form is important because the infinite can only be 
grasped from "an askew perspective" can be seen to be continuing the ideas that 
were first introduced in the letter to Schiller of 4th September 1795, where 
Hölderlin argues that it is only in the aesthetic presentation that a relation to 
the absolute can be given. t45] Although, as I have shown, Hölderlin's 
understanding of the nature of the relation to the absolute alters in the eight 
years between these two texts, the belief remains that it is only through the 
aesthetic presentation that man is able to gain a full understanding of this 
relation., This is shown by Hölderlin's comment that the vaterländisch forms 
allow the spirit of the age to be held onto and felt once it has been 
"comprehended and learnt". This distinction - which on first reading appears 
difficult - highlights the crucial function played by the aesthetic forms. In the 
aesthetic presentation the ideas which define and distinguish the particular 
"spirit of the time" are animated and in a certain sense given life. The 
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theoretical ideas of the age offer only a conceptual understanding of the time 
which lacks vitality and completeness. The function of the artist who attempts 
to present the vaterländisch forms, is to allow the concerns of the prevalent 
conceptual ideas to emerge in their work in order for the "spirit of the time" 
to be reflected and thereby better understood. However, as has been indicated 
by the earlier discussion, this process is not to be understood as a blind 
appropriation and affirmation of the current conceptual modes of thought. Rather 
the vaterländisch forms of art become the site through which the possibility of 
critique is offered. This is because the form does not merely enable the ideas 
to be reflected in a conceptual manner, but rather "holds onto and feels" them; 
i. e. the vaterländisch forms reflects the true "spirit of the time" because they 
are able demonstrate the full effects of the prevalent modes of thought. The 
vaterländisch form animates, gives life to the conceptual modes of 
understanding, allowing the underlying presuppositions to be presented and 
questioned. 
This point can be illustrated most clearly by returning to the question of the 
effect of Hölderlin's translations on the tragic presentation and the way in 
which the translations are constructed in order to allow the presentation to 
have relevance for Hölderlin's time. What conclusions can be drawn from 
Hölderlin's analysis concerning the nature of the "modern" tragic form? 
Furthermore, what does this analysis indicate about the nature of Hölderlin's 
experience of his own modernity? In order to address these questions it is 
necessary to return to the earlier discussion of Hölderlin's statement that the 
weakness of his time is its "absence of fate/destiny"; i. e. his age is "das 
Schiksaallose". In this discussion I argued that the vaterländisch art form in 
one sense reflects this weakness, yet at the same time, this recognition of the 
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"absence of destiny" as such brings forth an alternative understanding of the 
"fate" of the modern. Hölderlin illustrates how this "alternative" understanding 
can be developed in relation to the tragedy by returning to the discussion of 
the way in which the death of the hero occurs and the meaning which is 
attributed to this death. Having given his description of the weaknesses of the 
Greek and modern ages, Hölderlin writes, 
And hence the deadly factual, the actual murder with words has to 
be considered more a specifically Greek artform, subordinate to a 
more Vaterländisch one. As can well be demonstrated, a 
Vaterländisch one may be more deathly-factual than deadly factual: 
it ends not in murder and death, for the tragic must be 
comprehended herein, but more in the manner of Oedipus at Colonus, 
so that the word from the inspired mouth is frightful, and kills, 
not Greek, in the athletic and plastic spirit where the word seizes 
the body so that it is the latter which kills. 
Und so ist wohl das tödtlichfactische, der wirkliche Mord aus 
Worten, mehr als eigentümlich griechische und einer vaterländischen 
Kunstform subordinirte Kunstform zu betrachten. Eine vaterländisch 
mag, wie wohl beweislich ist, mehr tödtendfactisches, als 
tödlichfactisches Wort seyn. nicht eigentlich mit Mord oder Tod 
endigen, weil doch hieran das Tragische muß gefaßt werden, sondern 
mehr im Geschmake des Oedipus auf Kolonus, so daß das Wort aus 
begeisterem Munde schrecklich ist, und tödtet, nicht griechisch 
faßlich, in athletischem und plastischem Geiste, wo das Wort den 
Körper ergreift, daß dieser tödtet. [46] 
In this statement Hölderlin suggests that the interpretation of the tragic 
presentation is altered greatly by the changes that are made to make it a 
vaterländisch art form. The Greek presentation culminates in actual murder and 
death. However, in the vaterländisch form, the focus of the drama is altered so 
that what is of interest is not the processes of retribution, but rather the 
subsequent consequences which this process brings into operation. One could 
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perhaps go so far as to argue that Hölderlin's description of the vaterländisch 
art form alters the focus and definition of the tragic presentation so much that 
it can no longer be understood as tragedy. In creating a work which has 
relevance for an age which is marked by an "absence of destiny" the tragedy 
must apparently lose those elements which mark it out as tragedy. At the very 
least it can no longer be understood using the criteria which are used to define 
the Greek form of tragedy. Changing the focus of the interpretation of the 
drama from the actual death of the protagonists to their "spiritual" death 
alters the way in which the terrible events which occur when man challenges 
the role of God is understood. As I argued in relation to the analysis of 
Oedipus, what is demonstrated in Hölderlin's modern re-interpretation of the 
tragedy is the absence of the relation to the Gods. The transgression, the 
nefas, which the tragedy is founded upon, is understood not so much as a crime 
against the Gods, against the prevalent order, but rather is viewed as a 
violation by man of his own limitation. The modern re-interpretation of the 
tragedy shows the limits of man's finite historical consciousness, it 
demonstrates the impossibility of escaping from the constrictions of conceptual 
thinking. The actual horror of the confrontation with the power of the Gods 
which is indicative of the Greek tragedy - the "real death" - is transformed 
into the horror of the realisation of their absence. Hence Hölderlin's statement 
that in the modern presentation the "word" is immediate because it seizes the 
"spiritual body". The realisation of the absence of the Gods is both literal and 
figural. It is literal insofar as it again highlights the irrevocable break 
between the Greek and modern worlds; it emphasises that man's understanding is 
necessarily historically situated, and thus limited. The belief in the possibility 
of an immediate relation to the Gods of the kind which (apparently) occurs in 
the Greek world is removed; again, "the Gods live over our heads! "1471 The 
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absence is figural in the sense that the term "Gods" itself is brought into 
question for it must necessarily be reinterpreted and understood in a "modern" 
sense. That is, the statement that the "Gods" are absent from the modern 
world must be seen to refer to the lack of immediacy, the impossibility of the 
achievement of an unmediated relation to the Absolute. The certainty of the 
status of the I which is asserted in the Idealist understanding of the concept 
of intellectual intuition is necessarily challenged. Hence the negative 
interpretation which I have given of Hölderlin's statement that the tragic is 
"the metaphor of an intellectual intuition. " 
In his analysis of the tragic presentation Hölderlin demonstrates the 
limitations of the modes of thought of his time. The analysis of the function of 
tragedy within the modern presents us with an image of man's existence as a 
"wandering below the unthinkable"[ 481; i. e. we are marooned within a world 
which is constructed and given meaning through conceptual modes of thought, 
which outlaw the possibility of thinking of an "other" relation to the 
"unthinkable". However this does not mean that the possibility of this "other" 
relationship is totally excluded. As I stated at the end of the previous section, 
the tragic form not only demonstrates the limits of the conceptual modes of 
thought, but also when it is considered as an aesthetic phenonemon, offers an 
alternative presentation of the relation to that which lies outside of conceptual 
thought. Throughout this study I have emphasised the way in which the mimetic 
presentation always necessarily exceeds the conceptual constraints which are 
imposed upon it. In its actual presentation the art form always challenges the 
statement that it is merely a work of art. Instead it must be seen as the site 
in which other worlds, other interpretations and possibilities are given. In 
relation to the arguments put forward here, it can be suggested that through 
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the re-interpretation of the tragedy, Hölderlin is able offer a new and deeper 
understanding of his own time. This presentation reflects the concerns of his 
age thus necessarily redefining how the term "tragedy" is to be understood. 
This new understanding is encapsulated by the statements from the first letter 
to Böhlendorff which I quoted earlier, where Hölderlin writes, 
For this is the tragic for us: that, packed up in any container, we 
depart very quietly from the realm of the living, and not that, 
consumed in flames, we atone for the flames we are not able to 
control. 
And indeed! The former moves the innermost soul just as well as 
the latter. It is not such an imposing destiny, but it is a 
profounder one... 
Denn das ist das Tragische bei uns, daß wir ganz stille in irgend 
einem Behälter eingepakt vom Reiche der Lebendigen hinweggehn, nicht 
daß wir in Flammen verzehrt die Flamme büßen, die wir nicht zu 
bändigen vermochten. 
Und wahrlich! das erste bewegt so gut die innerste Seele wie das 
letze. Es ist kein so imposantes, aber ein tieferes Schiksaal. (491 
These comments point towards the need to acknowledge that the form of tragic 
presentation which is representative of the Modern must necessarily be different 
to that of the Greek. What is important is for the art form to reflect the 
concerns of the time in which it arose. Hence Hölderlin's approval of 
Böhlendorff's drama. In an age which is characterised as "das Schiksaallose", 
there cannot be any grand exits. Empedocles may jump into the fire of Etna but 
no one will pay any attention to the deed or herald the golden sandals left on 
the rim as signs of his apotheosis. Instead "our" fate is to slip away quietly 
without ceremony. This is the destiny of the Modern. However even in simply 
attempting to articulate this destiny, Hölderlin goes some way to giving it 
meaning and value. In a certain sense the acknowledgement of the 
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"senselessness" of this experience provides it with a value; for as Hölderlin 
states this modern destiny may be the more profound. The question that still 
remains though is how this profundity is to be understood, and who is capable 
of communicating it. Hölderlin's answer is that this is the role of the poet and 
dramatist - the proponents and practitioners of the Vaterländisch forms of art 
- whose task is to "feel and hold onto the spirit of the age once it has been 
comprehended and learned". However, as is shown by the example of Hölderlin 
himself, who is prepared to listen to the words of the poet? As he writes, 
"... and what to do or say in the meantime I don't know, and who wants poets 
at all in lean years? "(S O] 
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Conclusion. 
Höiderlin; Our Contemporary? 
To conclude this study it is necessary to return from the "foreign" of 
Höiderlin's text to the present and to show briefly how the arguments which I 
developed in previous chapters are related to the contemporary concerns and 
problems which I outlined in the Introduction. In the course of this study I 
have focussed upon two main issues. The first concerns the way in which 
Hölderlin confronts the problematic relationship between Ancient Greece and 18th 
century Germany. Secondly I have highlighted the problems which arise out of 
Hölderlin's attempts to understand the function of tragedy in his age. 
Furthermore, as I have shown through the arguments which have been developed, 
these two concerns are not mutually exclusive. That is, the problems which 
arise in the course of Hölderlin's investigations into the relationship between 
Greece and Germany necessarily affect the way in which the question concerning 
the nature of modern tragedy is understood. Thus, as I argued in Chapter 2, 
Hölderlin reassesses the relationship between the modes of thought of his own 
time and Ancient Greece by demonstrating that this relationship can never be 
one of simple imitative replication. The problems of Hölderlin's modern world 
cannot be solved by recourse to the classical example. The reason for this is 
twofold. First, as Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe points out in his article "Hölderlin 
and the Greeks", the ancient world cannot function as an origin or ground. The 
Greeks cannot act as "the model" for the Germans because Greek culture is 
necessarily divided. The Greek culture with which the Germans are presented 
cannot be understood as the "true" culture of Greece - i. e. the natural of the 
Greek - because the only way in which the Greeks are able to develop a 
cultural identity is to move into the foreign, that is, to appropriate what is 
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not theirs. What is presented as "Greek" is not the natural identity of Greece, 
but rather the identity which they appropriated. Hence, as Lacoue-Labarthe 
argues, Greece cannot be imitated because Greece "in itself" did not exist. [, ] 
The notion of Greece as a unified realm against which all subsequent cultures 
are to be measured is a myth. The second consequence of this breakdown of the 
Greek "model" is irreconcilably to distance Hölderlin's time from the Greeks. 
Once Greece has been removed as the model, it becomes clear that Germany 
must seek to determine its own identity. Whilst Germany can still learn from 
the example of the Greeks, its identity cannot be based on theirs. Rather, as 
Hölderlin argues in the first letter to Bbhlendorff, all that they can have in 
common is "a living relationship and skill". 
At the same time as Hölderlin is developing his understanding of the 
relationship between Greece and Germany, he is also concerned with establishing 
an alternative "aesthetic" philosophy. This project is motivated by the desire to 
find a form of thought that will be capable of addressing and reflecting the 
needs of his time. Hölderlin feels that purely "theoretical" modes of thought 
will never be fully effective for they cannot express or address the nature of 
the Absolute completely. As he writes in his letter to Schiller of 4th 
September 1795, theoretical thought can only establish an "asymptotic relation" 
with the Absolute. It is only in the aesthetic presentation that the relation to 
the Absolute can be given. Hence, as I showed in chapters 3 and 4, between 
1798 and 1800 Hölderlin develops his so-called "poetological" writings in which 
he addresses the philosophical concerns of his time from an aesthetic 
perspective. In these analyses the tragic form becomes central to Hölderlin's 
thought, for it is defined as "the metaphor of an intellectual intuition. " 
Hölderlin argues that the relation to the Absolute can be best presented in and 
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through the "tragic-dramatic" form. However, as I showed in my analysis of 
the text On the Difference of the Poetic Modes, Hölderlin's project proves 
problematic because his analysis of the tragic form starts to undermine the 
theoretical premises upon which the project is built. These problems are 
exacerbated further by Hölderlin's Empedocles project. As I argued in Chapter 
4, through his attempt to write a tragedy premised upon his theoretical beliefs, 
Hölderlin is forced to confront the question of how these beliefs can be put in 
practice in such a way as to be effective. Hence he has to confront the problem 
of whether it is possible to develop a tragedy which is relevant to his own 
time. As I showed throughout the analysis which I gave in chapters 3 and 4, 
the problem to which Hölderlin returns constantly concerns the conflict between 
his theoretical understanding of the relation between humanity and the Absolute, 
and the way that this has to be understood from a historical perspective. It is 
this problem which, I would suggest, causes Hölderlin to abandon the 
Empedocles project and to turn to the translation of Sophocles. He realises that 
his poetological project is still too theoretical, for it is unable to address the 
concerns of his own time directly. Hence his decision to turn to the translations 
can be understood as an attempt to address the problems which he perceives in 
his own time from a different perspective. Furthermore, as I argued in the 
introduction to Chapter 5, in these translations Hölderlin brings the problem of 
the relationship between Greece and Germany into confrontation with the issues 
which arise out of the poetological writings and the Empedocles project, and in 
particular the question concerning the nature and function of modern tragedy. 
Hence the Sophocles translations and the accompanying Remarks can be 
understood as Hölderlin's response to the problem of finding a way in which the 
work of art can be given relevance to his time. In these texts Hölderlin 
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addresses the question of the function of the tragic form. In so doing he 
attempts to demonstrate how the Greek world can be made relevant to the 
Modern, whilst simultaneously using his translation of the Greek text as a way 
of offering a critique of the contemporary modes of thought. Hence the Remarks 
on Oedipus and the Remarks on Antigone can be read both as an analysis of the 
Greek texts which allows the Greek world to speak to the modern, and also as 
a way of creating a text which reflects and addresses the contemporary 
situation. As I showed in the analysis which I developed in Chapter 5, the 
Remarks can be interpreted as Hölderlin's attempt to expose the aporias and 
dilemmas of his contemporary modes of thought. His analysis illustrates the 
limits of theoretical thought, and at the same time demonstrates the problem of 
trying to think "outside" of these limits. His text is able to gesture towards 
the "other" of conceptual thought - towards that which cannot be presented, 
cannot be thought - but is itself also constrained by the limits which it 
exposes. Hence through his translation of Sophocles, Hölderlin is able to 
reinterpret the function of tragedy so as to allow the form to speak of, and 
to, his own time. However, the question remains as to the status of Hölderlin's 
"reinterpretation" of Sophocles, for it could be argued that the aporias and 
limitations which are revealed through the translations indicate the 
impossibility of a modern tragedy. That is, the limits which Hölderlin's 
analysis exposes, shows that his "modern" age is irreconcilably alienated from 
the situation in which tragedy can have meaning. Hölderlin's interpretation of 
Sophocles exposes the tragedy of Hölderlin's own situation, whilst 
simultaneously rendering the tragic form itself redundant. In introducing the 
imperative that the work of art must be "väterlandisch", Hölderlin reveals the 
impoverishment of his time, for it illustrates the constrictions and limitations 
which are imposed upon the artist or thinker. Furthermore, this imperative also 
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exposes the fragility of thought, for it challenges the assumptions upon which 
the systems of thought are built. 
Having summarised the arguments which I have developed in the previous 
chapters it is now possible to turn to address the question of their relevance 
to our own time. In the Introduction to this study, I mentioned that the reason 
why I chose to focus on Hölderlin - rather than a more mainstream thinker - 
was Lacoue-Labarthe's comment that Hölderlin was a "modern" thinker; i. e. the 
problems which he confronts can be seen to be relevant to our situation. What, 
therefore, can be found within the analysis which I have given, which can be 
used to substantiate - and perhaps develop - this claim? 
In order to answer this question it is first necessary to define what is implied 
by the use of the term "modern". In response to Lacoue-Labarthe's description 
of Hölderlin as "modern" it could be argued that the use of this term is in 
itself an indication that "we" are distanced from Hölderlin. This is because our 
contemporary modes of thought have "surpassed", "overcome" the constrictions 
of the modern, and that the multiplicity of discourses in which we engage can 
be interpreted as signs that "we" are "post-modern" thinkers. However, I think 
that this form of "periodization" is in itself indicative of "modern" forms of 
thought. Therefore, in attempting to establish what we might understand by the 
description "modern", I shall employ the analysis and definition which J. F. 
Lyotard gives in his paper "Rewriting Modernity". Here Lyotard argues against 
the description of our contemporary time as "post-modern" by commenting, 
... we have to say that the postmodern is always implied in the 
modern because of the fact that modernity, modern temporality, 
comprises in itself an impulsion to exceed itself into a state other 
than itself... Modernity is constitutionally and ceaselessly pregnant 
with its postmodernity. (21 
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In attempting to offer a definition of the "modern" Lyotard chooses to oppose 
it to the "classical age". He argues, 
Rather than the postmodern, what would be properly opposed to 
modernity here would be the classical age. The classical age involves 
a state of time (let's call it a status of temporality) in which 
advent and passing, future and past, are treated as though, taken 
together, they embraced the totality of life in one and the same 
unity of meaning. For example, this would be the way that myth 
organizes and distributes time, creating a rhythm of the beginning 
and the end of the story it recounts, to the point of making them 
rhyme. 131 
This distinction between the modern and the classical is, I think, pertinent and 
useful in relation to this discussion, because it helps to establish why Hölderlin 
can be described as a modern. It can be argued that it is precisely the unified 
"classical age" against which Hölderlin reacts. In his analysis of the 
relationship between Greece and Germany, Hölderlin is implicitly criticising 
those who hark back to the possibility of retrieving this form of unity. 
Furthermore, as I argued earlier, Hölderlin's analysis exposes the "mythical" 
nature of such beliefs. Greek culture is, and always was, divided. Hence 
Hölderlin is situated in the position from which the "unity" of the classical age 
can only be understood as a utopian dream. In Hölderlin's account of his 
experience of his own time, the ends of the story cannot, and will not, 
"rhyme". This perhaps also helps to explain why the tragic form is rendered 
redundant and why Hölderlin cannot complete Empedocles. If it is accepted that 
even Hölderlin's account of the structure of tragedy presupposes a concept of 
unity and balance then it can be suggested that Hölderlin's modernity does not 
possess this unity. Despite the fact that the tragic form is constructed around 
conflict and disorder, it presupposes the existence of a coherent belief structure 
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for the conflict is itself generated from the tensions which occur when these 
belief structures clash. However, in the modern time such belief structures are 
absent, or are reduced to codified moral beliefs which lack credibility, and 
therefore the unity which sustains the tragic conflict is absent. This point can 
be substantiated by referring to the earlier discussion in the introduction to 
Chapter 4 when I mentioned Hölderlin's reference to Empedocles in Hvperion. I 
commented that, in reference to Hölderlin's inability to complete The Death of 
Empedocles, it is telling that the "modern" Hyperion chooses not to follow the 
example of Empedocles and throw himself into the mouth of Etna. Hyperion 
remains poised on the lip of the volcano, not because he is frightened of the 
act of suicide, or because he does not desire apotheosis, but rather because the 
difference in times means that such an act cannot be given value or meaning. 
Hyperion declares, 
... one must think more highly of oneself than I do before, thus 
unbidden, one can flee to Nature's heart, or whatever else you may 
be pleased to call it, for believe me! as I am now I have no names 
for things and all before me is uncertainty. 
... aber man muß sich höher achten, denn ich mich achte, um so 
ungerufen der Natur ans Herz zu fliegen, oder wie du es sonst noch 
heißen magst, denn wirklich! wie ich jetzt bin, hab ich keinen 
Nahmen für die Dinge und es ist mir alles ungewiß. J4l 
The imitation of Empedocles' act has no place in Hyperion's or, it may be 
inferred, in Hölderlin's age. For, as Hyperion remarks, in his time he has "no 
names for things". All before him is "uncertainty". Without names, without the 
external certainties, tragedy cannot occur, for it is necessarily constructed 
around established names and beliefs. In the "modern" age it is impossible to 
think so highly of oneself that one declares oneself a God. This is not because 
such a declaration is viewed as foolhardy, but rather that such terms have no 
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meaning; Hyperion has "no names" in which, or for which, he could dedicate his 
act. Hence the conditions for the tragic act are absent. Hyperion's life story 
may contain elements which we consider "tragic", but it can never aspire to the 
status of tragedy. In fact in Hyperion's statement, it is possible to hear 
resonances of the remark of Christa Wolf which I discussed in the Introduction 
to this study: "Aren't we beyond all proclamations and prophecies 
. and so 
beyond tragedy. " 
However, even if, in the light of this discussion, it is accepted that Hölderlin 
can be described as a "modern", what relevance can his texts have for us? Why 
are Hölderlin's theoretical texts of value? Before these questions are addressed 
from a positive perspective, it is necessary to establish what role Hölderlin's 
texts cannot perform. This is because one of the most important conclusions 
towards which Hölderlin's thought gestures, is the need always to be aware of 
the problematic relationship between one's own time and the historical past 
which informs and constructs the present. To suggest, as the title given to this 
conclusion does, that Hölderlin is "our contemporary" does not mean that the 
problems which he confronts and the solutions which he develops can be 
transposed into the contemporary situation unchanged. Whilst parallels can be 
discovered between Hölderlin's position and our own, this does not mean that 
our situations are identical. As Hölderlin writes in the letter to Böhlendorff 
with respect to Germany's relation with the Greeks, whilst their situations may 
appear alike, in the solutions which are developed "we must not have anything 
the same as them. " Similarly in "our" relation with Hölderlin we must not 
assume that because we have identified Hölderlin as "modern", our experiences 
of our own times are the same. Hölderlin's analysis of the necessary difference 
between cultures and eras highlights what Lacoue-Labarthe describes as the 
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"chiasmic" structure of history; that is to say the fact that the relationship 
between times is inherently asymmetrical. For a culture to survive and progress 
it must define its own identity in relation to what has gone before, but this 
must be understood as an active creative process, rather than a blind imitation 
of already existing ideas. Hence, to define this process using the terminology of 
another of the main themes of this study, Hölderlin indicates that the mimetic 
relationship between a culture and it predecessors should be understood in 
terms of process - as the active production and generation of culture - rather 
than the static re-production of already existing modes of thought and 
expression. 
Therefore, when comparisons between Hölderlin's texts and our time are being 
developed this necessary distance must always be remembered. However, I think 
that the close examination of Hölderlin's work which I have given can provide 
an account which is useful for helping us to understand some of the problems 
of our present. In conclusion, I shall indicate briefly where further fruitful 
comparisons may he developed and explored. First, as I mentioned in the 
Introduction to this study, the fact that Hölderlin's theoretical writings have 
been marginalised by the mainstream of philosophical thought is itself 
interesting for it suggests that Hölderlin's work does not quite fit into 
"accepted" modes of thinking. One reason I would suggest, why Hölderlin does 
not "fit", is that in taking the aesthetic project to its logical conclusion - i. e. 
by attempting to develop an "aesthetic" philosophy in and through the analysis 
and development of actual works of art - he comes up against impasses and 
problems similar to those which confront the thinkers of the late 20th Century. 
This point can be exemplified by referring to my discussion of language in the 
third section of Chapter 4. Here I argued that Hölderlin can be differentiated 
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from his contemporaries in that he takes seriously the question of the means by 
which and through which philosophical ideas are transmitted. He realises - 
however indistinctly - that language is not simply the vessel in which pure 
ideas and thoughts are transmitted, but rather that these ideas can only be 
constructed in and through the medium of language. Hence he can be seen to 
prefigure some of the recent discussions of the necessary "textuality" of 
thought. Secondly, in relation to my discussion of the Remarks in Chapter 5, it 
is clear that in these texts Hölderlin is confronting the problem of how it is 
possible to address that which lies "outside" the boundaries of conceptual 
thought - in a certain sense these texts can be read as an exploration of how 
it is possible to think "the unthinkable". Hence, in relation to the recent 
discussions of the possibility of thinking at the limits of a tradition which I 
mentioned in the Introduction to this study, it is possible to suggest that 
Hölderlin's text may provide some guidance. Hölderlin's comment that it is the 
task of the poet to "grasp and feel" the spirit of an age, once it has been 
"comprehended and learnt", is of importance because it offers an alternative 
way of approaching the apparent sterility and impotence of purely "theoretical" 
modes of thought. In this remark Hölderlin provides reasons and justifications 
for the need of philosophy to take aesthetic forms of thought seriously. The 
poet has a freedom which is denied to the philosopher, and is able to gain 
insights into their own situation; the poet is able to intimate that which 
philosophical - i. e. theoretical - modes of thought cannot articulate. Hölderlin's 
writings help to explain and justify why the poets should be welcomed back 
into the city of philosophers. Third, and finally, in relation to the question of 
how "we" should confront tragedy, I think Hölderlin's discussion of the 
problems of creating a "modern tragedy" can be used to help us understand our 
experience of the apparent "lack of tragedy". The analysis which Hölderlin 
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provides of the changes which must be made to Sophocles text in order to 
allow it to address the concerns of his time exemplify why "our" experience of 
tragedy can be considered analogous to the description which he provides in the 
first letter to Böhlendorff of the "authentic" modern tragedy. As Hölderlin 
shows in the Remarks, the modern world is defined in and through its 
experience of "the unthinkable"; an "unthinkable" that can truly not be thought, 
because as Hölderlin comments through the character of Hyperion, we "have no 
names" in which to try to construct our understanding of this "unthinkable". 
Although as I have made clear throughout this study, our relationship to 
Höiderlin cannot be understood in any way to be identical, insofar as he and we 
can be described as modern - that is, what we have in common is the 
experience of the fracturing and disruption of our respective times -I think 
that Hölderlin's insights into the "less impressive" but "profounder" nature of 
the modern experience of the tragic are of value. This is because Hölderlin 
teaches us to find ways of re-evaluating this experience, not so as to attempt 
to revive tragedy, to create "modern tragedy", but rather in order to find 
different ways of understanding our own present. The absence of tragedy is 
understood therefore not as a negative assessment, but rather as the recognition 
and acknowledgement which is necessary in order to allow alternative approaches 
and responses to our experience of the "modern" to be developed. 
For Hölderlin, this alternative approach was to turn back to the creation of his 
poetry; to find a voice in which he could speak of the intimatory relation with 
the absent Gods. For ourselves, another approach must be found. Hölderlin can 
gesture towards the possible routes which may be taken, but it is up to us 
decide which way to go. We must determine our own route for our own 
"wandering below the unthinkable. " 
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vi/ Myth. = Vernant, J. P. and Vidal-Naquet, P. Myth and Trapedy in Ancient 
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Introduction. 
1. i/ Nietzsche, F. Human all too Human. p. 264 Translation substantially 
modified. Kritische Gesamtauszabe. Abt. 4 Bd. 3. p. 106. 
ii/ Wolf, C. Cassandra. Trans. Van Heurk, J. (London: Virago Press, 1991, ) 
p. 164. Voraussetzungen einer Erzählung: Kassandra. p. 27. 
III/ Hölderlin, F. Poems. pp. 602-3. 
2. As Hans Robert Jauß shows in his article "Literarische Tradition und 
gegenwärtiges Bewußtsein der Modernität" in Literaturgeschichte als Provokation, 
pp 11-67, this desire to establish a rigid separation between past and present 
can be traced back as far as the 5th century AD, when the early Christian 
church attempts to differentiate itself from the Roman world-view. The 
opposition between "ancient" and "modern" is then reassessed and re-established 
at each point of historical crisis and change. Each "modern" society redefines 
the "ancient" against which it is set. Furthermore, the balance of the 
relationship between these terms alters, depending on whether the "ancient" is 
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viewed as a lost "golden age" to which the "modern" aspires to return, or a 
primitive era which the achievements of the "modern" have managed to overcome. 
It is this distinction which forms the basis of the most well-known debate 
between ancient and modern; i. e. the debate engendered by Charles Perrault in 
1687, French Classicism's Querelle des And ens et des Modernes. It is against 
this background that the German reassessment of the "modern" takes place. As 
Jauß argues in his Sections six to eight (pp. 35-50) of "Literarische 
Tradition... ", after the 1780's with the rise of Classicism and Romanticism, the 
meanings attributed to the terms ancient and modern become complicated and 
confused because the different movements interpret the terms in conflicting 
ways. It is not until the mid-nineteenth century and the work of Baudelaire 
that a new - and distinctly "modern" - definition of the "modern" is given. 
Jauß argues that this new understanding of the modern marks the final 
development of the history of the word. It can be summarised by the remark 
which Baudelaire makes in Le Peintre de la We Moderne. "La modernite, c'est le 
transitoire, le fugitif, le contingent, la moitid de fart, dont 1'autre moltie est 
I'eternel et 1'immuable. " (The modern, it is the transitory, the fugitive, the 
contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the unchanging. ) 
(Jauß, p. 55) 
3. Throughout the period from 1865 to 1875 Nietzsche is obsessed with the 
Greeks. This period includes the early philological writings on the Greek 
philosophers, the publication of the Birth of Tragedy, the notes which 
constitute the projected "companion-piece" to this work often referred to as The 
Philosophers Book, and the publication of the Untimely Mediations. Throughout 
the Nachlass Nietzsche makes repeated attempts to 'come to terms with the 
Greeks. In relation to the main theme of this study it is of note that many of 
the problems with which Nietzsche grapples are almost identical to those which 
appear in Hölderlin's work. Both writers are obsessed by the figure of 
Empedocles, both attempt to write a dramatic tragedy based upon the events of 
his death. Furthermore, both thinkers are attempting to develop an "aesthetic 
philosophy" which will be able to overcome the limitations and 'onesidedness' of 
theoretical modes of thought. In this early work Nietzsche shares a great 
affinity with much of German Romantic thought, (see for example Max Baeumer's 
paper "Nietzsche and the tradition of the Dionysian" in O'Flaherty, Studies... 
1976. ) and close investigation of the links would be very productive. In fact, 
-233- 
this study was conceived initially as a comparative investigation of Hölderlin's 
and Nietzsche's work on tragedy. However, the demands of time, space and 
clarity - the three regulative ideas of thesis writing - necessarily curtailed 
this project. I can therefore only gesture here towards the links that exist 
between the two thinkers, although in the future I hope to return to examine 
them in more depth. 
4. Nietzsche, Human all to Human. For details see note one. 
5. The response which this sense of loss and absence evokes is varied. In The 
Writing of the Disaster, Maurice Blanchot argues - or more appropriately, 
demonstrates - that the only form of writing that can reflect and respond to 
the present crisis is a discourse which is fragmentary and makes no claim to 
closure or mastery. The disaster to which the title of this work refers is the 
unnameable, the undescribable; i. e. the impossibility of ever ascribing meaning 
and certainty to the present. Even the work of those thinkers who apparently 
revel in the breakdown of traditional structures and meaning - and here I am 
referring to writers such as Baudrillard and those who follow his form of 
analysis e. g Kroker et al. - displays a latent sense of loss and desperation. 
The manic celebration of the "post-modern" modes of culture covers over an 
underlying nihilism which, rather than simply rejoicing in its freedom, also 
highlights the vacuity of the present. 
6. I am using the term "Grand Narrative" and "metanarrative" in the sense in 
which they are employed by J. F Lyotard in his works such as The Postmodern 
Condition and Le Differend. In the former text Lyotard writes, "I will use the 
term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a 
metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, 
such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation 
of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth... if a 
metanarrative implying a philosophy of history is used to legitimate knowledge, 
questions are raised concerning the validity of the institutions governing the 
social bond: these must be legitimated as well. Thus justice is consigned to the 
grand narrative in the same way as truth. Simplifying to the extreme, I define 
postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives. " (pp. XXIII-XXIV. ) 
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7. This chapter title only appears in the English translation, not in the 
original French. However, it aptly describes the attitude which Lacoue-Labarthe 
considers to be appropriate in relation to the present. 
8. The tradition of thought to which Lacoue-Labarthe refers can be described 
broadly as the interpretation of the history of philosophy which is developed in 
and through Heidegger's thought. Lacoue-Labarthe understands the history of 
philosophy as the development of a certain determination of Being. As he 
argues, the "exhaustion" of philosophy becomes "apparent at the very point 
when philosophy began to question itself, in the tension that constituted it as 
such, the meta-physical tension. Or, in other words, from the moment when, 
after the thesis on being, in which philosophizing has its essence, had 
irreversibly become thesis on being as thesis, all the theses which succeeded it 
- whatever the style or the alms of the most recent great philosophies 
(accomplishment, restoration, overturning, liquidation, or transcendence of 
philosophy) - have been engulfed in a will to thesis" p. 4. 
9. Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics, p. 3 and 4. 
10. This discussion of "doing wrong" arises in the course of a chapter in which 
Lacoue-Labarthe attempts to understand how Heidegger's involvement in Nazism 
and subsequent silence on the Holocaust can be addressed. He wants to be able 
to find a form of language that will express his unease and disapproval of 
Heidegger's action, but because of the breakdown of traditional ethical systems 
of thought he is unable to find a discourse which can legitimately express his 
feelings. 
11. Lacoue-Labarthe states, "We are, of course, forced to live and act according 
to the norms and prescriptions of ethics, i. e. norms and prescriptions derived 
from the old ethical systems, but no one can any longer be in any doubt.. . that 
we are in this regard entirely without resources. It is no doubt still possible 
to answer the question "How are we to judge"? It is certainly no longer 
possible to answer the questions, "From what position can we judge? " "In the 
name of what or whom"? For what we are lacking now and for the foreseeable 
future, are names, and most immediately 'sacred names', which in their various 
ways governed, and alone governed, the space (public or other) in which ethical 
life unfolded. " p. 31. 
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12. Wolf writes, "If I may formulate a poetological problem so soon, let it be 
this: There is and there can be no poetics which prevents the living experience 
of countless perceiving subjects from being killed and buried in art objects. So, 
does this mean that art objects ("works") are products of the alienation of our 
culture, whose other finished products are produced for self-annihilation? ... My 
overall concern is the sinister effects of alienation, in aesthetics, in art, as 
well as elsewhere. " (Cassandra. p. 142) 
13. Wolf, C. Cassandra. see note 1. 
14. That is, the society out of which Greek tragedy arose was itself fractured 
and troubled by dissent. Thus, although the tragedy addresses the concerns of 
the society as a whole, it could be possible to suggest that unified community 
which is presupposed by the structure of the performance is itself a myth. For 
further discussion of this point see Chapter One. 
15. The obsession with Greece is shown in all forms of artistic presentation. 
Schiller and Goethe, working within the Classicist tradition, produce many plays 
and. poems based on Greek myths (eg. Goethe's Iphigenia) or honouring Greek 
society and traditions (eg. Schiller's poems "Die Götter Griechenlands" and 
"Das Ideal und das Leben" etc). 
16. In the Romantic tradition, between 1794 and 1800 Friedrich Schlegel is 
preoccupied with his project of producing his History of the Poetry of the 
Greeks and Romans. This project was never fully realised, only the first part 
was published in a completed form in 1798. However other shorter articles and 
fragments that were published as part of the Athenaeum project (eg. the 
Dialogue on Poetry. ) all show an overwhelming preoccupation with understanding 
the culture and thought of Greece. In Idealist philosophy Schelling offers the 
first systematised interpretation of Greek tragedy in the Tenth Letter of the 
Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. (for further discussion of this text, see 
nöte 21 Chapter Three. ) This is then developed in the System of Transcendental 
Idealism (1800), where the analysis of the work of art is placed at the centre 
of the system, and a more sustained analysis is then provided in the Lectures 
on the Philosophy of Art. (1802-3). Hegel first uses the model of tragedy in 
1802, in his text "On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law. " In this 
text, Hegel sees the relationship and struggle between the particular and the 
Universal as being acted out through the structure of the tragedy. To illustrate 
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how this struggle occurs and is reconciled he uses the example of Aeschylus's 
Orestia. As Peter Szondi explains in his essay "The Notion of the Tragic" in 
On Textual Understandine, "by interpreting the tragic process as the self 
division and self-reconciliation of the moral nature, Hegel makes its dialectical 
structure apparent for the first time... In Hegel the Tragic and the dialectic 
coincide. " (p. 50) As Szondi then goes on to suggest "the Phenomenology places 
the Tragic (though without calling it by that term) in the centre of the 
Hegelian philosophy, interpreting it as the dialectic governing a morality, that 
is to say, as the spirit in its stage of true spirit. " (p. 54. ) (For further 
discussion of this "theoretical" interpretation of the function and role of 
tragedy see Szondi's book Versuch über das Tragische. ) It is Hegel and 
Schelling who introduce the "theoretical" interpretation of tragedy which has 
become dominant within subsequent theories of tragedy. However, as I argue in 
the main text, this interpretation subsumes the tragic form into the wider 
system of thought, using it to exemplify a theoretical process, thus neutralising 
its effects as a dramatic form. This fact alone separates Hölderlin from 
Schelling and Hegel, for his theory incorporates the dramatic elements of the 
tragedy, as well as its internal structure. 
17. Lacoue-Labarthe, P. "Caesura of the Speculative" in Typography. p. 208. 
18. Ibid. p. 209-10. 
19. Lacoue-Labarthe's analysis often collapses together various disparate parts 
of Hölderlin's text without stating where they originate. This is particularly 
true of his statements concerning Hölderlin's interpretations of Sophocles. Later 
in the essay "Caesura", he claims that for Hölderlin Antigone is the most 
Greek of tragedies, whilst Oedipus is the most modern. However, whilst on the 
surface this interpretation may appear correct, when Hölderlin's own texts are 
examined it is very difficult to make this interpretation fit. Hölderlin himself 
never. expressly makes this claim, rather it appears that Lacoue-Labarthe 
develops this reading from vague references and chance remarks that are 
scattered throughout the texts. However, it would be equally possible to offer a 
different interpretation which challenges the validity of these terms. In fact 
later in the essay, Lacoue-Labarthe himself seems to want to question whether 
the use of the terms "ancient" and "modern" are appropriate. (See the 
arguments that are developed from p. 222 onwards in Typographies. ) However, 
even if Lacoue-Labarthe is using these terms as a heuristic device in order to 
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further his own argument, such an approach simply confuses, rather than 
clarifies the discussion of what are already highly elliptical and ambiguous 
texts. It is for this reason that I have decided not to confront Lacoue- 
Labarthe's arguments head on, rather preferring to develop my own 
interpretation. However, where my interpretation either coincides or disagrees 
radically with Lacoue-Labarthe's I indicate this in the notes. 
20. Ironically enough, critics who interpret Hölderlin's work from a literary 
perspective often use the greatness of the poetry as an opportunity to denigrate 
a philosophical approach to his work. However in these instances they are not 
deriding the paucity of Hölderlin's philosophy, but rather wish to claim that in 
the light of the poetry, the philosophical approach per se is redundant. 
Hopefully in this study I will achieve a balance between these two points of 
view. 
Chapter 1. 
1. Plato. The Republic. Trans. A. Bloom (New York: Basic Books inc, 1968) 
398a p. 76. All subsequent references to The Republic are taken from this 
edition unless otherwise stated . 
2. The possibility that this procedure can be interpreted in two mutually 
exclusive ways, is substantiated by the fact that the rituals described here and 
the adornments which are placed upon the poet can be related to both the 
celebrant and the sacrifice. Elsewhere, Plato refers to fillets of wool as the 
dress appropriate for the celebrant, or for the adornment of a victor, and the 
libations of myrhh are those which were used for celebratory rituals. However, 
the sacrificial victim was treated in a very similar manner, being anointed with 
libatory liquids and dressed in special clothing and adornments. The treatment 
of the poets can be understood to combine the rites of Ostracisation and of the 
Scapegoat (the Pharmakon) which were instituted in 6th century Athens; the city 
chooses a person as a sacrificial victim whom they honour for a year and then 
banish from the city as a form of purging of any possible crime. (For further 
discussion of this ritual, see Vernant Myth p. 132-5. and also Burket, Greek 
Religion. pp. 82-4. ) 
3. I am aware that by focussing solely on The Republic, it could be argued 
that I have ignored the discussions of mimesis that occur in other places in 
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Plato's texts, most importantly in the Cratvlus and the Theatetus. I concentrate 
upon the Republic because this is the only text in which the problem of 
dramatic mimesis is confronted directly. In other texts Plato's discussion is 
much broader for it considers imitation understood in a much wider sense. For 
example, in Cratvlus Plato discusses the "imitative" relation between words and 
that which they name. Thus, primarily because of limitations of space, I focus 
my discussion on the text which has most relevance to the specific theme of 
this study, tragedy. For further discussion of the function of mimesis in other 
texts of Plato, see Gerald Else's discussion in Plato and Aristotle on Poetry 
and Andrew Benjamin's paper "Interpreting Reflections" in his book Art. Mimesis 
and the Avant-Garde. pp. 7-43. 
4. The festival itself took place in Athens over the space of one week, at a set 
time of year (early spring, mid-March), with one preliminary day of processions 
and feasting, when the statue of Dionysus was paraded from its temple, out 
into the countryside and then returned into the city and set in the place of 
honour within the open-air theatre. The probable order of events at the festival 
was "contest of ten boys' dithyrambs (one from each tribe) and contest of ten 
men's dithyrambs (one from each tribe) on the first day; contest of five 
comedies on the second day; contest of the three tragic ensembles (each with 
three tragedies and a satyr play) on the next three days. " (Winkler, Nothing to 
Do with Dionysos p. 5. note 3. ) However other events took place also, marking 
the festival as a truly civic occasion. (See note 7) 
5. This kind of interpretation is exemplified by Stanford in his book Greek 
Tragedy and the Emotions where he writes, "the performances at the City 
Dionysia were part of a religious celebration in the sacred precinct of Dionysos 
with his high priest enthroned in the front row... The performances were 
preceded by sacrifices and libations. " (p. 11. ) There is no mention of the civic 
aspect of the festival, nor of the apparent disjunction between the fact that, 
although it is dedicated to Dionysus, there is an apparent lack of Dionysian 
excessive entertainment. (See note 6. ) 
6. For further discussion of this point see the Introduction to Nothing To Do 
With Dionvsos? Ed. by Winkler and Zeitlin, and also Vernant's article "The God 
of Tragic Fiction" in Myth. 
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7. Among the events that occurred which reinforce the civil nature of this 
festival were the distribution of honours to citizens; the judging of the contest 
by one general from each of the 10 to 12 main tribes, who performed libations 
to the god before taking on the role of judge; the display of tributes from the 
cities of the Athenian Empire, and also the display of the gains of war; and 
finally the parade of the orphans of the city whose fathers had been killed in 
battle and had been brought up at the expense of the state. For further 
discussion of these points and their relation to the ideology of the state, see 
the articles by Longo, Goldhill and Winkler in Nothing to do with Dionysus. 
8. Goldhill, S. "The Great Dionysia and Civil Ideology" in Nothing to do with 
Dionysus, p. 114. 
9. Ibid. 
10. This is shown most clearly by an examination of the plot of Aeschylus' 
trilogy the Oresteia. In this set of three plays the quarrels of the family and 
their subsequent downfall is irretrievably linked to the fate of the state. 
Similarly in Euripides' Bacchae the tragic confrontation arises out of the 
challenge which the women pose to the order of the state when they leave their 
regular duties and move into the hills. The plot develops in such a way that 
the downfall of Thebes becomes mirrored in the destruction of Pentheus' family. 
11. There are only records of two plays which do not fit into this schema, and 
which record contemporary events. The first is mentioned by Herodotus, in VI, 
21, where he refers to the reception given to a play by the poet Phrynicus 
entitled The Fall of Miletus first performed in 494 BC, which uses as its 
theme the injuries that the Persians had inflicted upon the town of Miletus only 
two years previously. He writes; "the whole theatre broke into weeping; and 
they fined Phrynicus a thousand drachmae for bringing to mind national 
calamities, their own which touched them so nearly, and forbade forever the 
acting of that play. " 
The other play is Aeschylus' The Persians, which records the defeat that the 
Persians had suffered at Salamis eight years earlier. However this play differs 
from the one mentioned above in several crucial ways. It is written from the 
point of view of the defeated aggressors, thereby placing the Athenians as 
victors, and it is also set in the land of the aggressors, rather than on Greek 
-240- 
soil. Therefore a form of geographical and cultural displacement occurs, which 
ensures that the observer is distanced from the action. 
Apart from these two instances, I have found no other record of tragedies 
whose plots are set contemporaneously with their performance. Therefore it 
seems justified to argue that a displacement from the present is a consistent, if 
not quite invariable feature of Greek tragedy. 
12. For further discussion of this point see Chapters 3 and 4 of Goldhill's 
book Reading Greek Tragedy. In Chapter 3 Goldhill argues that it is in the 
"areas of overlap between oikos and polls, public and private, that tensions may 
be seen developing that bear closely on the institution of tragedy. For the 
ideology of the oikos... often fits uneasily with the ideology of the polls. " [p. 
73.1 In Chapter 4 Goldhill proceeds to demonstrate how this tension is manifest 
in the Antinone where the arguments between Antigone and Ismene, Creon and 
the chorus revolve around the correct meaning and interpretation of the terms 
philos and ekthros, (friend or kin versus enemy or foe. ) Goldhill argues that 
the tragic confrontation arises from different interpretations and values which 
are put on these terms by the family and the state. 
13. Vernant, Myth p. 26. 
14. Whilst the conventions of recital of the epic involved the reciter acting out 
the story which he was telling, this was not a truly dramatic depiction of the 
events; i. e. the reciter may well have adopted different voices and mannerisms 
for different characters, but there was not the literal embodiment which occurs 
in the dramatic event. Furthermore the interjection of passages of third person 
narration and description also act to differentiate the epic recital from the 
tragedy. For further discussion of this point see Else, The Origin and Early 
Form of Greek Tragedy Chapter 3. p. 69-70. 
15. Vernant, "The Tragic Subject: Historicity and Transhistoricity" in Myth. 
p: 243. 
16. See Vernant "Intimations of the Will in Greek Tragedy" in Myth. pp. 49- 
85. 
17. E. g. the reaction of the chorus to Oedipus' re-emergence blinded; 
What madness swept over you? What god, 
what dark power leapt beyond all bounds, 
beyond belief, to crush your wretched life- 
Godforsaken, cursed by the gods. 
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I pity you but I cant bear to look, 
I've much to ask, so much to learn, 
so much fascinates my eyes, 
but you.... I shudder at the sight. 
Oedipus the King. Trans. Fagles, line 1435. 
And then compare this with Oedipus' reply to the chorus' questioning of "What 
superhuman (daimon) drove you on? ", "But the hand that struck my eyes was 
mine alone - no one else -I did it all myself. " This i s the first action of 
Oedipus that is not determined, thus the chorus learns of the poss ibility of 
self determination, yet this is contra dicted by the events which have preceded 
this act. 
18. This process can be considered analogous to the description which Paul 
Ricoeur gives of the process of reading a text in his essay "Appropriation" in 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Here Ricoeur writes "to understand is not 
to project oneself into the text; it is to receive an enlarged self from the 
apprehension of proposed worlds which are the genuine object of 
interpretation". (p. 183) As Ricoeur then argues in the rest of the essay, this 
process does not presuppose or retain a stable "ego-subject" who remains 
separate from the process of interpretation. Rather it engenders a form of 
"self-understanding". However as Ricoeur states in the conclusion to the essay 
"By the expression self understanding, I should like to contrast the self which 
emerges from this understanding of the text to the ego which claims to precede 
this understanding. It is the text, with its universal power of unveiling, which 
gives a self to the ego". I intend the relationship between the observer of the 
drama and the dramatic presentation to be understood in these terms. 
19. In fact, as Gerald Else suggests, in order for Plato to expel the poets 
from the Republic, he has to define his employment of the term mimesis very 
specifically so as to give himself sufficient justification for his actions. Else 
argues that not only does Plato have to link the term mimesis specifically to 
dramatic imitation - for the term normally had a much more general connotation 
- but he also had to describe the practitioners of the art of imitation using 
very precise language linking their actions with those of the "Thaumaiopoiois" 
«Oaupaionoioiq) that is bracketing them with jugglers, conjurers, magicians, all 
professions and activities which lack prestige in the Greek state. For the 
details of this - convincing - argument see Chapter two of Else's book Plato 
and Aristotle on Poetry, p. 17 - 47. 
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In his article "The Birth of Images" in Mortals and Immortals, Jean-Pierre 
Vernant agrees with Else's argument and also points out that Plato has to 
redefine and limit the meanings of other terms which are associated with 
images and semblance. He argues that "In the texts of the sixth and fifth 
centuries, neither eikazein and eikasia nor dokein and doxa nor phainein and 
phainomena had yet taken on the essentially negative connotation attributed to 
them in the philosophical system where, by the same move, Plato founds the 
first general theory of imitation and simultaneously cuts the image off from 
the real and from knowledge. " (p. 181). 
20. Ricoeur, P. "Metaphor and the Problem of Hermeneutics" in Hermeneutics and 
the Human Sciences. p. 180. 
21. Republic. 376c, p. 53. 
22. The conventions of Greek dramatic performance stipulated that there should 
be three actors who would perform all the parts. The actors were rated in 
order of status, with the best part being given to the most highly acclaimed 
actor. This convention provides interesting insights into how the Greeks 
perceived and interpreted the plays; eg In Antigone the first actor took the 
part of Antigone, thereby indicating that her character was seen to be the most 
important. Creon was played by the third actor. The chorus was originally 
made up of members of the audience, and its role was only later formalised 
into a set group of 15 members, one of whom took the role as spokesman for 
the group. 
23. Republic 394d-e. p. 73. 
24. Ibid. 395c. p. 74 
25. Ibid. 395d. p. 74 (trans. slightly modified using Jowett's translation. ) 
26. Ibid. 597e. p. 280. 
27. Ibid. 595a-b. p. 277. 
28. Ibid. 602b. p. 285. 
29. See the discussion from 606a to 608d in the Republic where Plato 
establishes that poetry generally will only appeal to the baser elements of 
Human Nature, and diverts people from study of the higher qualities of justice 
and virtue. 
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30. For further discussion of how the Pharmakon operates as a site of 
contradiction and dispersal within Plato's texts, see Derrida's article "Plato's 
Pharmacy" in Dissemination. Here Derrida does not specifically link the 
Pharmakon with dramatic mimesis, but rather concentrates upon how it disrupts 
the relation between the notion of writing and truth upon which Plato's theory 
depends. 
31. Republic 500c-d. p. 179-80. 
32. Ibid. 398b. p. 76. 
33. This is shown by the argument that Plato puts forward at 598 (p. 280-1) 
where he argues that the painter only imitates the appearance of an object, not 
how it actually is. This also means that he or she will only ever be able to 
show part of an object; they cannot present the whole object. This is used to 
indicate that the image is therefore far removed from the truth. Plato states, 
"Then the imitator is a long way off the truth, and can reproduce all things 
because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image". 
34. It could be argued that the interpretation I have put forward concerning 
Plato's understanding of the function of the work of art is one-sided because I 
have ignored the remarks that are made about the artist in the Phaedrus. In 
the middle of this text, Plato outlines four types of the divine madness which 
provides the afflicted with access to higher knowledge. The third form of 
madness is attributed to the Muses. Plato writes that this form of madness 
"seizes a tender, virgin soul and stimulates it to rapt passionate expression, 
especially in lyric poetry, glorifying the countless mighty deeds of ancient 
times for the instruction of posterity. But if any man comes to the gates of 
poetry without the madness of the Muses, persuaded that skill alone will make 
him a good poet, then shall he and his works of sanity with him be brought to 
naught by the poetry of madness, and behold, their place is nowhere to be 
found. " (245. p. 57. ) These comments are often interpreted as Plato's attempt 
to rehabilitate the position of the work of art. This is substantiated by 
reference to the arguments which Plato develops subsequently where he states 
that beauty is the highest form of all and that the love of beauty is the 
fourth and highest type of divine madness. However, although Plato places 
beauty at the centre of his description, it must be remembered that he is 
referring to the form of beauty, not to beauty understood as an aesthetic 
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phenomenon. The images of beauty in the world remind the lover of "true 
beauty", giving him or her access to knowledge of the true forms. Hence the 
rehabilitation of art serves only to reinforce Plato's metaphysical schema. 
Furthermore, it only refers to certain forms of artistic practice which are 
subordinated to the demands of the wider metaphysical schema. This is 
substantiated by the statements that are made in sections 247c - 248e, where 
Plato outlines the various incarnations to which the soul may be assigned. The 
highest incarnation is as "a seeker after wisdom or beauty, a follower of the 
Muses and a lover". (p. 79. ) This corresponds to the qualities which are 
associated with divine madness. Plato proceeds to outline the other possible 
incarnations in order of rank. The sixth of the nine possible incarnations which 
he lists is as "a poet or other imitative artist". Hence it is clear that the 
"lover of beauty" cannot be equated with the artist. The arguments which I 
outlined earlier in this note cannot be read as a vindication of the status of 
the work of art. Even in this text - which on first reading might be thought 
to re-evaluate art - Plato denigrates the majority of the forms of art, 
particularly mimetic art. For further discussion of this text see Else's 
comments in Plato and Aristotle on Poetry. 
35. cf. Vernant's comment in "The Birth of Images" in Mortals and Immortals, 
"Plato gives the image its own form of existence and bestows on it a particular 
phenomenal status. Defined as semblance, the image possesses a distinctive 
character that is all the more marked, since from now on, appearance is no 
longer considered as an aspect, a mode, a level of reality, a kind of dimension 
of the real, but rather as a specific category confronted with "being" in an 
ambiguous relation of the "faux-semblant". This specificity implies, as its 
counterpart, the expulsion of the image from the realm of the authentically 
real, its relegation to the field of the fictive and the illusory, and its 
disqualification from the point of view of knowledge. " (p. 181). 
36. Aristotle, Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument. Ed. Else. p. 31. 
37. Ibid. p. l. 
38. Ibid. p. 124. 
39. Ibid. p. 238. 
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40. The slightly unusual neologism "emplotment" is the translator's rendering 
of Ricoeur's term "la mise en intrigue". Literally the term means the staging, 
the production of the plot. 
41. Ricoeur. Time and Narrative. p. 34. 
42. Ibid. p. 35. 
43. Aristotle. Poetics. p. 252. 
44. This is not to say that Aristotle's theory is completely independent of 
other aspects of his theoretical thought. However, unlike Plato he does not 
allow the metaphysical premises of his theory to legislate for every single 
aspect of the work of art. Furthermore, his metaphysics does not denigrate the 
work of art, rather the work is evaluated using criteria which is specific to 
aesthetic judgement. 
Chapter 2. 
1. - Pfau, p. 140. StA. Vol. 6,1. p. 307. 
2. Earlier in the letter Hölderlin has chastised the German people for their 
"conceited domesticity" and argued that they suffer from "a lack of flexibility, 
of drive, of manifold development of strengths. " He welcomes the emergence of 
Kantian philosophy which he believes will help to challenge and shake the 
Germans out of their complacency. Hence later in the letter he states that 
"Kant is the Moses of our nation who leads it out of Egyptian apathy into the 
free solitary desert of his speculation... " 
3. With respect to the interpretation of Aristotle's Poetics which I gave in the 
previous chapter, it is interesting to the note that "universal ideals" to which 
the classicist theorists appeal, are based upon the statements that Aristotle 
makes in this work. Thus, although in the previous chapter I argued that 
Aristotle's text is not intended to be prescriptive - it is a descriptive account 
of the features which make up a tragedy - by the early 17th century it has 
developed canonical status and is seen to provide universal rules for aesthetic 
composition. However, this interpretation of Aristotle fails to recognise that he 
is speaking of the process of mimesis; it understands mimesis as a concept 
rather than a process. Thus in Aristotle's description of the work of art as 
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the "imitation of nature", the emphasis of the interpretation is placed upon the 
actual object of imitation, rather than the process whereby it is engendered. 
4. This cyclical conception of historical progression can be traced back to the 
Renaissance. As Karl Menges argues in "Herder and the 'Querelle des Anciens et 
des Modernes'" in Eighteenth-Century German Authors and their Aesthetic 
Theories. ed. Critchfield, R. and Koepke, W., "The cyclical notion extends back 
into the Renaissance, where the idea of progress had already prompted Italian 
Humanists to level "an historical minded criticism against the idea of perennial 
Rome" despite their unquestioned veneration of Antiquity. The theoreticians of 
fifteenth century thus anticipated the later struggle in France in that they 
engaged in a comparative discussion of the ages, based on the premise that that 
the republics of Venice or Florence should be considered as equal to the city 
states of Sparta or Athens, as the works of Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio to 
those of ancient Greece or Rome. " (p. 156 - 157. ) 
5. Menges, K. Ibid. p. 157. 
6. For details of the historical background to the Quarrel of Ancients and 
Moderns, and the development of Enlightenment thought see Peter Gay's book 
The Enlightenment: The Rise of Modern Paganism. especially Book One, "The 
Appeal to Antiquity. " pp. 31 - 197. For a slightly outdated - but very 
entertaining - account of the rise of German Classicism see E. M. Butler's book, 
The Tyranny of Greece over Germany. 
7. Winckelmann, J. "Thoughts on the Imitation of the Painting and Sculpture of 
the Greeks" in German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism. Ed. Nisbet, H. B.. p. 
33. 
8. The ideals of Greek art around which Winckelmann develops his theory can be 
seen to be influenced by neo-Platonic interpretations of the nature of the 
Forms. The ideals to which Winckelmann aspires are the ideals of beauty, 
simplicity and tranquillity. Thus, in the light of the arguments which i 
presented in the previous chapter, it is perhaps not surprising that his theory 
advocates a form of mimesis understood as simple imitatio. 
9. For further discussion of Schiller and Schlegel's relationship to the Quarrel 
see R. J. Jauß' article "Schlegels und Schillers Replik auf die 'Querelle des 
Anciens et des Modernes" in Literaturgeschfcte als Provokation p. 67 - 107. 
Reasons of space and time prevent me from considering F. Schlegel's work in 
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any form. However, for an extremely detailed discussion of Schlegel's response 
to the Quarrel and his relation to Hölderlin, see Jonathan Steinwand's PhD. 
dissertation, Mnemonic Images: The Gender of Modernity in Schiller, Schlegel 
and Hölderlin. especially Chapters Three and Four. 
10. Schiller introduces this idea in Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man., 
It is developed further in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry. 
11. For example as Helga Madland argues in her article "Imitation to Creation: 
The Changing Concept of Mimesis from Bodmer and Breitinger to Lenz" in 
Eighteenth-Century German Authors... F. G. Klopstock can be seen to exemplify 
this point of view. Madland writes, "Klopstock unhesitatingly rejects the 
imitation of the classics. In his view, "the prototype is the tree, imitation is 
the shadow, which is either always either too long or too short, never the true 
shape of the tree. " "Imitation is shadow without sap and strength, formation 
without beauty. " Instead of following established and normative rules of 
poetics, Klopstock urges the poet to turn inward and listen to his inner spirit. " 
p. 30. 
12. In the article mentioned in the note above, Madland shows how Gerstenberg 
realises that there are two conflicting interpretations of mimesis prevalent in 
his age. She writes, "Gerstenberg recognized that as the phrase "imitation of 
nature" had rolled through the centuries, it had created a considerable amount 
of confusion. Imitation of nature had evolved to mean both the imitation of 
reality and the adherence to classicist rules. In order to clarify the matter, he 
divides imitation into two categories, imitation of models ("Nachahmung von 
Mustern") and imitation of nature ("Nachahmung der Natur"); the imitation of 
existing models can be subdivided into two modes, which he calls Nachäffung 
and Nacheifern. Nachäffung, the mindless imitation of foreign literature, is 
unequivocally rejected. Nacheifern, or emulation, however, is on a somewhat 
higher scale... " p. 32. 
13. Madland, H. Non-Aristotelian Drama in Eighteenth Century Germany and its 
Modernity: J. M. R. Lenz. p. 123. 
14. Pfau, p. 39. Translation modified. It is important to note that Pfau 
translates the term "Angenommen" as "appropriated". However, in this context a 
more accurate translation is "assumed" or "adopted", as I have used. This 
distinction is necessary because the term "appropriated" also appears in the 
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translation of the letter to Böhlendorff. In this context this translation is 
accurate because it is refers to the German term "anzueignen". Thus it can be 
seen that the reader who approaches the texts in translation could be forgiven 
for assuming that there is a direct relationship between the ideas which 
Hölderlin is expressing in these texts. However, as is made clear in the original 
German, Hölderlin does not imply any such relationship. FA. Vol. 14. p. 92. 
15. For discussion of how Hölderlin's work can be situated within the context 
of 18th century German debates concerning the "quarrel" see the article by 
Ernst Behler, "The Force of Classical Greece in the Formation of the Romantic 
Age in Germany" in Paths from Ancient Greece, Carol Thomas, ed., (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1988), p. 118-139. 
16. Pfau, p. 39. FA. Vol. 14. p. 92. 
17. Hölderlin's use of the term Bildungstrieb is unique. The term has appeared 
previously in 1780 in the work of the biologist Blumenbach in his treatise 
"Über den Bildungstrieb". In this essay Blumenbach uses the term in relation to 
the growth and development of plants. (For further details of Blumenbach's 
work see Lange p. 144) However, Hölderlin employs the term to denote the force 
or drive which motivates the artist's desire to create. Throughout the text I 
have not attempted to offer a translation because the term Bildung has several 
meanings which become interrelated and intertwined in Hölderlin's usage. Whilst 
Bildung means both "cultivate" or "educate" (as it is used in the term 
B1ldungsroman), it also means "form" and "image" thereby linking the term 
with issues concerning representation and presentation. It is also likely that 
Hölderlin is attempting to make an implicit distinction between his understanding 
of this term and Schiller's terms sinnlichen Trieb, Stofftrieb and Spiel trieb 
which are introduced in the twelfth letter of On the Aesthetic Education of 
Man, (1794-5). For a discussion of the wider meaning and function of Bildung 
see H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method p. 10-19. Here Gadamer shows how, in the 
latter half of the 18th Century, the term develops a multiplicity of meanings 
and connotations. He concentrates specifically on the way that these meanings 
are brought together in Hegel's work. 
18. Pfau, p. 39. FA. Vol. 14. p. 92. 
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19. Schiller, F. "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry" trans. Elias, J. in German 
Aesthetic and Literary Criticism, H. B. Nisbet, ed., (Cambridge: CUP, 1985) 
p. 194. 
20. The anxiety of influence which Hölderlin suffered with respect to Schiller 
should not be underestimated. In fact, only 18 months prior to the writing of 
the Perspectives Fragment, Hölderlin wrote a long letter to Schiller in which he 
discusses the problem of influence, both of an individual or a culture, upon a 
writer and admits to Schiller that "I am overwhelmingly dependent upon you. " 
(vor Ihnen dependir' ich unüberwindlich. ) StA. Vol. 6,1. p. 241. However, in the 
later writings, from approximately 1800 onwards, Hölderlin's own voice can be 
discerned clearly. 
21. / Casimir Ulrich Böhlendorff (1775-1825) was a friend of Hölderlin's from 
1799 onwards. He was a minor writer and traveller, who became influenced by 
the second generation of German Romantics, eg Tieck and Runge. 
22. This letter is contemporaneous with several of Hölderlin's poems concerning 
the nature of Germany and the destiny of a people and land. See for example, 
Germania and Der Rhein 
23. Unfortunately this drama is lost and therefore it is impossible to decide 
whether the remarks made in this letter concerning tragedy refer specifically to 
Bbhlendorff's drama, or if they can be read as having a more universal 
significance. 
24. Translation taken from Szondi, Peter. "11ölderlin's Overcoming of Classicism" 
Trans. Timothy Bahti. Comparative Criticism Vol. 5 (1983). p. 251-270. I have 
chosen to use this translation rather than Pfau because it remains much more 
faithful to the original. StA. Vol. 6,1. p. 425-6. 
25. The emphasis which Hölderlin places upon the necessity of law and 
regulation with regard to the process of poetic composition separates his views 
from the mainstream ideas associated with Romantic thought. Hence when 
Hölderlin speaks of the "free use of the national" he is not referring to any 
notion of "spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings" or other similar ideas 
which have come to be seen as synonymous with Romantic thought. 
26. Bahti, p. 251. (see note 24 for details). StA. Vol. 6,1. p. 426. 
-250- 
27. This account remains problematic to the extent that in the Perspectives 
essay, Hölderlin has described the Greeks as the culture in which the desire to 
"to form the unformed" could be achieved. In terms of this description, the 
Greek culture cannot contain anything which is prior or "positive". However, I 
think that by time of the letter to Böhlendorff, Hölderlin has modified his 
views and no longer sees Greece as a unique, autogenous culture that has no 
precedents. This can be substantiated by the occasional comments throughout his 
later writings concerning Egyptian culture, and the possible relation between 
Egypt and Greece. This is particularly evident in the third and final draft of 
the drama The Death of Empedocles where Hölderlin introduces the character of 
the Egyptian seer Manes, who acts as Empedocles' tempter. For further 
discussion of the validity of this interpretation see p. 19-22 of Warminski, 
Readings in Interpretation (for details see note 35). 
28. Winckelmann J, "Thoughts on the imitation of the Painting and Sculpture of 
the Greeks", trans H. B. Nisbet in German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism, H. B. 
Nisbet, ed., (Cambridge: CUP, 1985) p. 33. 
29. Bahti p. 251. StA. Vol. 6,1. p. 426. 
30. Ibid. 
31. One of the most important proponents of this interpretation is Lawrence 
Ryan in his work, Hölderlin's Lehre vom Wechsel der Tone. For a discussion of 
the problems inherent in this approach see Szondi's book Hölderlin-Studien. 
(Frankfurt-a-M. 1967) p. 129-142. 
32. As Szondi states in the introduction to his article, his interest lies not 
only in outlining the arguments given in the first letter to Böhlendorff, but 
also in showing what it does not say. One of the main interpretations he argues 
against is the so-called tiäterlandische Umkehr, whereby the interpreters - e. g. 
Wilhelm Michel, Hölderlin's Abendlandische Wendung (Jena 1923)- argue that 
this letter sets out Hölderlin's mission as a poet of the German nation, wherein 
he turns away from the example provided by the Greeks and attempts to set 
out the conditions necessary for the emergence of a authentically German voice. 
For Szondi's - convincing - arguments against this interpretation see p. 256-61 
of Overcoming of Classicism. 
33. Szondi, Overcoming of Classicism p. 262. 
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34. Ibid. 
35. Warminski, A. Readings in Interpretation: p. 33 
36. In his article "Hölderlin and the Greeks" in Typographies P. Lacoue- 
Labarthe emphasises the radicality of Hölderlin's interpretation of the relation 
between Greece and Germany. He argues that in Hölderlin's work "we find one 
thing, first of all, that is completely unprecedented in the age: namely that 
Greece, as such Greece itself, does not exist, that it is at least double, divided 
- even torn. And that what we know about it, which is perhaps what it was or 
what is manifested of itself, is not what it really was - which perhaps never 
appeared. In the same way, correlatively, the modern West - what Hölderlin 
never identifies simply with Germany, but calls, more generally, Hesperia - does 
not yet exist, or is still only what it is not. " (p. 242) I return to discuss the 
full implications of these remarks in the conclusion of this study. 
37. Hölderlin makes this statement in the Remarks on Antigone (1803), in the 
context of outlining what he perceives as the main weaknesses of Greek and 
Modern culture. The Greek's weakness is their "tendency to comprehend 
themselves", whilst the Modern's is their "absence of destiny, the dysmoron ". 
This remark can be linked to the earlier discussion of the brief comments in 
the letter to Böhlendorff concerning the nature of the modern tragedy, which is 
characterised by a lack of external structures which could validate and uphold 
the tragic process. If the Modern's weakness is an absence of destiny, 
(dysmoron means literally "lack of Moira; i. e. fate) then this helps to explain 
why the experience of tragedy in the modern is described as "quiet departure" 
rather than an "act of atonement". 
Chapter 3. 
1. For a resume of the historical and philological dispute surrounding the exact 
authorship of this fragment see the introductory section of David Farrell 
Krell's article The Oldest Program towards aS ystem in German Idealism, in 
Owl of Minerva 1985, Vol 17, Pt no. l pp. 5-19, especially pp. 6-8. The most 
detailed and thorough discussion of all aspects o f this text is to be found in 
the essays collected in My th oloiie der Vernunft: Here1's "Ältestes 
Systemprogramm" des deutschen Idealismus, ed. Christoph Jamme and Helmut 
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Schneider, (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1984. ). The first chapter of this book is 
devoted to the debate concerning the authorship of this text. 
2. As David Farrell Krell points out in his article mentioned in note 1, this 
collapsing together of the theoretical and practical postulates goes against the 
basic tenets of the Kantian system, for it breaks down the basic distinction 
between ethics and metaphysics which Kant wishes to uphold. However as Krell 
moves on to argue, the emphasis on practical reason is not simply a distortion 
of Kant's theory by Fichte for in places Kant "had asserted the primacy of 
pure practical reason, "because all interest is ultimately practical" (Critique of 
Practical Reason. A 219) But if this is so then all ideas in philosophy are 
postulates. Kant's keystone and conclusion, namely, absolute freedom, would now 
have to become the first principle of philosophy. " (p. 13, Krell) 
3. Krell, System-Program Fragment. p. 9. 
4. Kant discusses the status of the "I think" in section #16 of Transcendental 
Deduction B. Here he describes the "I think" as a "representation which must 
be capable of accompanying all other representations, and which in all 
consciousness is one and the same" (p. 153). The difference between Kant's and 
Fichte's understanding of the status of the "I" can be best clarified by 
comparing Fichte's position as it is outlined in the main text with the 
statements which Kant makes in the Transcendental Deduction, Sections 24-5, in 
the Critique of Pure Reason. Here Kant writes that "I have no knowledge of 
myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is 
thus very far from being a knowledge of the self... I exist as an intelligence 
which is conscious solely of its powers of combination... land] therefore can 
know itself only as it appears to itself in respect of an intuition which is not 
intellectual and cannot be given by the understanding itself, not as it would 
know itself if its intuition were intellectual" (p. 169). 
5. This essay was written as a public response to an attack on Fichte's work 
by Professor Schmid, a rival professor at Jena. It is useful because its 
polemical style provides a succinct summary of Fichte's views. For a discussion 
of the debate out of which the text arises see the Editor's preface in Fichte: 
Early Philosophical Writings, translated and edited by Daniel Breazeale, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1988. 
6. Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings p. 330. 
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7. Krell, System-Programme Fragment. p. 9. 
8. Ibid. p. 11. 
9. A move towards discussing the aesthetic from the Kantian perspective may 
have been expected for a number of reasons. Firstly, as has already been 
stated, the first half of the System-Programme deals with Kantian themes and 
motifs, hence it may have been expected to continue. Secondly, the move back 
towards Platonic theory appears at first sight to be retrogressive, for it 
apparently reintroduces the Platonic metaphysical schema which the Kantian 
schema has attempted to throw into question and move beyond. In introducing 
the notion of an Idea of beauty that unifies all, the authors of the Programme 
are apparently uncritically advocating the imposition of an Absolute without 
providing any explanation as to why it fulfils the criterion of being the "idea 
which unifies all". 
10. Near the end of the section in the Phaedrns. where Plato gives the allegory 
of the charioteer and his horses, an argument is given which establishes the 
Idea of Beauty as the highest of the Forms and sets it against knowledge. 
This is because beauty can be most clearly discerned on earth and hence the 
observer can be most easily led into contemplation of the Form of Beauty. Hence 
Plato writes, "Now beauty, as we said, shone bright amidst these visions, and 
in this world below we apprehend it through the clearest of our senses, clear 
and resplendent. For sight is the keenest mode of our perception vouchsafed us 
through the body; wisdom, indeed, we cannot see thereby... nor yet any other of 
those beloved objects, save only beauty; for beauty alone has this been 
ordained, to be most manifest to sense and most lovely of them all. " (250c-d. 
p. 93. ) This can also be compared with Socrates account of Diotima's teaching in 
the Symposium, sections 210-212, in praise of the love of beauty. However, it 
must be noted that although Hölderlin's employment of the idea of Beauty 
originates from this Platonic formulation, in his later work - i. e. from the 
Homburg period onwards - he moves away from a "static" conception of Beauty. 
This occurs in conjunction with the development of a more historical perspective 
in Hölderlin's thought. 
11. Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute. The 
Theory of Literature in German Romanticism. p. 35. 
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12. Hölderlin spent many years working on his novel Hyperion and the project 
underwent many different changes and incarnations. He first mentioned writing 
the novel in 1792, and in 1794 Schiller published a first fragmentary section in 
his journal Neue Thalia. Other fragmentary drafts exist including a verse draft 
and a proposal for a section entitled Hyperion's Youth. The novel was published 
in its final form in two sections, Volume One appeared in 1797, and Volume 
Two in 1799. For the purposes of this study the most important features are 
the changes which occur in the underlying theoretical presuppositions of the 
novel. In the earlier versions of the novel, Hölderlin views the development of 
Hyperion's character as a movement from innocence to experience. This can be 
related to the discussion of the meanings of the term Bildung in Chapter 2, 
note 17, and more generally to the Bildungsroman. (Eg. Goethe's Wilhelm 
Meister. ) However the description which is given in the final versions of the 
novel of the process of Bildung which Hyperion undergoes must not be 
understood simply in terms of a move into a state of enlightenment. This is 
because the kind of knowledge which is attained calls into question the status 
of the process of enlightenment, understood in a Rousseauean manner. The 
"education" of Hyperion is necessarily different from that of Emile or even 
Goethe's Wilhelm Meister. Hence the subtitle of Hölderlin's novel, The Hermit in 
Greece. Hyperion ends up isolated from his people, he cannot live in his native 
land, rather he chooses a life of isolation and contemplation, comforted only by 
his memories and a commitment to his belief in the beauty of nature. However 
as I argue in the main text, even this belief is tainted by sadness for in order 
to presuppose nature as a whole, as a unitary unifying force, he must also be 
aware of its necessary subjugation to time and fate. Hence the underlying mood 
of the novel is one of pessimism and resignation. The process of Bildung which 
he undergoes is unable to provide him with any positive solutions to the 
experiences and problems he faces. Therefore although the novel apparently ends 
positively with the heart and arteries metaphor of reconciliation, all that has 
preceded this image points towards its inherent flaws and problems. Hence 
Hyperion's final statement "So I thought. More soon" ("So dacht ich. Nächstens 
mehr") can be read as suggesting the provisional, open-ended nature of this 
conclusion; i. e. the certainty of this conclusion cannot be guaranteed, and the 
"more" which will follow "soon" could equally return Hyperion to his previous 
melancholy and gloom. 
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13. Hyperion. Santer, p. 66. FA. Vol. 11. p. 680. 
14. Hyperion. Santer, p. 67. FA. Vol. 11. p. 681. 
15. Hyperion. Santer, p. 68. FA. Vol. 11. p. 683. (Translation modified, so as to 
emphasise the Kantian terminology used in this passage. ) 
16. The commentators who argue that the move to the aesthetic constitutes a 
radical break with the first half of the System-Programme tend to be those 
who read the System-Programme from a Hegelian perspective, seeing the text as 
an early expression of Hegel's views. For example Otto Pöggeler describes the 
introduction of the aesthetic as "a tension, if not a complete breach". 
(Ed. Jamme/Schneider Mythologie der Vernunft... p. 135, quoted in Krell System- 
Programme Fragment), ) Hence the latter half of the text is seen to reflect the 
way in which Hegel comes under Hölderlin's influence in Frankfurt in 1795. The 
adoption of aesthetic Platonism in the latter half of the text is therefore 
viewed as a momentary move on Hegel's part which will be quickly surpassed as 
he then moves his attention away from the aesthetic into religion. However 
viewed from a Hölderlinian perspective, the two halves of the text do cohere, 
for the linking together of the concerns of the first half with the aesthetic is 
suggested elsewhere in Hölderlin's theoretical writings, for example On Religion 
which confronts the issues of politics and ethics and relates them to the 
aesthetic absolute. 
17. Translation taken from the notes to Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc 
Nancy The Literary Absolute, p. 132. StA. Vol. 6.1. p. 181. 
18. One of the most obvious uses of Schillerian imagery and motifs in Hyperion 
is the allusion to the Goddess Minerva which occurs in the previous quote in 
the main text. Schiller, in the 8th letter of The Letters on the Aesthetic 
Education of Man uses exactly the same imagery in a very similar context. He 
writes, "Dare to be wise.. . Not for nothing does the ancient myth make the 
goddess of wisdom emerge fully armed from the head of Jupiter. " "Erkiihne 
dich, weise zu sein.. . Nicht ohne Bedeutung lässt der alte Mythus die Göttin der 
Weisheit in voller Rüstung aus Juptiers Haupte steigen. " (p. 50-1) 
19. It can be suggested tentatively that it is this characterisation of a 
"universal poetry" which separates Hölderlin's work from that of the Jena 
Romantics such as Schlegel and Novalis. For involved in the notion of universal 
poetry is the idea that all borders and boundaries which delimit genre will be 
-256- 
removed. However for Hölderlin - as I show in the main text - the genre 
distinctions remain in place and form the basis for his theoretical position, 
providing the intersection between the poetological and philosophical theory. 
20. Hyperion. Santner, p. 133. FA. Vol. 11. p. 782. 
21. This is best exemplified by the 10th letter of Schelling's Letters on 
Dop, matism and Criticism where the relationship between freedom and necessity 
is explained in terms of the fate of the hero in Greek tragedy. Although the 
question of tragedy is addressed in this letter, it is used only to illustrate the 
wider theoretical issues which Schelling is demonstrating. Hence the wider 
issues raised by tragedy become subjugated to the demands of the philosophical 
system which is being outlined. 
22. The writings discussed in this section were written between 1798 and 1800 
during one of the most settled periods of Hölderlin's life. Although he has had 
to separate from his "Diotima", Susette Gontard, he is still reasonably content, 
as is witnessed by the letters which have survived. He lives in Homburg for the 
majority of this period and most of his theoretical texts date from this time. 
23. As is the case with most of the essays discussed in this section, the titles 
which I am using are editorial additions. To keep the discussion coherent I 
refer to the essays by the title given in the English translation by Pfau. 
However it must be noted that these titles do not always correspond to the 
titles in either of the German editions. To add to the confusion Pfau himself is 
not consistent in his translations of the titles of the essays. For example in 
the main text he entitles Hölderlin's essay "On the Operations of the. Poetic 
Spirit", whilst in the notes he refers to it as "On the Process of the Poetic 
Spirit. " 
24. Pfau, p. 83. FA. Vol. 14. p. 369. 
_25. 
This discussion of the relationship between the poetic modes and their 
components can also be linked to Hölderlin's complex theory of tones, whereby 
the structure of a poem is calculated using formulaic expressions which ensure 
that each of the modes contains the correct balance of component parts. The 
tabular structure is most clearly demonstrated in the fragment Löst sfch nicht 
die idealische Katastrophe... FA. Vol. 14. p. 170-1. 
26. FA. Vol. 14. p. 342. My translation. 
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27. This final letter of Volume One concludes with Hyperion and Diotima 
describing the beautiful future which lies in front of them, wherein "All shall 
be changed! From the root of humanity the new world shall spring! A new 
divinity shall rule over them, a new future brighten before them. " Hyperion is 
heralded as "the teacher of our people, a great man! " 
28. Hyperion. Santner, p. 76. FA. Vol. 11. p. 698. 
29. Ibid. 
30. The necessity of both the divine and nature's subjection to limitation 
creates the situation whereby the historical, temporal present becomes the site 
of mediation between spheres that had hitherto been kept rigidly separate. It is 
this point which has made several commentators link Hölderlin's discussion of 
the "one differentiating in itself" with Spinoza's pantheistic - as opposed to 
theodistic, hence transcendent - conception of God. Whilst it is clear that 
Hölderlin is influenced by the new, rediscovered philosophy of Spinoza - one of 
his earliest theoretical pieces is on Jacobi's letter Concerning the teachings of 
Spinoza - he does not subscribe fully to the Spinozist position that the terms 
God and Nature are interchangeable. (cf Spinoza Ethics Part IV. "For the 
eternal Being, which we call God or Nature... ") Rather it is necessary for 
Hölderlin's thought that the divine and nature delimit separate spheres. This is 
most clearly shown in some of the later poetry where nature and the divine can 
be seen to be in conflict with each other, eg Der Rhein. However these 
separate spheres are brought into relation with each other in the movement, 
process of the Absolute. 
31. StA. Vol. 6.1. p. 351. My translation. 
32. StA. Vol. 6.1. p. 290. My translation. 
33. The points made in this section can be summarised most clearly by the 
comments which Christoph Jamme makes in his article "Hegel and Hölderlin". 
- Jamme writes, "The question as to the sense of alienation (Entfremdung) was 
formulated theologically by Hölderlin as the question of the sense of creation 
as God's self-externalisation (Eni-äusserung), leads the friends [i. e. Hegel and 
Hölderlin] to an analysis of the tragic and of fate, to a connection of beauty 
and sacrifice. The analysis of "fate" serves to answer how reconciliation is 
even historically possible under the conditions of disunion... The finite becomes 
a necessary component of the Absolute; God must become time. .. The simultaneity 
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of revelation and concealment, which distinguishes Hölderlin's heretical concept 
of God and which asserts "that the divine, when it emerges, can never be 
without a certain sorrow and humility", lays the cornerstone for the Homburg 
theory of art. When the state of harmonious oneness strives for 
externalisation, man is the "voice" and "sign" of the divine. Spirit steps forth 
only in the sign. The Absolute must itself suffer internal division, must go out 
of itself in order to express itself, to become form. " (p. 368-9) "Hegel and 
Hölderlin" in Clio (1986, vol 15, pp. 359-377) 
34. Pfau, p. 84. FA. Vol. 14. P. 370. 
35. In an early text, dating from 1794-5, entitled Judgement and Being, 
Hölderlin has already questioned the efficacy of the Fichtean concept of 
intellectual intuition. In the second half of this short, but extremely dense 
fragment, Hölderlin directly addresses the problems which arise in the Fichtean 
system. He shows why he considers that the Fichtean conception of intellectual 
intuition falls short of allowing access to the original form of unity, "Being". 
Hölderlin gives his own definition of this "original unity" when he writes, 
"Being - expresses the connection between subject and object. Where subject and 
object are united absolutely, and not only in part... there and nowhere else can 
be spoken of Being proper as is the case with intellectual intuition. " He then 
argues that, 
this being must not be confused with identity. If I say: I am I, the 
subject ("I") and the object ("I") are not united in such a way that 
no separation could be performed without violating the essence of 
what is to be separated; on the contrary the I is only possible by 
means of this separation of the I from the I. How can I say "I" 
without self-consciousness? Yet how is self-consciousness possible? 
In opposing myself to myself, separating myself from myself, yet in 
recognizing myself as the same in the opposed regardless of this 
separation. Yet to what extent as the same? I can, I must ask in 
this manner; for in another respect it [the "I"] is opposed to itself. 
Hence identity is not a union of object and subject which simply 
occurred, hence identity is not = to absolute Being. 
Aber dieses Seyn muß nicht mit der Identität verwechselt werden. 
Wenn ich sage: Ich bin Ich, so ist das Subject (Ich) und das Object 
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(Ich) nicht so vereiniget, daß gar keine Trennung vorgenommen 
werden kann, ohne, das Wesen desjenigen, was getrennt werden soll, 
zu verlezen; im Gegenteil das Ich ist nur durch diese Trennung des 
Ichs vom Ichs möglich. Wie kann ich sagen: Ich! ohne 
Selbstbewußtseyn? Wie ist aber Selbstbewußtseyn möglich? Dadurch 
daß ich mich mir selbst entgegenseze, mich von mir selbst trenne, 
aber ungeachtet dieser Trennung mich im entgegensetzen als dasselbe 
erkenne. Aber in wieferne als dasselbe? Ich kann, ich muß so fragen; 
denn in einer andern Rücksicht ist es sich entgegensetzt. Also ist die 
Identität keine Vereinigung des Objects und Subjects, die schlechthin 
stattfände, also ist die Identität nicht = dem absolutem Seyn. (FA. 
Vol 17 p. 56 
In the first two sentences of this section Hölderlin establishes how and why 
his understanding of "Being" has to be differentiated from the Fichtean notion 
of Identity. His argument is based upon the premise that an inherent 
contradiction exists between the two concepts. For Hölderlin it is essential that 
"Being" is a unitary concept, it cannot be separated into component elements 
without intrinsic violence being done to the concept. However, Fichtean identity 
is based upon the possibility of the separation of the original identity. 
Therefore as Hölderlin moves on to explain, the Fichtean statement of Identity 
which founds the system - the "I am I" - can only function through a process 
of separation and differentiation. To establish the identity of the I it is 
necessary first to oppose oneself to oneself. thus creating the distinction and 
division into the component elements of subject and object. It is only through 
this movement that self-consciousness can occur. However it is at this stage of 
the argument that Hölderlin introduces another objection to the Fichtean project. 
Having rehearsed the moves which allow for the recognition of the self through 
the process of separation after asking the question "how is self-consciousness 
possible? ", he then questions the validity of the assumption that the I will 
automatically recognise itself through this division; i. e. how is the "I" able to 
recognise itself as itself. as the same, for as he then goes on to state "I can, 
I must ask in this manner: for in another respect it [the 11 is opposed to 
itself". What is at stake within this slightly tortuous argument is an attempt 
to challenge the automatic assumption that the dialectical schema which 
underlies and motivates the dynamics of the Fichtean system is capable of 
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guaranteeing the necessary status of the unity of the "I"; i. e. the crux of 
Hölderlin's argument lies in the weight and significance which is attributed to 
the way in which the word "as" operates when it is asked to what extent the I 
recognises itself as the same. In terms of a strict Fichtean analysis a problem 
does not exist with this question for it is assumed that the third term of the 
dialectic automatically comes into play moving the emphasis from the questioning 
of the "as" towards the immediate assumption that it is recognised as the 
same, thus denying the possibility of a disruption of the dialectic. However, 
Hölderlin suggests that there are two interrelated factors which challenge this 
presupposition. Firstly there is the fact that separation has occurred, "the I is 
opposed to itself", with nothing to preclude the possibility that all that can 
occur is a process of infinite separation, and the impossibility of ever achieving 
self-conciousness. This interpretation of the second to last sentence of the 
section can be substantiated further by comments which Hölderlin makes in a 
letter to Hegel which is contemporaneous with the composition of this text. Here 
Hölderlin questions how the Fichtean Absolute "I" can ever achieve self- 
consciousness if it by definition "contains all reality; it is everything and 
outside of it is nothing; hence there is no object for this "I", for otherwise 
not all reality would be within in it. " What ensues from these remarks and the 
arguments which follow is a questioning of the assumption that the Absolute 
would be capable of limiting itself in the manner suggested by Fichte, for 
Hölderlin assumes that by definition the Absolute cannot be restricted. 
Therefore according to this reasoning it is impossible for the necessary 
oppositions and restrictions to occur without either denying that the "I" is 
Absolute, or conversely accepting that the "I" is Absolute but concluding from 
this that no self-consciousness is conceivable. 
Having outlined his interpretation of the Fichtean understanding of self- 
consciousness, Hölderlin concludes by stating; "Hence identity is not a union of 
object and subject which simply occurred, hence identity is not = to absolute 
Being. " From this remark it is clear that Hölderlin considers that he has 
conclusively shown that the Fichtean concept of identity is not the same as his 
understanding of the term "Being". 
For further discussion of the details of this text see Manfred Frank's article 
"'Intellektuale Anschauung'. Drei Stellungnahmen zu einem Deutungsversuch von 
Selbstbewußtsein": Kant, Fichte, INölderlin/Notialis. " in Der Aktualität der 
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Friihromantik, Ed. Behler and Hörisch. See also Chapter 1 of Andrzej 
\Varminski's book Readings in Interpretation. 
36. Pfau, p. 62. FA. Vol. 14. p. 33. 
37. Hölderlin writes, "once he [i. e. the poet] has realised that a conflict is 
necessary between the most original postulate of the spirit which aims at the 
communality and unified simultaneity of all parts, and the other postulate which 
commands the spirit to move beyond itself and reproduce itself within itself and 
others through a beautiful progression and alternation... " "... wenn er 
eingesehen hat, daß ein nothwendiger Widerstreit entstehe zwischen der 
urspriinglichsten Forderung des Geistes, die auf Gemeinschaft und einiges 
Zugleichseyn aller Theile geht, und zwischen der anderen Forderung, welche ihm 
gebietet, aus sich heraus zu gehen, und in einem Schönem Fortschritt -und 
Wechsel sich in selbst und in anderen zu reproduciren... " (Pfau, p. 62. FA. Vol. 
14. p. 303. ) 
38. Jamme, C. Hegel and Hölderlin. in Clio (1986, Vol 15. ) p. 372. 
39. Pfau, p. 72. FA. Vol. 14 p. 312. 
40. Pfau, p. 77. FA. Vol. 14. p. 417. 
41. Pfau. pp. 85-6. FA. Vol. 14. p. 371. 
42. This version of the story is chronicled in Hesiod and Homer. However 
Hölderlin is also apparently conflating the Greek legend with the Roman version 
where Saturn is identified with Chronos and Jupiter with Zeus. In the Roman 
version, the reign of Saturn is seen as the Golden Age "in which men lived like 
gods and death was no more than sleep" (Dictionary of Mythology). Hence 
Zeus/Jupiter's overthrow of his father is seen as an act without motive, which 
offers another explanation as to why Hölderlin refers to the "necessary 
arbitrariness of Zeus". This interpretation is substantiated by the poem Nature 
and Art or Saturn and . Jupiter, which is contemporaneous with this text. In 
this poem Hölderlin describes Saturn as "guiltless" and identifies him with the 
Golden age which Jupiter destroys. This poem is important for the whole 
discussion of the relation between the Absolute and Man, for in it Hölderlin 
establishes the primacy of the reign of Saturn, arguing that Jupiter is 
responsible for the divisions and conflict which exist in the world, but also 
states that a relationship with this earlier time is still possible, for Saturn's 
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name is still remembered by the singer and hence the poets can still find ways 
through their art, of remembering and witnessing to the past time. 
43. Pfau, p. 86. FA. Vol. 14. p. 371. 
Chapter 4. 
1. At the end of the novel, Hyperion has been rejected by the Germans and is 
left totally isolated and is preparing to return alone to Greece. He recalls how 
he imitated Empedocles and went to the summit of Etna to contemplate his fate. 
He states "There I remembered the great Sicilian who, weary of counting the 
hours, knowing the soul of the world, in his bold joy in life there flung 
himself down into the glorious flames, for "the cold poet had to warm himself 
at the fire, " said someone later to mock him. 0 how gladly would I have taken 
such mockery on myself! " "Da fiel der große Sizilianer mir ein, der einst des 
Stundenzählens satt, vertraut mit der Seele der Welt, in seiner kiihnen 
Lehenslust sich da hinabwarf in die herrlichen Flammen, denn der kalte Dichter 
hätte müssen am Feuer sich wärmen, sagt' ein SFrotter ihm nach. 0 wie gerne 
hätt ich solchen Spott auf mich geladen! " (Hyperion p. 126, FA. Vol 11. p. 772. ) 
2. For a good introduction in English to the background to, and changes which 
occur in, Hölderlin's conception of the Empedocles project see M. B. Benn's 
introduction to Der Tod des Emnedokles (OUP, Oxford, 1968) As Benn states, 
the most radical changes occur between second and third drafts of the drama, 
where Hölderlin brings his plan more in accordance with the theoretical position 
which he has set out in the Ground and in Becoming in Dissolution. In the 
third version the characters are altered and the technique is much more 
rigorously classical both in terms of adhering to Greek dramatic conventions of 
time and space, and also in metre and line structure. 
3. Pfau. p. 50. F. A. Vol. 13 p. 868. 
4. Ibid. 
5. The linking of the 3 tragic forms - the ode, poem, and the dramatic-poem - 
with the three poetic modes - the lyric, the epic, and the tragic - may at 
first appear contradictory for it appears to be confusing the various categories. 
However, I think two explanations can be given which validate this 
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interpretation. First the Ground was written before the Poetic Modes essay and 
it is therefore not surprising to find Hölderlin using slightly different 
categorisations and names in the two texts. Secondly it must also be 
remembered that the names "tragic" "heroic" etc do not just denote one type of 
mode, but also constitute one of the characteristics of the modes themselves. 
Hence it is legitimate to state that there can be a "tragic ode" or "tragic 
poem", for the use of term tragic in these categories refers to a characteristic 
of the mode, not to a type of mode itself. 
6. Pfau. p. 51. F. A. Vol. 13. p. 869. 
7. Pfau. p. 52. F. A. Vol. 13. p. 869. 
8. In the Physics at 199a Aristotle states that "... Thus if a house were one of 
the things which come to be due to nature, it would come to be just as it now 
does by the agency of art; and if things which were due to nature came to be 
not only due to nature but also due to art, they would come to be just as 
they are by nature. In general, art either imitates the works of nature or 
completes that which nature is unable to bring to completion. If, then, that 
which is in accordance with art is for something, clearly so is that which is in 
accordance with nature. " (ed. Ackrill, New Aristotle Reader. p. 107) 
9. Pfau. p. 53. F. A. Vol. 13. p. 871. 
10. Hölderlin uses the terms "organic" and "aorgic" which appear in this 
quotation in a very specific, yet idiosyncratic way. Pfau explains the difference 
between the two terms in the notes to his translation, arguing, "... Hölderlin's 
"organic" implies not a natural organism or the like, but designates the 
organised, reflected principle of the spirit and of art. Similarly the term 
"aorgic" does not refer to the merely lifeless but designates... the unreflexive, 
unrepresented disorganising manifestation of nature. " (Pfau. p, 168) 
11. Hölderlin's exact understanding of the function of Bildung is discussed in 
much greater depth in the second section of the chapter Hölderlin and Greece., 
suffice to say that is not simply to be equated with either "education" or 
"formation" but rather to an active process which combines all these 
connotations of the word. 
12. Pfau. p. 53-4. F. A. Vol. 13. p. 371. 
13. Pfau. p. 54. F. A. Vol. 13. p. 872. 
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14. Pfau. p. 56. F. A. Vol. 13. p. 873. 
15. Pfau. p. 57. F. A. Vol. 13. p. 874. 
16. Hölderlin gives examples of three specific, potentially contradictory facets 
of Empedocles character, which the drama could highlight. He states that he 
lives in an "independent" situation, "1/ generally as feeling man, 2/ as 
philosopher and poet, 3/ as a solitary man tending to his gardens. " However as 
Hölderlin then argues, none of these would make him a specifically dramatic 
character. Therefore he must be seen in relation to "a particular situation and 
with most specific motivation and task". Hence he has to be shown in his own 
particular battle with the universal. He must be engaged against the specific 
demands of fate and necessity. It is Empedocles' own singular desire to 
transcend the particular, to become immortal which then becomes the focus of 
the drama, and which Hölderlin uses to exemplify his wider theoretical position. 
17. It is for this reason that Becoming in Dissolution is one of the most 
difficult texts to interpret. The draft exists only in a very fragmented form 
and contains many revisions and corrections, which are often overwritten. Also 
the text is given different titles by different editors; Beißner refers to it as 
Werden im Vergehen whilst Sattler in the later Kritische Ausgabe names it Das 
untergehende Vaterland. For the problems in dating the text, see Sattler's 
introductory remarks p. 81, vol 14 Kritische Ausgabe. 
18. Pfau. p. 96. F. A. Vol. 14. p. 174. 
19. This point can be related to the earlier discussion on the function of 
metaphor in the essay On the Difference of the Poetic modes. In both instances, 
Hölderlin chooses to discuss the relation of the Absolute to the finite, to man, 
in terms of grammatical and linguistic structures. Hence the relationship which 
is suggested is always one that is mediated through language. This 
acknowledgement of the medium by which, and through which, philosophical 
thought is transmitted again separates Hölderlin from other contemporary 
thinkers, in particular Hegel. 
20. Pfau. p. 96. F. A. Vol. 14. p. 174. 
21. These ideas were discussed in depth in Chapter 3. The motif of the new 
emerging through the decline of the old is one that is established in the first 
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of the drafts for Hyperion and remains present throughout Hölderlin's 
theoretical writings up to and including the texts dating from 1800. 
22. Pfau. p. 97. F. A. Vol. 14. p. 174. 
23. This fragment of the text is one that is most corrupt and difficult to 
decipher. Consequently Beißner and Sattler render the line totally differently 
and in such a way th at their readings contradict one another. The reason for 
the discrepancies lies in the fact that they disagree over how to interpret the 
sign "o", which occurs in the text after the word "reales". Beißner ignores the 
sign totally rendering the sentence as "da hingegen die Auflösung an sich, ein 
Bestehendes selber wirklicher scheint und reales oder das sich Auflösende", 
thereby apparently suggesting that what actually appears is understood to be 
"real" or the "self dissolving". This reading is apparently achieved by 
interpreting the sign "ö" as the letter "o" and inferring that it must stand for 
"oder". However Sattler in the Lineare Textdarstellung p. 94,1.96 comments, 
"Zur Auff6sung des Zeichens ö vgl. in diesem Fragmentischer philsophischer 
Briefe, 1.80 und die inhaltliche Parallele 1.247. " When these two instances are 
compared and the remark read in relation to the rest of the text, it appears 
probable that Sattler's reading is the more accurate. This is confirmed 
particularly by the fact that the charact eristics that are attributed later to 
the "actual dissolution" include the statement that it appears as "reales 
nichts". As Hölderlin is discussing the "actual dissolution" at this point, 
Sattler's interpretation of the sign as denoting "Nichts" seems to be most 
accurate and creates the most coherent reading. 
24. For the English reader who first approaches this text in translation, the 
problems that exist with it are compounded further by the fact that Pfau's 
translation is in places totally inaccurate. Pfau bases his translation upon the 
Stuttgart edition and some deviances from the Frankfurt edition are therefore 
to be expected. However, in some places the translation is wrong when compared 
with both editor's versions. This is particularly true of the long paragraph 
beginning on p. 99 of the translation "Finally the idealistic dissolution.. ", p. 
176, line. 249 onwards in the FA, Kritische Ausgabe. In this paragraph Pfau 
wrongly attributes the terms "jene" and "diese" getting them totally round the 
wrong way. Therefore the first line should read "Finally the idealistic 
dissolution differs from the so called real one (since the former [not "latter" 
as Pfau states] moves in reverse, from the infinite to the finite... ) This mistake 
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is repeated 10 lines later in the paragraph, when the terms latter and former 
are again swapped round. In the original the passage states "also die idealische 
Auflösung unterscheidet sich von der sogenannt wirklichen endlich dadurch, daß 
diese ein reales Nichts zu seyn scheint, jene, weil sie ein Werden des ideal 
individuellen zum Unendlichreallen, und des unendlichrealen zum individuell 
idealen ist, in eben dem Grade an Gehalt und Harmonie gewinnt, jemehre sie 
gedacht wird als Übergang aus Bestehendem ins Bestehende... "(FA. p. 176) Pfau 
translates the passage as "the idealistic dissolution, then, finally differs from 
the so-called real one is [sic] that the former appears to be a real nothing 
while the latter, because it is a development from the real-individual to the 
infinite-real and from the infinite real to the ideal individual, gains substance 
and harmony the more it is thought of as a transition from existence to 
existence... " A more accurate translation of the passage would be "thus the 
idealistic dissolution finally is distinguished from the so-called actual 
dissolution, understood in that the so-called actual dissolution appears to be a 
real nothing, and the ideal dissolution - because it is a becoming of what is 
ideally individual into what is infinitely real, and of what is infinitely-real 
individually ideal - gains in content and harmony in precisely the degree to 
which it is thought of as a transition from one existing thing to another. " 
The effect of this mistranslation is to attribute the characteristics of actual 
dissolution to the idealistic dissolution and vice versa thereby making the 
passage appear to contradict all that has been stated previously in the text. 
25. Pfau. p. 97. F. A. Vol. 14. p. 175. 
26. Ibid. 
27. This can be related back to the discussion in the third section of Chapter 
One. 
28. Pfau. p. 100. F. A. Vol. 14. p. 177. 
29. Hölderlin continues this passage by stating "The new individual now strives 
to isolate itself from infinity precisely to the extent that from the second 
perspective the isolated, individual-old strives to universalise and dissolve itself 
into the infinite sentiment of existence. "(p. 100) 
30. This does not mean that the term "work" is here being employed in the 
same sense as it used by the Jena Romantics, whereby the term "work" still 
refers in some sense to the actual work of art. Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe 
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clarify this point in Chapter One of The Literary Absolute, when they identify 
Hölderlin with the Romantics by referring to their common understanding of the 
relationship to infinity - the "asymptotic relation" that is suggested in the 
letter to Schelling of Dec 1795. However, they distinguish Hölderlin from the 
Romantics with respect to the question of the status of the "work". Lacoue- 
Labarthe and Nancy write, "Yet unlike Hölderlin, and much closer to idealism, 
the romantics simultaneously postulate the motifs of a present, accomplished 
infinite in a work that the logic of the fragment stubbornly summarises within 
the contours of its ideal, and as a corollary to this, the potential infinite in 
itself as the actuality of the work" p. 48. 
31. This idea is also suggested briefly in the latter section of the Operations 
essay where Hölderlin states, "Just as cognition intuits language, so does 
language remember cognition". (p. 79) ("So wie die Erkenntniß die Sprache ahndet, 
so erinnert sich die Sprache der Erkenntniß" p. 158) Here, the idea that there is 
an intrinsic relationship between the act of recollection and cognition/knowledge 
can again be found. The relation between knowledge and the language in which 
this knowledge is expressed, understood, is premised upon the primacy of the 
act of recollection. It is through the "recollection" of the "cognition" that the 
"I" is constructed. 
32. See the letter to Schelling of December 10th 1795, quoted in section 1. 
33. For example the later poems such as Andenken and Mnemsoyne which deal 
specifically with the status and reliability of memory and recollection. 
Chatter 5. 
1/ The majority of the translation was completed between 1800 and 1802. 
However prior to this, Hölderlin is displaying an increasing interest in the 
works of Sophocles. He commenced translating Antigone after the the Empedocles 
project was abandoned. This draft was subsequently left and Hölderlin's 
attention turned to the translation of Oedipus. The bulk of this was translated 
in 1801, and then he returned to the Antigone translation. It is clear that 
Hölderlin had intended to also provide translations of Oedipus at Colonus and 
Ajax, although only brief fragments of these works survive. For a more 
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detailed outline of the process of composition see Beißner's commentary on the 
translations in StA. Vol. 5 p. 451. 
2/ These translations of Pindar are important because Hölderlin employs 
principles which are similar to those involved in the Sophocles translations. 
However detailed consideration of these texts is necessarily outside the scope - 
and competence - of this study. For an introduction in English to these texts 
see chapter VII of R. B Harrison's comprehensive study, Hölderlin and Greek 
Literature. 
3/ The scale of Hölderlin's productivity during this short period of time cannot 
be overstated. Not only was he engaged in the translation projects, but also he 
was drafting some of the greatest of the Hymns and Elegies; e. g. Germanien 
and Der Rhein and also Dichterberuf and Brod und Wein were all written 
between late 1800 and summer 1801. 
4/ From comments which Hölderlin makes in letters to his publisher, Wilmans, 
it is clear that the Remarks are not the full scale introduction to the 
translations which he had planned. In fact in a letter dated 8th December 1803, 
he makes clear that he considers the Remarks do not "sufficiently" outline his 
"conviction regarding Greek art and the "meaning of the plays". However, 
despite at least two written declarations of the imminent appearance of the full 
scale introduction to the translations it never materialised. The translations 
were eventually first published by Wilmans in 1804 with the Remarks appended. 
5/ Benjamin, W. "The Task of the Translator" in Illuminations p. 80-1. 
6/ Hölderlin, F. StA. Vol 6,1. p. 434. My translation. 
7/ The history of the critical reception of Hölderlin's translations is varied in 
the extreme. When they first appeared they were universally criticised not only 
in reviews, but also by people whom Hölderlin considered his friends and 
acquaintances. One of the most damning examples of this criticism are the 
remarks made by Voß, -a contemporary of Hölderlin's, whose father had 
translated and edited an earlier edition of Sophocles' tragedies - as David 
Constantine relates in his biography of Hölderlin. VoB states "What do you say 
to Hölderlin's Sophocles? Is the man mad, or only pretending to be, and is his 
Sophocles a covert satire against bad translators? The other evening when I 
was at Goethe's with Schiller I amused them both mightily with it. Try 
reading the fourth chorus in the Antigone. You should have seen Schiller 
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laugh.. "(Constantine, Hölderlin. p271/381. ) However, the translations. have 
subsequently been re-evaluated and now they are seen to offer a unique, if 
provocative interpretation of Sophocles' dramas. For an outline of the critical 
reception of Hölderlin's later work - including the translations - see Otto 
Pöggeler's article "Die Engen Schranken unserer noch Kinderähnlichen Kultur" in 
Jenseits des Idealismus. Ed. Jamme and Pöggeler. For a discussion in English 
see Jeremy Adler's introduction to his translations of the Remarks in 
Comparative Criticism 5. (1983) pp. 205-44. 
8. Benjamin takes this example from a quotation from Rudolf Pannwitz, whose 
work he considers to be "the best comment on the theory of translation that 
has been published in Germany. " Benjamin quotes the following statement of 
Pannwitz from Die Krisis der Europäischen Kultur, to substantiate his own 
theory. Pannwitz writes, "Our translations, even the best ones, proceed from a 
wrong premise. They want to turn Hindi, Greek, English into German instead of 
turning German into Hindi, Greek, English.. . The basic error of the translator is 
that he preserves the state in which his own language happens to be instead of 
allowing his language to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue.. die must 
expand and deepen his own language by means of the foreign language. " 
(Illuminations. p. 80-1) 
9. Ricoeur, P. Time and Narrative. p. 35. 
10. For example, in his article "Poetische Logik: Zu IEölderlin's "Anmerkungen 
zu Oedipus" und "Antigonel"I in Jenseits des Idealismus, Gerhard Kurz states 
"Die Anmerkungen sind jeweils gleich aufgebaut: Im ersten Teil wird die 
Bedeutung des "allgemeinen Kalküls" für die Poese überhaupt und für die 
Tragödie im Besonderen herausgestellt, im zweiten Teil wird die Tragödie 
interpretiert, an zentralen Reden, und im dritten Teil wird die Tragödie als 
Gattung interpretiert. " (p. 83. ) 
II.. Hölderlin, F. Remarks on Oedipus. Pfau, p. 101. FA. Vol. 16, p. 249. 
12. For example, Hölderlin's discussion of the positioning of the caesura and the 
necessity of achieving internal balance in the tragic form can be linked to 
Aristotle's insistence that the tragedy should contain the necessary unities of 
time and place, and that there should always be a discernible moment of 
peripeteia, around which the action is constructed. Hölderlin's analysis differs 
from Aristotle's insofar as he never specifically discusses the relationship 
-270- 
between the tragedy and the observer in terms of the cathartic effect of the 
performance. However it could be argued that Hölderlin does consider this 
relationship implicitly through the way in which the translation must modify 
the drama so that it can reflect the contemporary world-view. In so doing he 
gives the tragedy relevance for his own time thus allowing for the possibility 
that the contemporary observer can undergo a cathartic experience when they 
observe the dramatic performance. (This possibility is, of course, dependent upon 
a certain understanding and interpretation of Aristotle's use of catharsis. I am 
aware that some commentators - in particular G. Else - argue that catharsis is 
not to be understood as referring to an experience which the spectator 
undergoes, but rather is a process which is internal and integral to the 
structure of the drama. ). 
13. Hölderlin, F. Remarks on Oedipus. Pfau, p. 101-2. FA, Vol 16, p. 250. 
Translation modified. In particular I have altered Pfau's translation of the 
expression "der Vorstellung selber" from "the representation itself" to 
"representation itself". In this context, I think Hölderlin is not referring to a 
specific instance in the process of the presentation of the drama, but rather is 
making a statement concerning the nature of dramatic representation itself. 
14. Ricoeur, P. Time and Narrative. p. 34. 
15. Hölderlin, F. Remarks on Oedipus. Pfau, p. 102. FA, Vol. 16, p. 251. 
16. See for example, David Constantine's comments on the Remarks in his study 
Hölderlin. He describes the texts as "fascinating, but often, especially those on 
Antigone, quite opaque or idiosyncratic to an unfathomable degree, and it is not 
advisable to labour over them for too long" (p. 294) Whilst in defence it could 
be argued that it is not Constantine's intention to provide a detailed analysis of 
these texts, I think it is unnecessary to dismiss them in such a cavalier 
fashion. A more considered approach is shown by Klaus-Rüdiger Wöhrmann in 
his book Hölderlins Wille zur Tra-a6die. Wöhrmann provides a detailed analysis 
of Hölderlin's use of the term "intellectual intuition" tracing the way in which 
the term is developed throughout the earlier texts. However, he only refers to 
the Sophocles translations in the final three pages of the book, warning against 
basing one's understanding of Hölderlin's work primarily on these later texts. 
He argues that the later work is to be read as a symptom of the failure of 
Hölderlin's earlier project rather than seeing it as its logical conclusion. 
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However, at the same time as warning against spending too much time trying to 
unravel "die Schwerverständlichkeit der Anmerkungen", he also argues - 
correctly I think - that the later texts can only be understood in relation to 
the earlier work. He states that a "lopsided" interpretation is gained if one 
concentrates solely on celebrating their "madness", rather than seeing them as 
the culmination of Hölderlin's "theoretical" interests. (See Wöhrmann pp. 164-6. ) 
However, even this more considered analysis suggests that the Remarks belong 
"... im Dunkel der späten Deutung" thus indicating that they merit less serious 
consideration. 
17. The dating of this text is problematic. Beißner dates it as originating from 
the Homburg period (i. e. 1798-9) but Sattler dates it at least two years later 
making it contemporaneous with the Sophocles' translations. Sattler is able to 
substantiate this dating using various forms of evidence. For example he argues 
that the paper on which it is written corresponds to the type which Hölderlin 
was using for the Sophocles translations and some of the language which is 
used e. g the term "Lebenslicht" first appears in other writing which dates from 
this period. Therefore it is now generally accepted that the text dates from the 
later period approximately from 1801-2. For further discussion of the problem 
of dating this text see FA, Vol. 14 p. 379. 
18. Hölderlin, F. The Significance of Tragedies. Pfau, p. 89. FA, Vol. 14, p. 
383. Translation substantially modified. 
19. Hölderlin, F. The Remarks on Oedipus. Pfau, p. 107. FA, Vol. 16, p. 257. 
Translation substantially modified. 
20. Some commentators interpret the term "das Ungeheure" as referring to the 
actual persons involved in the tragedy. That is, through her transgression of 
the laws of the state Antigone becomes "das Ungeheure". In the eyes of the 
state she is a "monstrosity", an "aberration". However, I think that this 
interpretation does not take enough consideration of the process of 
transgression. It is not the individuals themselves who are to be seen as "das 
Ungeheure" - in a sense it could be argued that the tragic process destroys 
any notion of "individuality" - but the process in which they are caught up. 
21. Etymology taken from Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary p. 433. 
22. As R. B Harrison points out in his book Hölderlin and Greek Literature. p. 
169-70, the term "der Zorn" appears throughout both Hölderlin's later poetry 
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and theoretical writings. It not only signifies the conflict and struggle between 
man and God but also contains the connotation of being "divinely possessed". In 
entering into a relationship with the God, man loses any sense of self-identity; 
he is consumed by the proximity of the God. 
23. In his discussion of Hölderlin's Sophocles translations in his book 
Antigones, George Steiner translates the term nefes, crime or transgression as 
"enormity". Referring to Oedipus' insistence that the identity of Laius' killer 
must be established and punished Steiner writes "In so doing, Oedipus succumbs 
to the temptations of nefas. The term signifies "enormity" more exactly, an 
enormity sprung from opposition to the Gods, from some violence done to 
natural destiny. Hölderlin would have known the term from Virgil and from 
Lucretius, in whom it is specifically associated with the world of the Furies. " 
(p. 78. ) These statements support my translation of das Ungeheure as enormity, 
for the moment of nefas, the overstepping of the limit, is the moment of the 
meeting of man and God. 
24. Hölderlin, F. The Remarks on Oedipus. Pfau, p. 104. FA, Vol. 16, p. 253. 
25. Hölderlin, F. The Remarks on Oedipus. Pfau, p. 107-8. FA, Vol. 16, p. 257- 
8. Here I have modified Pfau's translation substantially because in places it is 
both inaccurate and inconsistent. In particular, Pfau is not consistent in his 
translation of the term "Untreu". In the first paragraph of this passage he 
renders the term as "infidelity", whilst in the third paragraph he uses 
"unfaithful". This means that the relationship between the processes described 
in both paragraphs is not shown. In the second paragraph, Pfau translates the 
phrase "In der äußersten Gr inze des Leidens" as "in the utmost form of 
suffering". In translating "Granze" as "form" rather than "limit", Pfau fails 
to pick up on the relationship between this process and the process which is 
described earlier when the "man and God mate". In both instances, this process 
takes place at the "limits". Also Pfau does not show clearly how the second 
paragraph is related to the third. In Pfau's translation it is difficult to 
ascertain what the word "it" with which the third paragraph commences, refers 
back to. 
26. Kant makes this point clear in the introductory section of the 
"Transcendental Logic" in The Critique of Pure Reason. Here he provides the 
well known formulation "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
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concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts 
sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our 
intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers 
or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit 
nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge 
arise. "(p. 93) Time can only he understood in relation to the categories, 
likewise as is stated later, man can only have knowledge through the 
representation of himself in the categories. 
27. See Section 25 of "Transcendental Deduction B. " in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Here Kant states, "... In order to know ourselves, there is required in 
addition to the act of thought, which brings the manifold of every possible 
intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate mode of intuition, whereby 
this manifold is given; it therefore follows that although my existence is not 
indeed appearance (still less illusion) the determination of my existence can take 
place only in conformity with the form of inner sense, according to the special 
mode in which the manifold, which I combine is given in inner intuition. 
Accordingly I have no knowledge of my self as I am but merely as I appear to 
myself. " (p. 168-9) my emphasis. 
28. See Kant's statement at the end of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, "... such intellectual intuition [i. e. intuitus originarius 
not intuitus derivatives] seems to belong solely to to the primordial being, and 
can never be ascribed to a dependent being, dependent in its existence as well 
as in its intuition, and which through that intuition determines its existence 
solely in relation to given objects. " (p. 90) 
29. See Kant's discussion of the ideas of God, Freedom and immortality in "The 
Canon of Pure Reason. " in Critique of Pure Reason. p. 630-4. 
30. In his analysis of the Remarks in The Caesura of the Speculative and in 
Chapter 5 of Heidegger. Art and Politics, Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe tends to 
equate the moment of the caesura with the moment of categorical reversal, 
thereby turning the caesura into a conceptual term which describes the moment 
of the recognition of finitude. In the latter text, after giving a brilliantly 
succinct summary of the Kantian basis of Hölderlin's thought, Lacoue-Labarthe 
writes "... it is not perhaps impossible to raise the caesura to the rank of a 
concept, if not the concept. of historicity. A caesura would be that which, 
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within history, interrupts history and opens up another possibility of history, 
or else closes off all possibility of history. " (p. 45) Whilst objections to the 
elevation of the figure of the caesura to a concept cannot be sustained on 
technical grounds, I think that this move is problematic insofar as it reduces 
Hölderlin's discussion of the tragic process to this one concept. In so doing he 
ignores many of the statements that are made in the Remarks on Antigone 
concerning the way in which the work must be applicable to the time in which 
it is conceived. Thus, although it may be appropriate for Hölderlin to focus his 
discussion of the structure of the tragedy round the "meeting of man and God" 
it must be remembered that this is appropriate only for his own time. In 
elevating his analysis of the caesura to the rank of a concept, Lacoue-Labarthe 
is in danger of making the concept ahistorical. That is, in becoming the concept 
which governs the understanding of historicity, the caesura may no longer be 
relevant to the process which it is supposed to describe. It is for this reason 
that I am wary of the attempts to simply reduce all of Hölderlin's analysis of 
the tragic process to the moment of the caesura. The caesura has a meaning 
only in relation to the wider processes of which it forms a part. 
31. Hölderlin, F. "Brod und Wein" stanza seven. Poems. p. 248-9. 
"But, my friend, we have come too late. Though the gods are living, 
Over our heads they live, up in a different world. 
Endlessly there they act and, such is their kind wish to spare us, 
Little they seem to care whether we live or do not. 
For not always a frail, a delicate vessel can hold them, 
Only at times can our kind bear the Gods. 
Aber Freund, wir kommen zu spät. Zwar leben die Götter, 
Aber über dem Haupt droben in anderer Welt. 
Endlos wirken sie da und scheinens wenig zu achten, 
Ob wir leben, so sehr schonen die Himmlischen uns. 
Denn nicht immer vermag ein schwaches Gefäß sie zu fassen, 
Nur zu Zeiten erträgt göttliche Fülle der Mensch. 
32. For example, in the last stanza of the poem "Voice of the People", 
Hölderlin writes, 
"So their descendants heard, and no doubt such lore 
Is good, because it serves to remind us of 
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The Highest; yet there's also need of 
One to interpret these holy legends. " 
"So hatten es die Kinder gehört, und wohl 
Sind gut die Sagen, denn ein Gedächtniß sind 
Dem Höchsten sie, doch auch bedarf es 
Eines, die heiligen auszulegen. " (Poems p. 182-3. ) 
Also in the elegy "The Archipelago", Hölderlin states, 
"... Always, as heroes need garlands, the hallowed elements likewise 
Need the hearts of us men to feel and mirror their glory. " 
"... Immer bedürfen ja, wie Heroen den Kranz, die geweihten 
Elemente zum Ruhme das Herz der fühlenden Menschen. " (Poems p. 214-5) 
Both these poems emphasise the reciprocal relationship between humanity and the 
Gods. The Gods need the poets to remember and recount the stories of the past 
in order to give them a position and value in the present. The poet acts as the 
"interpreter" of the Gods, his or her "reinterpretation" allows the relationship 
between man and god to be given a relevance for the present. 
33. Hölderlin, F. Remarks on Antigone., Pfau, p. 113. FA, Vol. 16, p. 417. 
Translation Modified. 
34. This discussion of the "word" can be related to the statements I made 
concerning the function of the Caesura in section 5: 2. The moment at which the 
"word" seizes the protagonist can be understood as the moment of peripeteia, 
the point at which the action reverses, sealing the fate of the hero. 
35. Hölderlin, F. Remarks on Antigone. Pfau, p. 113, FA, Vol. 16, p. 418. 
Translation modified. 
36. For example, in his comments on the Remarks on Antigone Gerhard Kurz 
writes, "In den Anmerkungen zur Antigonae bevorzugt Hölderlin die Vokabel "das 
reine Wort", synonym mit "Geist" oder "das Unendliche". Die Veränderung von 
"Vorstellung selber" zum "Wort", das den Menschen ergreift, deutet auf den 
geschichtsphilosophischen Index, den Hülderlin dieser Tragödie zuteilt: Antigone 
ist stärker als Ödipus die Tragödie des Übergangs von der griechischen zur 
christlichen Welt. Das "Wort" bezieht sich auf das griechische logos schon in 
seiner christlichen Bedeutung: das "Wort Gottes"..., das in der Welt Fleisch 
"Leib" ("Poetische Logik" in Jenseits des Idealismus p. 100-1) See also the final 
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section of Meta Corssen's article "Die Tragödie als Begegnung zwischen Gott 
und Mensch" in Hölderlin-Jahrbuch Vol 3. pp. 139-87, especially pp. 180-7. 
37. This is exemplified best by poems such as Patmos and The Only One. In the 
latter poem Hölderlin attempts to mediate and forge a relationship between the 
ancient Gods and the Christian God, so as to allow himself better to 
understand his own time. This poem also demonstrates Hölderlin's problematic 
relationship with Christianity. 
38. On first reading it appears strange that Hölderlin changes the term Zeus to 
"Father of time" because, as I argued in Chapter 3, in mythology Zeus is the 
son of Chronos who is traditionally thought of as the God of time. However, in 
this context, I think Hölderlin is using the phrase in a metaphoric rather than 
literal sense, and is referring to the way in which Zeus' killing of Chronos 
divides the unity of heaven and earth thus instituting finitude and temporality. 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that Hölderlin is explaining the changes 
that must be made to the text in order to "bring it closer to the modes of 
representation of our time". Hence the term "Zeus" cannot remain because it 
originates from a time in which the Gods had a more intimate relationship with 
man. However the mythology of Hölderlin's era lacks this form of intimate 
relationship - God can only communicate through his "unfaithfulness" - that is 
he can only be manifest through the finite, through what he is not. Therefore 
man's relation to the Gods can only occur in and through time, and the term 
"father of time" reflects this relationship more accurately. 
39. Throughout the analysis of this text I have decided not to translate the 
term "vaterlandisch" so as to allow it to retain the resonances which it 
contains in German. This is because the term does not correspond completely to 
any of the English equivalents such as "national" or "patriotic". The closest 
equivalent in English would be the slightly clumsy neologism "fatherlandish". 
Furthermore, in other places Höiderlin uses terms which can be more 
specifically translated as "national" or "patriotic". For example, in the latter 
half of the final section of the Remarks on Antigone, Hölderlin specifically uses 
the term "patriotische", and in the first letter to Böhlendorff he refers to the 
"free use of the national", "das Nationelle frei gebrauchen"(StA. Vol 6.1. 
p. 425) Both these examples suggest that Hölderlin wants to establish a 
distinction between "vaterländisch" forms of art and the wider terms "des 
Nationelle" and "patriotische". I think it could suggested that the 
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"vaterländisch" forms of art are not necessarily identical to that which is 
accepted as "das Nationelle". 
40. Hölderlin, F. Remarks on Antigone. Pfau, p. 114. FA, Vol 16. p. 418. 
Translation modified. 
41. The Greek term which Hölderlin uses along with the term "das 
Schiksaallose" is "dysmoron" (Suaµopov) which can be translated as misfortune 
or bad fate. However this does not quite capture the full meaning of Hölderlin's 
use of the term. During a course of lectures on Hölderlin at the Collegium 
Phaenomenologicum in Perugia, August 1991, Francoise Dastur offered the 
following interpretation of the phrase, which is I think, much more provocative 
and pertinent to the argument I am advancing. She suggested that the term 
dysmoron could be understood as deriving from the idea of the "absence of 
moira", that is to the removal, displacement of fate. The Fates - that is the 
Moraea in Greek mythology - are not performing their duties properly. In a 
certain sense in the modern world, they are "dys"functional, their ability to 
influence the lives of mortals is impaired. 
42. This point arises out of the earlier discussion of the need to choose 
suitable "analogical subject matter" for the drama, so as to allow the concerns 
of the present to be presented successfully. For further elaboration see the 
longer discussion in section one of this chapter. 
43. This form of interpretation which links the translations of Sophocles with 
the later hymns was prevalent throughout the 1920's and 30's. In Nazi Germany 
Hölderlin was seen as the poet of the German nation, whose writings supported 
the nationalistic cause. Whilst it is impossible to deny that one of the most 
prevalent themes in Hölderlin's work is his desire to understand the spirit of 
his country, it must be understood that the relation between the poet and his 
country is complicated. As I hope I have shown in the course of this study, 
iiölderlin is not celebrating the glories of the German state, rather he is 
suggesting that the relationship between an individual and their own time is 
necessarily problematic. The poet's role is not to reflect the glories of their 
society but rather to offer critical comment and analysis. 
44. Hölderlin, F. Remarks on Antigone. Pfau, p. 116. FA, Vol. 16, p. 421. 
Translation modified. 
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45. See the discussion of this text in Chapter Three, section 1. 
46. Hölderlin, F. Remarks on Antigone. Pfau, p. 116. FA, Vol. 16. p. 418. 
Translation modified. 
47. Hölderlin, F. Bread and Wine. For details and further discussion see note 
31. 
48. This statement is taken from section two of the Remarks on Antigone where 
Hölderlin, after quoting Antigone's reply to Kreon's accusation that she is 
adhering to a custom and set of rules which is evil, comments "The amiable, 
the understanding in misfortune. The dreaming naive. The true language of 
Sophocles, since Aeschylus and Euripides know more how to depict suffering and 
wrath, yet less how to depict man's understanding as wandering below the 
unthinkable. " (Pfau p. 110. ) ("Das Liebenswürdige, Verständige im Unglük. Das 
Träumerischnaive. Eigentliche Sprache des Sophokles, da Aeschylus und Euripides 
mehr das Leiden und den Zorn, weniger aber des Menschen Verstand, als unter 
Undenkbarem wandelnd, zu objectiviren wissen. " FA, Vol. 16. p. 413. ) 
49. Hölderlin, F. Translation Bahti, T. StA, Vol 6.1. p. 427. 
50. As Hölderlin writes at the end of stanza seven of Bread and Wine. 
"... But meanwhile too often I think it's 
Better to sleep than to be friendless as we are, alone, 
Always waiting, and what to do or say in the meantime 
I don't know, and who wants poets at all in lean years?.. " 
"... Indessen dünket mir öfters 
Besser zu schlaffen, wie ohne Genossen zu seyn, 
So zu harren und was zu thun indeß und zu sagen, 
Weiß ich nicht und wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit?... " 
(Poems. p. 250-1. ) 
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Conclusion. 
1. Lacoue-Labarthe writes in the concluding paragraph to his paper "Hölderlin 
and the Greeks": "Greek art is inimitable because it is an art and because the 
sobriety that it indicates to us is, or should be, nature for us. Our nature 
(sobriety) can no more take its bearing from their culture than our culture 
(sacred pathos) can take its bearing from their nature - which was never 
carried into effect. 
In the chiasmic structure that shapes history, then, there is no longer any 
place, anywhere, for an "imitation of Antiquity" "It is probably not allowed 
for us" says the first letter to Böhlendorff, "to have with the Greeks anything 
identical". 
Greece will have been, for Hölderlin, this inimitable. Not from an excess of 
grandeur - but from a lack of proper being. It will have been therefore, this 
vertiginous threat: a people, a culture, constantly showing itself as inaccessible 
to itself. The tragic as such, if it is true that the tragic begins with the ruin 
of the imitable and the disappearance of models. " in Typographies. p. 247. 
2. Lyotard. "Rewriting Modernity" in The Inhuman. p. 25. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Hyperion, Santner, p. 126. FA. Vol. 11. p. 772. 
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